MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE
TO EVIDENCE

2014 Edition

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE LAW
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

The Supreme Judicial Court recommends the use of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. Our recommendation of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence is not to be interpreted as an adoption of a set of rules of evidence, nor a predictive guide to the development of the common law of evidence. The purpose of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence is to make the law of evidence more accessible and understandable to the bench, bar, and public. We encourage all interested persons to use the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence.

Chief Justice Roderick L. Ireland
Justice Francis X. Spina
Justice Robert J. Cordy
Justice Margot Botsford
Justice Ralph D. Gants
Justice Fernande R.V. Duffy
Justice Barbara A. Lenk

January 2014
PREFACE

In June 2006, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, at the request of the Massachusetts Bar Association, the Boston Bar Association, and the Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, created the Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law to prepare a Guide to the Massachusetts law of evidence. The Justices charged the Committee with the mandate “to assemble the current law in one easily usable document, along the lines of the Federal Rules of Evidence, rather than to prepare a Restatement or to propose changes in the existing law of evidence.” As Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall stated in her March 2006 address to the Massachusetts Bar Association, “[t]he Advisory Committee will compile a Guide to Massachusetts evidence law as it currently exists, replete with case law and reporters’ notes. The Guide will make our rules of evidence more accessible to bench, bar, and the public. It will improve the understanding, teaching, and presentation of Massachusetts evidence. It will advance the delivery of justice.”

The *Massachusetts Guide to Evidence* organizes and states the law of evidence applied in proceedings in the courts of the Commonwealth, as set forth in the Federal and State Constitutions, General Laws, common law, and rules of court. The Committee invites comments and suggestions on the Guide.

The Guide is organized into “Sections” using the format of the Federal Rules of Evidence insofar as the Federal rules comport with Massachusetts law and practice. Some sections are different from the Federal rules. For instance, Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs the law of privileges, contains one general section whereas the *Massachusetts Guide to Evidence* contains twenty-five sections detailing evidentiary privileges and disqualifications recognized in Massachusetts. Other sections, such as Section 1102, Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence, Section 1103, Sexually Dangerous Person Proceedings, and Section 1104, Witness Cooperation Agreements, have no counterpart in the Federal rules.

Each section contains a statement of the law of Massachusetts, current through December 31, 2013, and an accompanying “Note” that includes supporting authority. Some sections are based upon a single statute or decision, while other sections were derived from multiple sources. Certain sections were drafted “nearly verbatim” from a source with minimal changes, for instance, revised punctuation, gender-neutral terms, or minor reorganization, to allow the language to be stated more accurately in the context of the *Massachusetts Guide to Evidence*. For the practitioner’s easy reference, the Committee has included parallel citations to the North Eastern Reporter.

Many sections of the Guide use the language of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence (1980) or the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Committee concluded that such language is preferred when it represents an accurate statement of current Massachusetts law. The Committee wishes to emphasize two points. First and foremost, in accordance with its mandate from the Supreme Judicial Court, what the Committee has written are not rules, but rather, as the title suggests, a guide to evidence based on the law as it exists today. The Committee did not attempt, nor is it authorized, to suggest modifications, adopt new rules, or predict future developments in the law. Second, the Committee has recommended to the Supreme Judicial Court that the Guide be pub-
lished annually to address changes in the law and to make any other revisions as necessary. The Committee’s goal is to reflect the most accurate and clear statement of current law as possible. Ultimately, the law of evidence in Massachusetts is what is contained in the authoritative decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court and of the Appeals Court, and the statutes duly enacted by the Legislature.

Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law
INTRODUCTION TO THE 2014 EDITION

On behalf of the Supreme Judicial Court’s Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law, we want to express our gratitude to the Flaschner Judicial Institute for its support in publishing this 2014 official edition of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. As a result of Flaschner’s commitment to the continuing education and professional development of the Massachusetts judiciary, for the seventh straight year, the Guide will be distributed to every trial and appellate judge in the Commonwealth.

The purpose of the Guide is “to make the law of evidence more accessible and understandable to the bench, bar, and public.” Statement by the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court (January 2014). The value of the Guide in practice is confirmed by the fact that it has been cited as a source of authority by the Appeals Court and by the Supreme Judicial Court in both published and unpublished opinions more than 500 times since it was first published in 2008. The Guide is also frequently cited and relied upon by judges throughout the Trial Court. Ultimately, the best evidence of the Guide’s value is the frequency with which it is cited by lawyers and parties in civil, criminal, juvenile, and youthful offender cases as an authoritative expression of Massachusetts evidence law. The extraordinary consensus that exists among the members of the bench and the bar as to the Guide’s authoritativeness is a tribute to the acumen and dedication of the members of the Advisory Committee with whom we serve who labor throughout the year to understand and to concisely integrate into the fabric of the Guide developments in our common law, court rules, constitutional law, and statutes, as well as pertinent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, that sometimes bring about sweeping changes in the law of evidence and in the responsibilities of lawyers and judges.

Among the noteworthy changes in the 2014 edition of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence are the following: (1) a new Section 103(e) recognizing the Massachusetts practice that favors the use of motions in limine, along with a detailed note derived from Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 987 N.E.2d 205 (2013); (2) an expansion of Section 404(a)(2)(b) to reflect the additional purposes for which character evidence may be offered by the accused in a criminal case and in rebuttal by the prosecution; (3) a synopsis of important new case law concerning the scope of the attorney-client privilege under Section 502; (4) a new section dealing with the use of and relief from stipulations in both civil and criminal cases, along with a detailed note; (5) a clarification of the distinction between lay witness opinion testimony and expert witness opinion testimony in the note to Section 701 derived from Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 998 N.E.2d 322 (2013); (6) new cases addressing the evolving jurisprudence under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause; and (7) in Sections 801–804, a reorganization and improved explanation of the law dealing with hearsay and its exceptions, including, in particular, a clarification of the state-of-mind exception.

One of the challenges we expect to take up this year and may address in the 2015 edition is to revise the text sections of the Guide to reflect the changes in corresponding sections of the Federal Rules of Evidence which have been rewritten, the term of art that is used is “restyled,” and became effective on December 1, 2011. The drafters of the restyled Federal rules expressly declared that the meaning of the rules was not changed, but instead that they replaced legalese with plain English
and, in some cases, renumbered sections of the rules. This is the view taken by the Federal courts following the adoption of the restyled rules. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 245 n.17 (2d Cir. 2012) (the substance of the restyled Federal Rules of Evidence is the same as the previous version); United States v. Sklena, 692 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2012) (no substantive difference between the restyled Federal Rules of Evidence and the previous version); United States v. Jean-Guerrier, 666 F.3d 1087, 1091 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) (observing that the changes made to the Federal Rules of Evidence as part of the December 2011 restyling project were “intended to be stylistic only”). States which have adopted the Federal rules have begun to follow suit. See, e.g., State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 442 n.2 (N.M. 2013) (noting that effective June 16, 2012, New Mexico has restyled its rules of evidence to conform to the changes made in the Federal rules); In re: Rescinding and Replacing the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, No. 586 (Pa. Jan. 17, 2013) (order rescinding the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and replacing it with a restyled version modeled on the restyled Federal rules); Arizona State Hosp./Arizona Community Protection & Treatment Ctr., 297 P.3d 1003, 1009 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (Arizona rules of evidence were made to conform to restyled Federal rules effective January 1, 2012).

In closing, we hope that you will take the opportunity to write to us with comments, suggestions, and even criticisms about the material contained in the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence so that we will be better informed about how to improve it and thereby make the law of evidence in Massachusetts more accessible to all.

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Acknowledgments
Over the years, many judges and lawyers, too numerous to identify, have generously contributed their time and talents to help make this Guide useful to the bench and the bar. We encourage judges and lawyers with an interest in the law of evidence to suggest improvements to the Guide.
Currency, Usage, and Terminology

Currency and usage. The Massachusetts Guide to Evidence has been updated to state the Massachusetts law of evidence as it exists through December 31, 2013. The Supreme Judicial Court Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law has made every effort to provide accurate and informative statements of the law in the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. Counsel and litigants are encouraged to conduct their own research for additional authorities that may be more applicable to the case or issue at hand. Importantly, given the fluidity of evidence law, all users of this Guide should perform their own research and monitor the law for the most recent modifications to and statements of the law. The Guide is not intended to constitute the rendering of legal or other professional advice, and the Guide is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney.

“Not recognized” sections. Where the Advisory Committee has noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence contain a provision on a particular subject and the Committee has not identified any Massachusetts authority that recognizes that subject, or where the Supreme Judicial Court has declined to follow the Federal rule on that subject, the topic is marked “not recognized” to await further development, if any, of the law on that topic.

“Nearly verbatim” sections. The notes to some sections state that the section’s text was derived “nearly verbatim” from a specific statute, court decision, or court rule. This phrase explains that the Advisory Committee made minor modifications to an authority’s original language to allow the language to be stated more accurately in the context of the Massachusetts Guide to Evidence. Such modifications may include revised punctuation, gender-neutral terms, minor reorganization, and the use of numerals instead of spelling numerals.

Discretion. The term “discretion” appears numerous times in the text and the notes throughout this Guide. Unless the context requires a different meaning, the term discretion in this Guide refers to the definition provided by the Appeals Court in Lonergan-Gillen v. Gillen, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 748–749, 785 N.E.2d 1285, 1288–1289 (2003):

“The proper exercise of judicial discretion involves making a circumstantially fair and reasonable choice within a range of permitted options. Discretion ‘implies the absence of a hard-and-fast rule’ and may, in some settings, encompass taking no action. Long v. George, 296 Mass. 574, 578 (1937), quoting from Paquette v. Fall River, 278 Mass. 172, 174 (1932). Proper exercise of judicial discretion requires more than avoiding ‘arbitrary determination, capricious disposition, or whimsical thinking.’ Davis v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 235 Mass. 482, 496 (1920). It imports a willingness, upon proper request, to consider all of the lawfully available judicial options. ‘Where discretion to grant relief exists, a uniform policy of denying relief is error.’ Berryman v. United States, 378 A.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. 1977). ‘It is one thing to consider [a] right [to exclude evidence] and exercise it either way, but having been given that right, analogous to discretion, it is the duty of the judge to exercise it, and it is error as a matter of law to refuse to exercise it.’ Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 571 (1982).” (Footnotes omitted.)
Whether the range of choices that are open to the trial judge with discretion are narrow or wide will depend on the terms of the governing constitutional provision, statute, or common-law principle.

**Comments and suggestions.** Please send any comments or suggestions to the Advisory Committee on Massachusetts Evidence Law, c/o Joseph Stanton, Reporter, Appeals Court, Clerk’s Office, John Adams Courthouse, One Pemberton Square, Room 1200, Boston, MA 02108-1705, or by email to joseph.stanton@appct.state.ma.us.
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ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 101. Title

This volume may be referenced as the *Massachusetts Guide to Evidence*.

**NOTE**

The volume may be cited as Mass. G. Evid. § xxx (2014).
Section 102. Purpose and Construction

The sections contained in this Guide summarize the law of evidence applied in proceedings in the courts of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as set forth in the Massachusetts General Laws, common law, and rules of court, and as required by the Constitutions of the United States and Massachusetts.

The provisions contained in this Guide may be cited by lawyers, parties, and judges, but are not to be construed as adopted rules of evidence or as changing the existing law of evidence.

NOTE

The Advisory Committee has made every effort to provide the most accurate and clear statement of the law of evidence in Massachusetts as it exists at the time of the publication of this Guide. Importantly, these provisions are not to be interpreted as a set of formal or adopted rules of evidence, and they do not change Massachusetts law. Because Massachusetts has not adopted rules of evidence, the development of Massachusetts evidence law continues to be based on the common law and legislative processes.
Section 103.  Rulings on Evidence, Objections, and Offers of Proof

(a) Admission or Exclusion of Evidence. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is injuriously affected, and:

(1) As to evidence admitted, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or

(2) As to evidence excluded, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by an offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which the questions were asked.

(3) A motion in limine, seeking a pretrial evidentiary ruling, is insufficient to preserve appellate rights unless there is an objection at the time the evidence is offered.

(4) The denial of a motion to suppress evidence on constitutional grounds, however, is reviewable without further objection at trial.

(b) Record of Offer and Ruling. The court may add any other or further statement which clearly shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question-and-answer form.

(c) Hearing of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being made known to the jury.

(d) Substantial Risk of a Miscarriage of Justice in Criminal Cases. Nothing in this section precludes taking notice of plain errors in criminal cases, although not brought to the attention of the trial judge, if such error constitutes a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

(e) Motions in Limine. Where the issue can reasonably be anticipated, a motion in limine should be filed prior to trial.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 231, § 119, which states as follows:

"No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless the appeals court or the supreme judicial court deems that the error complained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of the parties. If either court finds that the error complained of affects only one or some of the issues or parties involved it may affirm the judgment as to those issues or parties unaffected and may modify or reverse the judgment as to those affected."

See also G. L. c. 231, § 132 (stating that no new trial in a civil proceeding may be granted based upon the improper admission or exclusion of evidence unless the error injuriously affected the proponent’s substantial rights). To determine whether a substantial right was injuriously affected by the exclusion of evidence

"the appropriate test is whether the proponent of erroneously excluded, relevant evidence has made a plausible showing that the trier of fact might have reached a different result if
the evidence had been before it. Thus the erroneous exclusion of relevant evidence is reversible error unless, on the record, the appellate court can say with substantial confidence that the error would not have made a material difference.”


Judicial Duty to Give Curative Instruction. In a criminal case, if defense counsel is unable to present certain evidence promised in an opening statement because the court changes an earlier ruling, the danger of prejudice is so great that the judge must give the jury an explanation why the defendant could not keep the promise made in the opening statement. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 534–535, 989 N.E.2d 483, 494 (2013) (alternatively, the judge may decline to give the curative instruction and instead allow the defendant to present the evidence).

Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. 358, 365, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (2001), and Commonwealth v. Pickles, 364 Mass. 395, 399, 305 N.E.2d 107, 109 (1973). “[O]bjections to evidence, or to any challenged order or ruling of the trial judge, are not preserved for appeal unless made in a precise and timely fashion, as soon as the claimed error is apparent.” Commonwealth v. Perryman, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 192, 770 N.E.2d 1, 5 (2002). “The purpose of requiring an objection is to afford the trial judge an opportunity to act promptly to remove from the jury's consideration evidence which has no place in the trial.” Abraham v. Woburn, 383 Mass. 724, 726 n.1, 421 N.E.2d 1206, 1209 n.1 (1981). If a timely objection is not made, the evidence is properly admitted, and the fact finder is entitled to give it such probative effect as it deems appropriate. Id.


“[W]hen objection, counsel should state the specific ground of the objection unless it is apparent from the context.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. at 365, 749 N.E.2d at 155, quoting P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence § 3.8.3, at 85 (7th ed. 1999). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 46; Mass. R. Crim. P. 22. The court may ask the party objecting to the admission or exclusion of evidence to state the precise ground for the objection. See Rule 8 of the Rules of the Superior Court. Further argument or discussion of the grounds is not allowed unless the court requests it. Id. The need for an exception has been abolished by Mass. R. Civ. P. 46 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 22.

A motion to strike is used to eliminate an answer that is objectionable either on substantive grounds or on the ground that it is nonresponsive. Commonwealth v. Pickles, 364 Mass. at 399, 305 N.E.2d at 109–110.


The offer of proof should state or summarize the testimony or evidence and show that the proponent would be prejudiced by the exclusion of the offered evidence. Holmgren v. LaLiberte, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 820, 821, 349 N.E.2d 379, 380 (1976). The court may consider only so much of the offer of proof that is responsive to the excluded question or evidence and apparently within the witness’s knowledge. Coral Gables, Inc. v. Beerman, 296 Mass. 267, 268–269, 5 N.E.2d 554, 555 (1936). An offer of proof that fails to satisfy the statutory or common-law requirements for the admissibility of the evidence will lead to the exclusion of the evidence. See Rockport Granite Co. v. Plum Island Beach Co., 248 Mass. 290, 295, 142 N.E. 834, 836 (1924).

An offer of proof is not necessary where the context is clear, see Commonwealth v. Donovan, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 83, 88, 455 N.E.2d 1217, 1220–1221 (1983), or where there is no doubt what the testimony will be, see Commonwealth v. Caldon, 383 Mass. 86, 89 n.2, 417 N.E.2d 958, 960 n.2 (1981); Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 429, 40 N.E. 189, 195 (1895).

If the evidence is excluded on cross-examination, an offer of proof generally need not be made, Stevens v. William S. Howe Co., 275 Mass. 398, 402, 176 N.E. 208, 210 (1931), although there is a “relatively rare group of cases where, if the purpose or significance of the question is obscure and the prejudice to the cross-examiner is not clear . . . the record must disclose the cross-examiner’s reason for seeking an answer to an excluded question.” Breault v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mass. 352, 358, 305 N.E.2d 824, 828 (1973).


Subsection (b). The first sentence is taken nearly verbatim from Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(c). As to the second sentence, if the court sustains an objection to a question, the court may permit the witness to answer the question in order to satisfy the need for an offer of proof.

Subsection (c). This subsection is derived generally from Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(c), Mass. R. Civ. P. 51(b), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 24(b). See Commonwealth v. Scullin, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 9, 14, 687 N.E.2d 1258, 1262 (1997) (“It is essential that [the court] take steps to ensure that the jury is not exposed to the questionable evidence before the issue of admissibility is finally decided. Failing to follow this course places the opponent of the evidence in a difficult situation, and may create an unfair advantage for the proponent of the testimony, especially in the event the evidence ultimately is excluded.”). See also Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 418, 422, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1988).

The court has the discretion to employ any one of several methods to determine preliminary questions while insulating the jury from inadmissible evidence. These methods range from pretrial motions to suppress or motions in limine, to conducting proceedings during trial at sidebar, in chambers, or while the jury is absent from the courtroom. The court also has discretion whether to rule on the admissibility of evidence in advance of the trial by a motion in limine or to wait until the issue arises at trial. See Commonwealth v. Olsen, 452 Mass. 284, 292–293, 892 N.E.2d 739, 745 (2008) (trial judge properly declined to rule in advance on motion in limine to permit defendant to call twenty-two witnesses to testify to the fact that the prosecution’s chief witness had a poor reputation in the community for truth-telling, leaving the issue to be decided as it arose with particular witnesses).

As stated above, a timely objection at trial is required to preserve an issue for appellate review. If an objection was not made, the appellate court can consider an issue, but does so under a limited standard of review. For cases other than capital cases on direct appeal, the appellate court will apply the so-called Freeman standard to unpreserved trial errors and analyze whether the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13, 712 N.E.2d at 580. The proper standard of review for a noncapital offense is as follows:

"An error creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice unless we are persuaded that it did not 'materially influence[]' the guilty verdict. In making that determination, we consider the strength of the Commonwealth's case against the defendant (without consideration of any evidence erroneously admitted), the nature of the error, whether the error is 'sufficiently significant in the context of the trial to make plausible an inference that the jury's result might have been otherwise but for the error,' and whether it can be inferred 'from the record that counsel's failure to object was not simply a reasonable tactical decision.'" (Citations and footnotes omitted.)

II. Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in any case in which the defendant was found guilty of murder in the first degree, see Commonwealth v. Francis, 450 Mass. 132, 137 n.5, 876 N.E.2d 862, 868 n.5 (2007), the Supreme Judicial Court has a special duty and plenary authority to review the whole case, on the law and the evidence, and may order a new trial or reduce the verdict even in the absence of an objection. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 n.1, 584 N.E.2d 621, 624 n.1 (1992).


Purpose. Massachusetts practice encourages the use of motions in limine. Motions in limine are useful to clarify or simplify the issues that need to be addressed prior to trial and to prevent irrelevant, inadmissible, or prejudicial matters from being considered by the trier of fact. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 Mass. 497, 500 n.2, 420 N.E.2d 319, 321 n.2 (1981). Such motions should be "narrowly limited to focus on a discrete issue or item of anticipated evidence," and "must not be used to choke off a valid defense in a criminal action, or to 'knock out' the entirety of the evidence supporting a defense before it can be heard by the jury." Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 314, 324–325, 439 N.E.2d 832, 838 (1982). See also Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 594, 452 N.E.2d 188, 196 (1983).

Timing. While a motion in limine may be filed during trial in advance of the evidence being offered, Commonwealth v. Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720, 735 n.21, 964 N.E.2d 956, 968 n.21 (2012); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 383 Mass. 73, 81, 417 N.E.2d 950, 955 (1981). In some cases, such as where there are challenges to the reliability of expert witness testimony, a pretrial motion in limine is required to preserve the opposing party's rights. Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 659, 746 N.E.2d 133, 137 (2001). A judge retains the discretion to reserve on a ruling until the evidence is presented at trial.

Section 104. Preliminary Questions

(a) Determinations Made by the Court. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification or competency of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, the admissibility of evidence, or the determination of probable cause, e.g., justification for a search and seizure, shall be made by the court, subject to the provisions of Subsection 104(b). In making its determination, the court is not bound by the laws of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact.

(1) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding that the condition has been fulfilled.

(2) When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the admission of other evidence, which has not yet been admitted, the court may admit such evidence de bene, subject to a later motion to strike if the evidence is not forthcoming.

(c) Hearing of Jury. Hearings on the admissibility of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so conducted when the interests of justice require.

(d) Testimony by Accused. The accused does not, by testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as to other issues in the case. A defendant who testifies at a preliminary hearing is nonetheless subject to cross-examination on issues that affect his or her credibility.

(e) Weight and Credibility. The principles of law stated in this section do not limit the right of any party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 405 Mass. 191, 197–198, 539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (1989), and Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 646, 779 N.E.2d 669, 673 (2002). See also Gorton v. Hadsell, 63 Mass. 508, 511 (1852) (explaining that Massachusetts follows the orthodox principle under which “it is the province of the judge . . . to decide all questions on the admissibility of evidence. It is also his province to decide any preliminary questions of fact, however intricate, the solution of which may be necessary to enable him to determine the other question of admissibility.”). The court may consider, in appropriate circumstances, representations of counsel and summary testimony. When the credibility of witnesses is in dispute on a preliminary question of fact, the court’s determination is final. See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 470, 688 N.E.2d 1350, 1353–1354 (1998); Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 235 Mass. 482, 502, 126 N.E. 841, 846 (1920). The general rule in all cases, except as to waiver of Miranda rights and the voluntariness of defendants’ statements in criminal cases, is that the judge’s findings of preliminary facts on which the admissibility of evidence depends need only be by a fair preponderance of the evidence. See Care & Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 792, 610 N.E.2d 934, 937 (1993); Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 498–499, 193 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1934).


Cross-Reference: Section 1101(c)(3), Applicability of Evidentiary Sections: Sections Inapplicable: Miscellaneous Proceedings.

Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Perry, 432 Mass. 214, 234, 733 N.E.2d 83, 101 (2000); Commonwealth v. Leonard, 428 Mass. 782, 785–786, 705 N.E.2d 247, 250 (1999); and Fauci v. Mulready, 337 Mass. 532, 540, 150 N.E.2d 266, 291 (1958). “Relevancy conditioned on fact” means that the judge is satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that the event took place or the condition of fact was fulfilled. Commonwealth v. Leonard, 428 Mass. at 785–786, 705 N.E.2d at 250. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 730, 933 N.E.2d 50, 62 (2010) (expert shoe-print evidence was relevant because reasonable jury could have found that police seizure of sneaker “from a closet in a bedroom at the defendant’s mother’s home—a room where the police also found personal papers bearing the defendant’s name and photographs of him”—warranted an inference that the sneaker belonged to him, and therefore made it relevant). Contrast Section 104(a) (judge finds facts by preponderance of evidence).

Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Harris-Lewis v. Mudge, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 480, 485 n.4, 803 N.E.2d 735, 740 n.4 (2004). In the event that the foundation evidence is not subsequently produced, the court has no duty to strike the evidence, admitted de bene, on its own motion. Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 313 Mass. 590, 595–596, 48 N.E.2d 630, 635 (1943). If the objecting party fails to move to strike the evidence, the court’s failure to strike it is not error. Muldoon v. West End Chevrolet, Inc., 338 Mass. 91, 98, 153

**Subsection (c).** This subsection is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 104(c) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 104(c) and is consistent with Massachusetts law. See Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 401 Mass. 418, 422–423, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1988).

**Subsection (d).** This subsection is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 104(d) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 104(d) and is consistent with Massachusetts law. See Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 444–446, 650 N.E.2d 1242, 1250–1251 (1995). It is well established that a defendant’s testimony in support of a motion to suppress evidence may not be admitted against him or her at trial on the issue of guilt. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). Such testimony may, however, be used for purposes of impeachment at trial if the defendant elects to testify. See Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. at 446 n.9, 650 N.E.2d at 1251 n.9 (the fact that defendant’s testimony at suppression hearing may later be used at trial does not mean the scope of cross-examination of defendant at preliminary hearing should be limited). See also United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991) (defendant’s testimony at a pretrial hearing can be used against him for impeachment purposes at trial).

**Subsection (e).** This subsection is based on the long-standing principle that, in cases tried to a jury, questions of admissibility are for the court, while the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are questions for the jury. See Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 13, 696 N.E.2d 909, 918 (1998); Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 419, 424–425, 341 N.E.2d 276, 280 (1976); Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 Mass. 62, 67 (1870).
Section 105. Limited Admissibility

When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.

NOTE

This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 275, 552 N.E.2d 558, 566 (1990) (“Evidence admissible for one purpose, if offered in good faith, is not inadmissible by the fact that it could not be used for another purpose.”). If there is no request for a limiting instruction, the evidence is before the trier of fact for all purposes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. 45, 48, 740 N.E.2d 176, 179 (2000); Commonwealth v. Hollyer, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 431, 395 N.E.2d 354, 356 (1979).

A party must ask for an instruction limiting the scope of the evidence, if one is desired, at the time the evidence is admitted. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. at 48, 740 N.E.2d at 179. “[T]here is no requirement that the judge give limiting instructions sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 436 Mass. 799, 809, 768 N.E.2d 529, 537 (2002). “A judge may refuse to limit the scope of the evidence where the objecting party fails to request limiting instructions when the evidence is introduced.” Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. at 48, 740 N.E.2d at 179. “After the close of the evidence it is too late to present as of right a request for a ruling that the evidence be stricken.” Id.

The trial judge has discretion in determining how to formulate limiting instructions. The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that:

“[a] trial judge may properly bring to the jury’s attention issues of fact and conflicts of testimony. [The judge] may point out factors to be considered in weighing particular testimony. Nothing . . . precludes, or could properly preclude, such guidance where the judge clearly places the function of ultimate appraisal of the testimony upon the jury.”

Section 106. Doctrine of Completeness

(a) Remainder of Writings or Recorded Statements. When a party introduces all or part of a writing or statement, the court may permit the adverse party to introduce or admit any other part of such writing or statement, provided that it is (1) on the same subject, (2) part of the same writing or conversation, and (3) necessary to an understanding of the admitted writing or statement.

(b) Curative Admissibility. When the erroneous admission of evidence causes a party to suffer significant prejudice, the court may permit incompetent evidence to be introduced to cure or minimize the prejudice.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 74, 958 N.E.2d 37, 50 (2011). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4). “When a party introduces a portion of a statement or writing in evidence the doctrine of verbal completeness allows admission of other relevant portions of the same statement or writing which serve to ‘clarify the context’ of the admitted portion.” Commonwealth v. Carmona, 428 Mass. 268, 272, 700 N.E.2d 823, 827 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Robles, 423 Mass. 62, 69, 666 N.E.2d 497, 502 (1996). “The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent one party from presenting a fragmented and misleading version of events by requiring the admission of other relevant portions of the same statement or writing which serve to clarify the context of the admitted portion” (citations and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Eugene, 438 Mass. 343, 351, 780 N.E.2d 893, 899 (2003). “The portion of the statement sought to be introduced must qualify or explain the segment previously introduced” (citations and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Richardson, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 94, 99, 793 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (2003). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. at 74, 958 N.E.2d at 50 (where defendant offered portion of victim’s testimony describing touching of her buttocks, Commonwealth was properly permitted to offer testimony about touching of vaginal area, as both answers pertained to issue of where defendant had touched victim and were made during the same line of questioning).

The decision as to when the remainder of the writing or statement is admitted is left to the discretion of the judge, but the “better practice is to require an objection and contemporaneous introduction of the complete statements when the original statement is offered.” McAllister v. Boston Hous. Auth., 429 Mass. 300, 303, 708 N.E.2d 95, 98 (1999). See Section 611(a), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Control by Court. The doctrine is not applicable to a defendant’s effort to admit the alibi portion of his or her statement which has nothing to do with the statement offered by the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 115, 725 N.E.2d 556, 563–564, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000).

ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Section 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts

(a) Scope. This section governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts.

(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either

(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or

(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to resources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.

(c) When Taken. A court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding, whether requested or not, except a court shall not take judicial notice in a criminal trial of any element of an alleged offense.

(d) Opportunity to Be Heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken.

(e) Instructing Jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that they may, but are not required to, accept as conclusive any fact which the court has judicially noticed.

NOTE


The Supreme Judicial Court is “not inclined towards a narrow and illiberal application of the doctrine of judicial notice.” Finlay v. Eastern Racing Ass’n, Inc., 308 Mass. 20, 27, 30 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1941).

For an extensive list of matters on which a court may take judicial notice, see W.G. Young, J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated Guide to Massachusetts Evidence § 201 (2011 ed.).

ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE

§ 201


In Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 402 Mass. 750, 759 n.7, 525 N.E.2d 369, 374 n.7 (1988), the court explained the difference between "judicial notice" of facts and "official notice" of facts. The latter includes matters that are "indisputably true," as well as other factual matters that an agency may take notice of due to its special familiarity with the subject matter. See G. L. c. 30A, § 6.

Subsection (c). This subsection, which is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 201(f) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 201(f), reflects the Massachusetts practice that judicial notice may be taken at any time by a trial or appellate court. Maguire v. Director of Office of Medicaid, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 551 n.5, 976 N.E.2d 205, 207 n.5 (2012). Commonwealth v. Grinkley, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 69 n.9, 688 N.E.2d 458, 464 n.9 (1997). While there is no express authority for the proposition that judicial notice is discretionary in connection with adjudicative facts, see Commonwealth v. Finegan, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 922, 699 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (1998), the principle follows logically from the settled proposition that when there are no disputed facts, a legal dispute is ripe for a decision by the court. See Jackson v. Longcope, 394 Mass. 577, 580 n.2, 476 N.E.2d 617, 620 n.2 (1985) (judicial notice may be taken by the court in connection with a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 754–755, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393 (1979) ("the right of a court to take judicial notice of subjects of common knowledge is substantially the same as the right of jurors to rely on their common knowledge."). See also Commonwealth v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 72, 21 N.E. 228, 229 (1889) (court took judicial notice that cigars were not drugs or medicine and properly excluded expert opinions stating the contrary). Courts may take judicial notice of their own records. See, e.g., Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass. 526, 530, 766 N.E.2d 482, 487 (2002). But see Commonwealth v. Berry, 463 Mass. 800, 804 n.6, 979 N.E.2d 218, 222 n.6 (2012) (appellate court will not take judicial notice of contents of police report included in trial court file where report was not introduced into evidence or considered by motion judge and was not made part of record on appeal).

Criminal Cases. The defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury means that the "trier of fact, judge or jury, cannot be compelled to find against the defendant as to any element of the crime." Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291, 331 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1975). Although the court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact in a criminal case, see Commonwealth v. Green, 408 Mass. 48, 50 & n.2, 556 N.E.2d 387, 389 & n.2 (1990), "[t]he proper practice in a criminal trial is to submit all factual issues to the jury, including matters of which the judge may take judicial notice." Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 755, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393–394 (1979), citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(g).

Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from the principle, grounded in due process considerations, that a party has a right to notice of matters that the court will adjudicate. See Department of Revenue v. C.M.J., 432 Mass. 69, 76 n.15, 731 N.E.2d 501, 507 n.15 (2000), and cases cited.
Subsection (e). The first sentence of this subsection, which is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 201(g) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 201(g), reflects Massachusetts practice. It is consistent with and follows from the principle set forth in Section 201(c). The second sentence is derived from Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 378 Mass. 751, 754–755, 393 N.E.2d 391, 393–394 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Finegan, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 923, 699 N.E.2d 1228, 1229 (1998), where the courts noted that any fact that is the subject of judicial notice in a criminal case must be given to the jury for its determination. See generally United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 22–26 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining relationship between Fed. R. Evid. 201[b] and Fed. R. Evid. 201[g]).
Section 202. Judicial Notice of Law

(a) Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice of

(1) the General Laws of the Commonwealth, public acts of the Massachusetts Legislature, the common law of Massachusetts, rules of court, the contents of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, and Federal statutes, and

(2) the contents of Federal regulations and the laws of foreign jurisdictions that are brought to the court’s attention.

(b) Permissive. A court may take judicial notice of the contents of Federal regulations and the laws of foreign jurisdictions not brought to its attention, legislative history, municipal charters, and charter amendments.

(c) Not Permitted. A court is not permitted to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, town bylaws, special acts of the Legislature, or regulations not published in the Code of Massachusetts Regulations.

NOTE

Subsections (a)(1) and (2). These subsections are derived from 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed); G. L. c. 30A, § 6 (regulations published in the Code of Massachusetts Regulations shall be judicially noticed); and G. L. c. 233, § 70 (“The courts shall take judicial notice of the law of the United States or of any state, territory or dependency thereof or of a foreign country whenever the same shall be material.”). See also Cohen v. Assessors of Boston, 344 Mass. 268, 269, 182 N.E.2d 138, 139 (1962); Ralston v. Commissioner of Agric., 334 Mass. 51, 53–54, 133 N.E.2d 589, 591 (1956); Mastrullo v. Ryan, 328 Mass. 621, 622, 105 N.E.2d 469, 470 (1952); Brodsky v. Fine, 263 Mass. 51, 54, 160 N.E. 335, 337 (1928).

The party which seeks to have the court notice or apply any foreign law has the burden of bringing it to the court’s attention. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 39(b) (“The court shall upon request take judicial notice of the law of the United States or of any state, territory, or dependency thereof or of a foreign country whenever it shall be material.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of the United States or of any state, territory or dependency thereof or of a foreign country shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in determining such law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43. The court’s determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”).


Subsection (c). Courts “will not take judicial cognizance of municipal ordinances, or of special acts of the Legislature” (citations omitted). Brodsky v. Fine, 263 Mass. 51, 54, 160 N.E. 335, 337 (1928). Furthermore, “[t]he general rule in Massachusetts is that courts do not take judicial notice of regulations [not included in the Code of Massachusetts Regulations]; they must be put in evidence” (citations and quotations omit-
ARTICLE III. INFERENCES, PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE, AND PRESUMPTIONS

Section 301. Civil Cases

(a) Scope. This section applies to all civil actions and proceedings, except as otherwise specifically provided by a statute, the common law, a rule, or a regulation.

(b) Inferences. An inference is a step in reasoning that the fact finder may make from evidence that has been accepted as believable. A fact may be inferred even though the relationship between the basic fact and the inferred fact is not necessary or inescapable, so long as it is reasonable and possible.

(c) Prima Facie Evidence. Where a statute or regulation provides that a fact or group of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact at issue, the party against whom the prima facie evidence is directed has the burden of production to rebut or meet such prima facie evidence. If that party fails to come forward with evidence to rebut or meet the prima facie evidence, the fact at issue is to be taken by the fact finder as established. Where evidence is introduced sufficient to warrant a finding contrary to the fact at issue, the fact finder is permitted to consider the prima facie evidence as bearing on the fact at issue, but it must be weighed with all other evidence to determine whether a particular fact has been proved. Prima facie evidence does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains throughout the trial on the party on whom it was originally cast.

(d) Presumptions. A presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of production to rebut or meet that presumption. The extent of that burden may be defined by statute, regulation, or the common law. If that party fails to come forward with evidence to rebut or meet that presumption, the fact is to be taken by the fact finder as established. If that party comes forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, the presumption shall have no further force or effect. A presumption does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains throughout the trial on the party on whom it was originally cast.

NOTE

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 440 Mass. 715, 720–721 & n.8, 802 N.E.2d 76, 82 & n.8 (2004), and DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246, 253 n.13, 408 N.E.2d 1353, 1357 n.13 (1980). "In this formulation, ‘possible’ is not a lesser alternative to ‘reasonable.’ Rather, the two words function in a synergistic manner: each raises the standard imposed by the other." Commonwealth v. Dinkins, 440 Mass. at 721, 802 N.E.2d at 82. "[W]e have permitted, in carefully defined circumstances, a jury to make an inference based on an inference to come to a conclusion of guilt or innocence. But we require that each inference must be a reasonable and logical conclusion from the prior inference; we have made clear that a jury may not use conjecture or guesswork to choose between alternative inferences." Commonwealth v. Dostie, 425 Mass. 372, 376, 681 N.E.2d 282, 284–285 (1997). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. White, 452 Mass. 133, 136, 891 N.E.2d 675, 678–679 (2008) (concluding that there was sufficient evidence connecting the defendant to a gun found at the crime scene, the court observed that
ARTICLE III. INFERENCE, PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE, AND PRESUMPTIONS

§ 301


Subsection (d). This subsection is based on the predominant approach in Massachusetts whereby a presumption shifts the burden of production and disappears when the opposing party meets its burden by offering evidence to rebut the presumption. However, the disappearance of the presumption does not prevent the fact finder from drawing an inference from one or more basic facts that is consistent with the original presumption. See Standeven v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 447 Mass. 20, 34–35, 849 N.E.2d 197, 209 (2006), quoting Epstein v. Boston Hous. Auth., 317 Mass. 297, 302, 58 N.E.2d 135, 139 (1944) (in the context of the statutory provision that an abutter is presumed to have standing in cases arising under G. L. c. 40A, the court observed that “[a] presumption does not shift the burden of proof; it is a rule of evidence that aids the party bearing the burden of proof in sustaining that burden by ‘throw[ing] upon his adversary the burden of going forward with evidence.’”); Jacobs v. Town Clerk of Arlington, 402 Mass. 824, 826–827, 525 N.E.2d 658, 660–661 (1988) (rebuttable presumption of death). The quantum of evidence required to rebut the presumption may vary. See Yazbek v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 916, 670 N.E.2d 200, 201 (1996).


A presumption may give rise to a constitutional question even in civil cases. See, e.g., Care & Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 571, 823 N.E.2d 356, 361 (2005) (“In cases that involve severing parental rights, the presumption that a child, who had been in the care of the department for more than one year, would have her best interests served by granting a petition for adoption or dispensing with the need for parental consent to adoption, violates the parents’ due process rights because it shifts the burden to the parent affirmatively to prove fitness and to prove that the best interests of the child would be served by maintaining parental rights.”). For a lengthy list of presumptions, see W.G. Young, J.R. Pollets, & C. Poreda, Annotated Guide to Massachusetts Evidence § 301 (2011 ed.). See also Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court § 3.07 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2003).
Section 302. Criminal Cases

(a) Scope. This section governs the operation of inferences, prima facie evidence, and presumptions in criminal cases.

(b) Inferences. The jury generally may draw inferences in a criminal case in the same manner as in a civil case.

(c) Prima Facie Evidence. Prima facie evidence means that proof of the first fact permits, but does not require, the fact finder, in the absence of competing evidence, to find that the second fact is true beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is contrary evidence, the first fact continues to constitute some evidence of the fact to be proved, remaining throughout the trial probative on issues to which it is relevant.

(d) Presumptions. The term “presumption” should not be used in connection with the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.

   (1) The defendant cannot be required to satisfy the burden of disproving a fact that is essential to a finding or verdict of guilty.

   (2) The defendant may be required to satisfy a burden of production.

Note

Subsection (a). Constitutional principles restrict the manner in which concepts such as inferences, prima facie evidence, and presumptions are permitted to operate in criminal cases. “[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). “[I]t is constitutionally impermissible to shift to a defendant the burden of disproving an element of a crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Moreira, 385 Mass. 792, 794, 434 N.E.2d 196, 198 (1982). Likewise, “[d]ue process requires that the State disprove beyond a reasonable doubt those ‘defenses’ that negate essential elements of the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 382 Mass. 189, 203, 415 N.E.2d 805, 814 (1981). Therefore, a conclusive or mandatory presumption or inference in any form which has the effect of relieving the jury of the duty of finding a fact essential to proof of the defendant’s guilt on a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence offered at trial, or which imposes on a defendant a burden of persuasion as to such a fact, conflicts with the presumption of innocence and violates due process. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523–524 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 589–590, 374 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1978).


Cross-Reference: Section 301(b), Civil Cases: Inferences.

There are numerous statutes that designate certain evidence as having prima facie effect. See, e.g., G. L. c. 22C, § 39, and G. L. c. 111, § 13 (certificate of chemical analysis of narcotics); G. L. c. 46, § 19 (birth, marriage, or death certificate); G. L. c. 90, § 24(4) (court record of a prior conviction if accompanied by other documentation); G. L. c. 185C, § 21 (report of inspector in housing court); G. L. c. 233, § 79F (certificate of public way); G. L. c. 269, § 11C (firearm with obliterated serial number).

"Such provisions serve to identify evidence that the Commonwealth may introduce to meet its burden and which, while just as probative as other evidence, is less burdensome to produce. They do not, however, alter the Commonwealth’s substantive burden of proof, render admissible any evidence that previously was inadmissible, or render sufficient any evidence that necessarily was insufficient beforehand." (Citation omitted.)


Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Moreira, 385 Mass. 792, 797, 434 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1982), where the Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[t]he word ‘presumption’ must be given an explanation consistent with the meaning of inference. The safer course, perhaps, is to avoid the use of the word ‘presumption,’ in any context which includes the burden of proof in criminal cases." See also Commonwealth v. McNerney, 373 Mass. 136, 149, 365 N.E.2d 815, 823 (1977) (explaining the problems that arise when the terms “presumption” and “inference” are used interchangeably). Additionally, in instructing a jury, the judge should explain that inferences operate only permissively, and that the jury are not required to accept any fact based on prima facie evidence. See Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 Mass. 513, 521–522, 404 N.E.2d 643, 648 (1980); Commonwealth v. Pauley, 368 Mass. 286, 291–292, 331 N.E.2d 901, 904–905 (1975). See also Commonwealth v. Corriente, 396 Mass. 319, 340, 486 N.E.2d 29, 43 (1985).

Subsection (d)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Moreira, 385 Mass. 792, 794–797, 434 N.E.2d 196, 198–200 (1982), and Commonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 363–364, 398 N.E.2d 463, 469 (1979). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").

Subsection (d)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Cabral, 443 Mass. 171, 179, 819 N.E.2d 951, 959 (2005), and cases cited. See id. ("[W]here a defendant asserts an affirmative defense, he takes on a burden of production, because the Commonwealth has no burden of disproving an affirmative defense unless and until there is evidence supporting such defense" [citation and quotation omitted].). This principle is illustrated by Commonwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. 537, 541, 854 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (2006), where the court explained that

"[t]he Commonwealth's burden to disprove the affirmative defense of honest and reasonable claim arises once the defendant has met his own burden of production. Thus, if any view of the evidence would support a factual finding that the defendant was acting as creditor to the victim's debtor, the defendant has met his burden of production and it is incumbent on the Commonwealth to disprove the defense." (Citation and quotation omitted.)

In Commonwealth v. Vives, 447 Mass. at 541 n.3, 854 N.E.2d at 1244 n.3, the court also made it clear that a defendant may be required to carry the burden of production as to an affirmative defense that relates directly to an element of the crime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 370 Mass. 684, 687–688, 352 N.E.2d 203, 205–206 (1976) (in prosecution for assault and battery, Commonwealth has no duty to affirmatively disprove that the defendant acted in self-defense until there is some evidence in the case to warrant
(2000) (Spina, J., concurring) (discussing the idiosyncratic use of the concept of “presumption” in insanity cases in Massachusetts and explaining that the “presumption of sanity” survives even when the defendant offers evidence that he or she was insane at the time of the commission of the crime because insanity is not an element of the offense). See also Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court § 3.07 (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 2003).

In a prosecution of a firearm charge, the defendant must give the Commonwealth notice that he or she intends to raise the defense of license and produce “some evidence” of a license, at which time the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to prove the absence of a license beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 806, 965 N.E.2d 774, 789–790 (2012). However, when the charge results from alleged illegal possession of a firearm by a coventurer, the defendant must give notice of the defense but is not required to produce any evidence of the existence of the codefendant’s firearm license, as he or she has no better access to that information than the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Humphries, 465 Mass. 762, 771, 991 N.E.2d 652, 660–661 (2013).
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

Section 401. Relevant Evidence

“Relevant evidence” is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

NOTE


“The general pattern of our cases on the alleged remoteness in time or space of particular evidence indicates two general principles. If the evidence has some probative value, decisions to admit the evidence and to leave its weight to the jury have been sustained. The exclusion on the ground of remoteness of relevant evidence has generally not been sustained. The cases have recognized a range of discretion in the judge.” (Citations and footnote omitted.)


Reliance is placed upon the trial judge’s discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is “substantially outweighed” by risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 831, 840 N.E.2d 939, 948 (2006). Although omitted in a number of cases, a proper explanation of this balancing test includes the term “substantially.” See Note to Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence.
Section 402. Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible

All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise limited by constitutional requirements, statute, or other provisions of the Massachusetts common law of evidence. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

NOTE


Cross-Reference: Note “Address of Witness” to Section 501, Privileges Recognized Only as Provided.
Section 403. Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence

Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, being unnecessarily time consuming, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

NOTE


Unfair Prejudice. “[T]rial judges must take care to avoid exposing the jury unnecessarily to inflammatory material that might inflame the jurors’ emotions and possibly deprive the defendant of an impartial jury.” Commonwealth v. Berry, 420 Mass. 95, 109, 648 N.E.2d 732, 741 (1995). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bishop, 461 Mass. 586, 596–597, 963 N.E.2d 88, 97 (2012) (“before a judge admits evidence that a defendant used [a racial slur] to describe a man of color, the judge must be convinced that the probative weight of such evidence justifies this risk”). Unfair prejudice also results when the trier of fact uses properly admitted evidence for an impermissible purpose, for example by relying on the truth of an out-of-court statement that was admitted for a nonhearsay purpose or, when evidence of a person’s prior bad act is admitted under Section 404(b), by considering that evidence as indicating that person’s propensity to commit such acts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosario, 430 Mass. 505, 509–510, 721 N.E.2d 903, 907 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fidalgo, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 133, 904 N.E.2d 474, 477 (2009).
In balancing probative value against risk of prejudice, the fact that the evidence goes to a central issue in the case weighs in favor of admission. See Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 490–491, 802 N.E.2d 521, 529 (2003). Unfair prejudice does not mean that the evidence sought to be excluded is particularly probative evidence harmful to the opponent of the evidence. An illustrative weighing of probative value against unfair prejudice arises regarding the admissibility of photographs of the victim (especially autopsy) or the crime scene. See generally Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 208–209, 834 N.E.2d 1159, 1170–1171 (2005); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 444 Mass. 289, 297–298, 828 N.E.2d 1, 8–9 (2005); Commonwealth v. Prashaw, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 24–25, 781 N.E.2d 19, 24 (2003). Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad act may be unfairly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible to prove the crime charged, but it may be admissible for other purposes (e.g., common plan, pattern of conduct, identity, absence of accident, motive). See Commonwealth v. Holloway, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 475, 691 N.E.2d 985, 990 (1998). See also Commonwealth v. Fidalgo, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 133–134, 904 N.E.2d 474, 478 (2009) (evidence that the defendant had been a passenger in three prior automobile accidents over the past nine years in which she had claimed injuries and sought damages was not relevant in a prosecution of the defendant for filing a false motor vehicle insurance claim because it showed nothing about the character of the prior claims and yet had the potential for prejudice since the case was essentially a credibility contest). The effectiveness of limiting instructions in minimizing the risk of unfair prejudice should be considered in the balance. Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 807, 556 N.E.2d 30, 35–36 (1990). See also Section 404(b), Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes: Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.

Confusion of Issues and Misleading the Jury. The trial judge has discretion to exclude relevant evidence if it has potential for confusing and misleading the fact finder. Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 25, 661 N.E.2d 56, 61 (1996); Commonwealth v. Beausoleil, 397 Mass. 206, 217, 490 N.E.2d 788, 795 (1986); Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 332, 698 N.E.2d 28, 41 (1998) (admissibility of a test, experiment, or reenactment requires consideration of “whether the evidence is relevant, the extent to which the test conditions are similar to the circumstances surrounding the accident, and whether the [experiment, demonstration, or reenactment] will confuse or mislead the jury” [quotation and citation omitted]).


Exclusion as a Sanction. See Section 1102, Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence.

Constitutional Considerations. In a criminal case, the defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense; however, this right does not deprive the trial judge of discretion to exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant, or that creates an undue risk of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. See Commonwealth v. Kartell, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 433 n.2, 790 N.E.2d 739, 743 n.2 (2003). See also Commonwealth v. Carroll, 439 Mass. 547, 552, 789 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (2003); Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 372 Mass. 337, 343, 361 N.E.2d 1289, 1292 (1977).
Section 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes

(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except as follows:

(1) Character of the Accused. In a criminal proceeding, the accused may offer evidence of a pertinent trait in reputation form only, and the prosecution may rebut the same.

(2) Character of the Victim. In a criminal proceeding, in support of a claim of self-defense,

(A) the accused may offer evidence known to the accused prior to the incident in question of the victim’s reputation for violence, of specific instances of the victim’s violent conduct, or of statements made by the victim that caused reasonable apprehension of violence on the part of the accused;

(B) where the identity of the first aggressor or the first to use deadly force is in dispute, the accused may offer evidence of specific incidents of violence allegedly initiated by the victim, or a third party acting in concert with or to assist the victim, whether known or unknown to the accused, and the prosecution may rebut the same with specific incidents of violence by the defendant.

(3) Character of the Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, as provided in Sections 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, nature of relationship, or absence of mistake or accident.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224, 496 N.E.2d 433, 441 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Bonds, 445 Mass. 821, 829, 840 N.E.2d 939, 946 (2006). Massachusetts follows the universally recognized rule against “propensity” evidence, i.e., evidence of a person’s character through reputation or specific acts (see Section 404[b]) offered to suggest that the person acted in conformity with that character or trait on the occasion in question is inadmissible. See Maillet v. ATF-Davidson Co., 407 Mass. 185, 187–188, 552 N.E.2d 95, 97 (1990); Commonwealth v. Doherty, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 633, 636–637, 504 N.E.2d 681, 683–684 (1987). In Figueiredo v. Hamill, 385 Mass. 1003, 1003–1005, 431 N.E.2d 231, 232 (1982), for example, the Supreme Judicial Court explained the difference between evidence of habit (a regular way of doing things) and evidence of character (a general description of one’s disposition), and held that evidence offered by the defendant that the decedent acted in a “habitually reckless manner” was inadmissible evidence of the decedent’s character. The prosecution may not offer in its case-in-chief evidence that the accused is a violent or dishonest person in order to demonstrate that the accused has a propensity to commit the crime charged. Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702, 708–709, 840 N.E.2d 484, 492–493 (2006). But see Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 664, 824
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N.E.2d 1, 13 (2005), discussed in the notes to Section 404(a)(2)(B). As Justice Cardozo stated, “the law has set its face against the endeavor to fasten guilt upon him by proof of character or experience predisposing to an act of crime.” People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y. 192, 197, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930).

While Section 404(a) applies in both civil and criminal cases, exceptions (1) and (2) apply only in criminal cases. Exception (3) applies in both civil and criminal cases.


The prosecution has the right to cross-examine for impeachment purposes the defendant’s character witnesses on matters that are inconsistent with the character trait to which the witness has testified, including specific instances of bad conduct or criminal activity. See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 53, 904 N.E.2d 442, 446 (2009) (When, in a prosecution for assault and battery, the defendant testified to his character for peacefulness, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by ruling that the Commonwealth was entitled to cross-examine the defendant based on his prior convictions for the same offenses involving the same victim to rebut his credibility as to his character, even though the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to use these prior convictions for impeachment purposes had been denied prior to trial.). See also Section 405(a), Methods of Proving Character: Reputation. The prosecution may also present rebuttal evidence of the defendant’s bad character in reputation form. Commonwealth v. Maddocks, 207 Mass. 152, 157, 93 N.E. 253, 253–254 (1910).


Subsection (a)(2)(B). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. 649, 664, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (2005); Commonwealth v. Pring-Wilson, 448 Mass. 718, 737, 863 N.E.2d 936, 950 (2007); and Commonwealth v. Chambers, 465 Mass. 520, 529–530, 989 N.E.2d 483, 490–491 (2013). Where a claim of self-defense is asserted and the identity of the first aggressor is in dispute, trial courts have discretion to admit a defendant’s evidence of specific incidents of violence allegedly initiated by the victim even if unknown to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 664, 824 N.E.2d at 13. The Adjutant rule does not permit evidence of the victim’s participation in athletic activities such as boxing or martial arts on the issue of whether the victim was the first aggressor, although such activities may, if known to the defendant, be relevant to a claim of self-defense based on the defendant’s reasonable fear of the victim. Commonwealth v. Amaral, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 559, 940 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (2011). If known to the defendant, the specific act evidence goes to the defendant’s state of mind, Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 577, 750 N.E.2d 977, 987 (2001); if the defendant was not aware of the violent acts of the victim, the evidence goes merely to the propensity of the victim to attack. Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 443 Mass. at 661–662, 824 N.E.2d at 12. See generally id. at 665, 824 N.E.2d at 14 (courts “favor the admission of concrete and relevant evidence of specific acts over more general evidence of the victim’s reputation for violence”). The rule announced in Commonwealth v. Adjutant is a “new common-law rule of evidence” to be applied prospectively only. Id. at 667, 824 N.E.2d at 15. See also Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 304–305, 893 N.E.2d 19, 31–32 (2008) (declining to apply the Adjutant rule retrospectively).

Cross-Reference: Section 412, Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation (Rape-Shield Law).


Evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is not admissible unless, as a matter of conditional relevance—see Section 104(b), Preliminary Questions: Relevancy Conditioned on Fact—the judge is satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that the event took place. Commonwealth v. Leonard, 428 Mass. at 785–786, 705
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Cross-Reference: Section 105, Limited Admissibility; Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence; Section 405, Methods of Proving Character; Section 406, Routine Practice of Business; Individual Habit; Section 611(b)(2), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Scope of Cross-Examination: Bias and Prejudice.
**Section 405. Methods of Proving Character**

(a) **Reputation.** Except as provided in (b) and (c), where evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation only. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct for impeachment purposes.

(b) **Specific Instances of Conduct.** In cases in which a person’s character or a trait of character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made by specific instances of conduct.

(c) **Violent Character of the Victim.** See Section 404(a)(2), Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes: Character Evidence Generally: Character of the Victim.

**NOTE**


A witness who testifies to a person’s reputation is then subject to cross-examination for impeachment purposes “as to his awareness of rumors or reports of prior acts of misconduct by the [person], including prior arrests or convictions, that are inconsistent or conflict with the character trait to which the witness has testified.” Commonwealth v. Montanino, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 136, 535 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1989). The prosecution may also present rebuttal evidence of a defendant’s bad reputation. Commonwealth v. Mad-docks, 207 Mass. 152, 157, 93 N.E. 253, 253–254 (1910).

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Care & Protection of Martha, 407 Mass. 319, 325 n.6, 553 N.E.2d 902, 906 n.6 (1990). Specific act evidence may be admitted in those cases where character is directly at issue, as in child custody and adoption cases on the issue of parental fitness, see Adoption of Irwin, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 43, 545 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (1989); negligent entrustment actions, see Leone v. Doran, 363 Mass. 1, 13–14, 292 N.E.2d 19, 29, modified on other grounds, 363 Mass. 886, 297 N.E.2d 493 (1973); negligent hiring actions, see Foster v. The Loft, Inc., 26 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 290–291, 526 N.E.2d 1309,

**Subsection (c).** See Notes to Section 404(a)(2), Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes: Character Evidence Generally: Character of the Victim.
Section 406. Routine Practice of Business; Individual Habit

(a) Routine Practice of Business. Evidence of the routine practice of a business or one acting in a business capacity, established through sufficient proof, is admissible to prove that the business acted in conformity with the routine practice on a particular occasion.

(b) Individual Habit. Evidence of an individual’s personal habit is not admissible to prove action in conformity with the habit on a particular occasion.

NOTE

This section is derived from Palinkas v. Bennett, 416 Mass. 273, 276–277, 620 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1993). “A habit is a regular response to a repeated situation with a specific type of conduct.” Id. at 277, 620 N.E.2d at 777. A trial judge has discretion in distinguishing between a routine practice of a business and a personal habit. Id.


“Massachusetts draws a distinction between evidence of personal habit and evidence of business habit or custom. Evidence of a person’s habits is inadmissible to prove whether an act was performed in accordance with the habit. . . . [F]or the purpose of proving that one has or has not done a particular act, it is not competent to show that he has or has not been in the habit of doing other similar acts. Despite this rule, evidence of business habits or customs is admissible to prove that an act was performed in accordance with the habit. . . . The fact that a habit is done by only one individual does not bar it from being a business habit.” (Quotation and citations omitted.)


Habit Versus Character. The distinction between habit and character is often difficult to make: habit “is the person’s regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct,” whereas character “is a generalized description of one’s disposition, or of one’s disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness.” Figueiredo v. Hamill, 385 Mass. at 1004, 431 N.E.2d at 232, quoting Advisory Committee Notes, Fed. R. Evid. 406.
Section 407. Subsequent Remedial Measures

(a) Exclusion of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures. When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.

(b) Limited Admissibility. This does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent or preceding measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, notice, feasibility of precautionary measures, or impeachment.

NOTE


When a party offers evidence of remedial measures to prove an issue other than negligence, the judge should determine whether it is relevant, see Section 402, Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible, and, if so, whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, see Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence. If the judge admits the evidence, the judge should, upon request, instruct the jury that the evidence cannot be considered as an admission of negligence or fault. See Section 105, Limited Admissibility; Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence.
Section 408. Compromise and Offers to Compromise in Civil Cases

Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim is likewise not admissible. This section does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias, prejudice, or state of mind of a witness; rebutting a contention of undue delay; or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 408, which was adopted in principle in Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. 601, 603–604, 664 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1996). But see Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 510, 789 N.E.2d 115, 120 (2003) (“even if we were to adopt the segment of [Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 408] pertaining to statements made during negotiations . . .”). “This rule is founded in policy, that there may be no discouragement to amicable adjustment of disputes, by a fear, that if not completed, the party amicably disposed may be injured” (quotation and citation omitted). Strauss v. Skurnik, 227 Mass. 173, 175, 116 N.E. 404, 404 (1917).

Evidence that a defendant compromised or offered to compromise a claim arising from the same transaction with a third person not a party to the action is not admissible to prove the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff. Murray v. Foster, 343 Mass. 655, 659–660, 180 N.E.2d 311, 313–314 (1962); Ricciutti v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 343 Mass. 347, 349, 178 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1961). In mitigation of damages, however, a defendant is entitled to the admission of evidence of a settlement amount between the plaintiff and a joint tortfeasor on account of the same injury, but such evidence is for the judge only and not the jury to consider. See Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. at 602–603, 664 N.E.2d at 824.

Evidence of a compromise or offer to compromise may be admitted (with limiting instructions) for a purpose other than to prove liability or the invalidity of the claim, such as to impeach the credibility of a witness. See Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. at 509–510, 789 N.E.2d at 120–121; Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 436 Mass. 316, 327–328, 764 N.E.2d 814, 824 (2002). For example, in an employment discrimination case, statements contained in settlement correspondence were properly admitted as probative of the employer’s state of mind. Dahms v. Cognex Corp., 455 Mass. 190, 199, 914 N.E.2d 872, 880 (2009).

There can be no offer to compromise a claim unless there is indication that there is a potential lawsuit. See Hurwitz v. Bocian, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 372–373, 670 N.E.2d 408, 413 (1996). Whether a particular conversation constitutes a settlement offer or admission may require the resolution of conflicting testimony and is a preliminary question for the trial judge. Marchand v. Murray, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 615, 541 N.E.2d 371, 374 (1989). See Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court. A unilateral statement that a party will “take care of” a loss will be treated as an admission of liability, not an offer to compromise. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Hollingsworth, 324 Mass. 424, 425–426, 86 N.E.2d 663, 663–664 (1949) (defendant’s statement made after accident that “I guess I owe you a fender” held to be admission of liability); Bernasconi v. Bassi, 261 Mass. 26, 28, 158 N.E. 341, 342 (1927) (defendant’s statement “I fix it up, everything,” held to be admission of liability); Dennison v. Swerdlove, 250 Mass. 507, 508–509, 146 N.E. 27, 27 (1925) (defendant’s statement immediately after automobile accident that he would “adjust the damage to your car” was an admission of fault). An expression of sympathy does not qualify as either an offer to compromise or an admission of liability. See Section 409, Expressions of Sympathy in Civil Cases; Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses.
Admissions made on the face of settlement documents are admissible. *Zucco v. Kane*, 439 Mass. at 510–511, 789 N.E.2d at 120–121. Where, however, the parties “understood at [the time of the negotiations] that what was said at that time was said without prejudice to either party,” admissions of fact will not be admissible at trial (quotation omitted). *Garber v. Levine*, 250 Mass. 485, 490, 146 N.E. 21, 22–23 (1925). However, evidence of conduct or statements made during such negotiations on collateral matters are admissible for their truth. See *Wagman v. Ziskind*, 234 Mass. 509, 510–511, 125 N.E. 633, 634 (1920); *Harrington v. Lincoln*, 70 Mass. 563, 567 (1855); *Dickinson v. Dickinson*, 50 Mass. 471, 474–475 (1845). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 23D (admissibility of benevolent statements, writings, or gestures relating to accident victims); Section 514, Mediation Privilege (under G. L. c. 233, § 23C, any communication made in course of mediation proceedings and in presence of mediator are not admissible, except where mediating labor disputes).

Cross-Reference: Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence.
Section 409. Expressions of Sympathy in Civil Cases; Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses

(a) Expressions of Sympathy in Civil Cases. Statements, writings, or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of a person involved in an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action.

(b) Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses. Evidence of furnishing, offering, or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.

(c) Medical Malpractice Claims. Any expression of benevolence, regret, apology, sympathy, commiseration, condolence, compassion, mistake, error, or a general sense of concern made by a health care provider, a facility, or an employee or agent of a health care provider or facility to the patient, a relative of the patient, or a representative of the patient, and that relates to an unanticipated outcome, shall be inadmissible as evidence in a medical malpractice action, unless the maker of the statement, or a defense expert witness, when questioned under oath during the litigation about facts and opinions regarding any mistakes or errors that occurred, makes a contradictory or inconsistent statement as to material facts or opinions, in which case the statements and opinions made about the mistake or error shall be admissible for all purposes.

NOTE


Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Gallo v. Veliskakis, 357 Mass. 602, 606, 259 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1970), and Wilson v. Daniels, 250 Mass. 359, 364, 145 N.E. 469, 471 (1924). This subsection is based on the public policy of encouraging a person to act “as a decent citizen with proper humane sensibilities” without having to admit liability (citations omitted). Lyons v. Levine, 352 Mass. 769, 769, 225 N.E.2d 593, 594 (1967). Statements that accompany offers of payment are not excluded under this section if otherwise admissible. See Gallo v. Veliskakis, 357 Mass. at 606, 259 N.E.2d at 570 (defendant’s statements of sympathy and that he would take care of the medical bills were inadmissible because they “had no probative value as an admission of responsibility or liability” [citations omitted]). Cf. G. L. c. 231, § 140B (evidence of advanced payments to injured person by insurer is not admissible to prove liability).

Subsection (c). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 79L (effective November 4, 2012).
Section 410. Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements

Evidence of a withdrawn or rejected guilty plea, plea of nolo contendere, or admission to sufficient facts is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the withdrawn plea, admission, or offer. Additionally, evidence of statements made in connection with and relevant to any of the foregoing withdrawn pleas, admissions, or offers is not admissible. Evidence of such statements, however, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, if any.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) bars the use in evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding of a withdrawn guilty plea, a withdrawn plea of nolo contendere, a withdrawn admission of sufficient facts, or a withdrawn offer of the same. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f). But see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 395 Mass. 737, 747–750, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1362–1364 (1985) (guilty plea, not withdrawn, is an admission of material facts alleged in complaint or indictment and is admissible as evidence of an admission in subsequent civil case without having preclusive effect); Hopkins v. Medeiros, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 613, 724 N.E.2d 336, 346 (2000) (“An admission to sufficient facts may be introduced against the defendant in a subsequently litigated civil suit arising out of the same incident on the theory that the proceeding was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, with the same degree of finality” [quotations and citation omitted].); Section 801(d)(2)(A), Definitions: Statements which Are Not Hearsay: Admission by Party-Opponent. Except in a prosecution for perjury, the bar applies to any statement made in the course of the plea negotiations as long as it is relevant to the negotiations. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f).

Unlike Fed. R. Evid. 410, the statements in question need not have been made to an attorney for the prosecuting authority to qualify for exclusion. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Mass. 440, 442–443, 720 N.E.2d 464, 466–467 (1999). Rule 12(f) excludes only statements made during “plea negotiations,” not the apparently broader “plea discussions” referred to in Fed. R. Evid. 410. Id. at 443, 720 N.E.2d at 467 (while statements to a detective could be excluded under Mass. R. Crim. P. 12(f), the statements were nonetheless admissible because they were not made during plea negotiations). On the issue of what constitutes plea negotiations, see Commonwealth v. Smiley, 431 Mass. 477, 482 n.3, 727 N.E.2d 1182, 1187 n.3 (2000) (holding there were no plea negotiations where prosecutor made no promises, commitments, or offers and defendant did not give his statement only in consideration of a benefit offered by prosecutor), and Commonwealth v. Luce, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 105, 111–112, 607 N.E.2d 427, 430–431 (1993) (meetings between defendant, counsel, and government officers did not constitute plea bargaining).

ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS § 411

Section 411. Insurance

(a) Exclusion of Evidence of Insurance. Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person or entity acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.

(b) Limited Admissibility. Evidence that a person or entity was or was not insured may be admissible when offered for a purpose other than liability, including proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. 800, 807–814, 309 N.E.2d 196, 202–206 (1974) (extensive discussion of principles and authorities), and Leavitt v. Glick Realty Corp., 362 Mass. 370, 372, 285 N.E.2d 786, 787–788 (1972). The exclusion covers (1) evidence offered by the plaintiff that the defendant is insured, (2) evidence offered by the defendant that the plaintiff has received third-party compensation for an injury, (3) evidence offered by the defendant that he or she is not protected by insurance, and (4) evidence offered by the plaintiff that he or she has no resort to insurance or other coverage for the loss. Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. at 808–810, 309 N.E.2d at 202–203.

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Fed. R. Evid. 411 and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 411 and is consistent with Massachusetts law. Evidence of insurance coverage may be admissible where the issue of control over the covered premises is disputed because the jury could properly infer “that the defendants would not have deemed it prudent to secure indemnity insurance on [an area] not within their control, or for the careless management or defective condition of which they could not be held responsible.” Perkins v. Rice, 187 Mass. 28, 30, 72 N.E. 323, 324 (1904). A blanket insurance policy covering more than one location is not, however, admissible to show control. See Camerlin v. Marshall, 411 Mass. 394, 398, 582 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1991).


Inadmissibility Due to Prejudicial Effect. Evidence of an insurance policy may still be excluded where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value after contemplating the effectiveness of a limiting instruction. See Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. at 812–813, 309 N.E.2d at 205. See also Shore v. Shore, 385 Mass. 529, 530–532, 432 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1982) (appropriate instructions could have cured possible prejudice from excluded evidence of insurance policy). But see McDaniel v. Pickens, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 70, 695 N.E.2d at 219 (raising but not reaching the issue of “whether jurors have attained to such a level of sophistication that they can take insurance and related things in stride when properly instructed” [citations omitted]).

Collateral Source Rule. Evidence of collateral source payments is generally not admissible to reduce the amount of damages recoverable, but may be admissible if probative of a relevant issue, such as impeaching the plaintiff’s credibility or showing motive. See Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 16–21, 483 N.E.2d 793, 801–804 (1985); Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Agency, Inc., 61 Mass. App. Ct.
The full amount of a medical or hospital bill is admissible as evidence of the reasonable value of the services rendered to the injured person, even where the amount actually paid by a private or public insurer is less than that amount. The actual amount paid by insurance is not admissible, but the defendant may offer evidence to establish the range of payments accepted by that provider for that particular service. *Law v. Griffith*, 457 Mass. 349, 353–354, 930 N.E.2d 126, 130–131 (2010). See G. L. c. 233, § 79G. The court may instruct the jury that any amounts paid by insurance are subject to recoupment by the payor. *Scott v. Garfield*, 454 Mass. 790, 801, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1010 (2009). The amounts actually paid to the health providers by the health insurer must be redacted on medical bills admitted into evidence. *Id.*

Unless it is relevant for some other purpose, evidence of a settlement with another defendant is not admissible to reduce the amount of damages, but the court should make the appropriate deduction after the verdict. *Morea v. Cosco, Inc.*, 422 Mass. 601, 603, 664 N.E.2d 822, 824 (1996). In most cases, the verdict in a motor vehicle liability case will be reduced by the amount of any personal injury protection benefits received by the plaintiff. G. L. c. 90, § 34M. In a medical malpractice case, the defendant may, at a post-verdict hearing, offer evidence to the court as to the amount of medical bills that have been covered by insurance. The amount of any such bills, less the amount of any premiums paid by the plaintiff for one year prior to the accrual of the cause of action, shall be deducted from the itemized verdict. This procedure does not apply to any payor who has subrogation rights based on any Federal law. G. L. c. 231, § 60G.
Section 412. Past Sexual Conduct and Alleged Sexual Reputation (Rape-Shield Law)

(a) Rape Shield. Except as otherwise provided, evidence of the reputation or specific instances of a victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admissible in any criminal or civil proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct.

(b) Exceptions. The following specific act evidence may be admissible:

1. evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct with the defendant;
2. evidence of the victim’s recent conduct alleged to be the cause of any physical feature, characteristic, or condition of the victim; and
3. evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.

(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. Evidence under Subsection (b) is admissible only after an in camera hearing on a written motion for admission of same and an offer of proof. If, after the hearing, the court finds that the weight and relevancy of the evidence is sufficient to outweigh its prejudicial effect to the victim, the evidence shall be admitted; otherwise the evidence will not be admitted. If the proceeding is a jury trial, said hearing shall be held in the absence of the jury. The court’s finding shall be in writing and filed but shall not be made available to the jury.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 21B, and Commonwealth v. Domainique, 397 Mass. 693, 696–700, 493 N.E.2d 841, 844–846 (1986). Evidence of a victim’s sexual conduct cannot be introduced at a trial for any of the crimes on this nonexhaustive list: G. L. c. 265, §§ 13B, 13F, 13H, 22, 22A, 23, 24, and 24B, and G. L. c. 272, § 29A. Evidence in the form of reputation or opinion is not admissible to prove the complainant’s reputation for unchastity. See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 227–228, 415 N.E.2d 181, 185–186 (1981) (the rape-shield statute “reverses the common law rule under which evidence of the complainant’s general reputation for unchastity was admissible” [citation omitted]). Note that the cases use the terms “victim” and “complainant” interchangeably.

“The rape-shield statute is principally designed to prevent defense counsel from eliciting evidence of the victim’s promiscuity as part of a general credibility attack.” Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 412 Mass. 516, 523, 590 N.E.2d 1151, 1155 (1992). “The policy rationale for this law is that evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct might divert attention from the alleged criminal acts of the defendant, inappropriately putting the victim on trial” (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Houston, 430 Mass. 616, 621, 722 N.E.2d 942, 945 (2000). In Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 404–405, 989 N.E.2d 426, 434–435 (2013), the Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in ruling that a witness who overheard the victim speaking on a cell phone could testify that the victim invited a boy to visit her on the evening of the alleged sexual assault but would not be permitted to testify that the victim was overheard promising to engage in oral sex.

Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 21B. The complainant’s prior sexual activity with the defendant may be relevant to the issue of consent, particularly to show the complainant’s emotion to that particular defendant. Commonwealth v. Grieco, 386 Mass. 484, 488, 436
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

§ 412


Subsection (b)(3). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 227–229, 415 N.E.2d 181, 185–186 (1981). The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that

"[a] defendant’s constitutional right to put forth his full defense outweighs the interests underlying the rape-shield statute, however, only if he shows that the theory under which he proceeds is based on more than vague hope or mere speculation, and he may not engage in an unbounded and freewheeling cross-examination in which the jury are invited to indulge in conjecture and supposition” (quotations and citations omitted).


Conversely, “[i]n the exercise of this discretion a trial judge should consider the important policies underlying the rape-shield statute. He should exclude evidence of specific instances of a complainant’s sexual conduct in so far [sic] as that is possible without unduly infringing upon the defendant’s right to show bias.” Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. at 231, 415 N.E.2d at 188.

Cross-Reference: Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence.
Section 413. First Complaint of Sexual Assault

(a) Admissibility of First Complaint. Testimony by the recipient of a complainant’s first complaint of an alleged sexual assault regarding the fact of the first complaint and the circumstances surrounding the making of that first complaint, including details of the complaint, is admissible for the limited purpose of assisting the jury in determining whether to credit the complainant’s testimony about the alleged sexual assault, not to prove the truth of the allegations.

(b) Admissibility of Additional Reports of a Sexual Assault Under an Alternative Evidentiary Basis. When otherwise admissible testimony or evidence other than the first complaint includes or implies that a report of a sexual assault was made, it may be admitted only if the trial judge determines that (1) it serves an evidentiary purpose other than to corroborate the testimony of the alleged victim and (2) its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

NOTE


"The doctrine seeks to balance the interest of two competing concerns: that a complainant (who . . . may be still a child) has her credibility fairly judged on the specific facts of the case rather than unfairly by misguided stereotypical thinking; and that the defendant receive a trial that is free from irrelevant and potentially prejudicial testimony."


"Under the new doctrine . . . the recipient of a complainant’s first complaint of an alleged sexual assault may testify about the fact of the first complaint and the circumstances surrounding the making of that first complaint. The witness may also testify about the details of the complaint. The complainant may likewise testify to the details of the first complaint (i.e., what she told the first complaint witness), as well as why the complaint was made at that particular time. Testimony from additional complaint witnesses is not admissible."


Role of the Trial Judge. The following sections of this Note amplify the doctrinal framework set forth in the guideline. Regarding this “body of governing principles,” the Supreme Judicial Court has explained that the trial judge “is in the best position to determine the scope of admissible evidence, keeping in mind the underlying goals of the first complaint doctrine, our established first complaint jurisprudence, and our guidelines for admitting or excluding relevant evidence.” Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. at 73, 958 N.E.2d at 49. The exercise of discretion as to whether evidence is admissible under the first complaint doctrine is fact specific and requires the trial judge to conduct a careful and thorough analysis based on the principles set forth in this Note. “Once a judge has carefully and thoroughly analyzed these considerations, and has decided that proposed first complaint evidence is admissible, an appellate court shall review that determination under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id.
Applicability of First Complaint Doctrine. The first complaint doctrine is not applicable to cases in which neither the fact of a sexual assault nor the consent of the complainant is at issue. Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 247, 834 N.E.2d at 1200.

“First complaint testimony, including the details and circumstances of the complaint, will be considered presumptively relevant to a complainant’s credibility in most sexual assault cases where the fact of the assault or the issue of consent is contested. However, where neither the occurrence of a sexual assault nor the complainant’s consent is at issue [i.e., identity of the perpetrator], the evidence will serve no corroborative purpose and will not be admissible under the first complaint doctrine.”

Id. at 247, 834 N.E.2d at 1200.

Identifying the First Complaint. That the complainant’s first report of a sexual assault is abbreviated in nature does not change its status as the first complaint. See Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. 449, 455–456, 879 N.E.2d 105, 112–113 (2008). A first complaint witness is not disqualified from testifying where the alleged victim previously disclosed only physical abuse to that witness. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 584, 987 N.E.2d 597, 600 (2013). While ordinarily there will be only one first complaint witness, two first complaint witnesses may testify in circumstances “where each witness testifies to disclosures years apart concerning different periods of time and escalating levels of abuse, which constitute different and more serious criminal acts committed over a lengthy period.” Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 288–289, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1149–1150 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 71 n.9, 958 N.E.2d 37, 47 n.9 (2011) (distinguishing Kebreau and limiting first complaint to initial disclosure of “touching” where subsequent disclosure of rape could have been disclosed by complainant as part of her first complaint). The fact that the complainant tells someone that he or she is upset, unhappy, or scared is not a first complaint. See Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 446, 879 N.E.2d 99, 103 (2008). “Law enforcement officials, as well as investigatory, medical, or social work professionals, may testify to the complaint only where they are in fact the first to have heard of the assault, and not where they have been told of the alleged crime after previous complaints or after an official report.” Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 243, 834 N.E.2d at 1198.

The first complaint evidence could be in the form of a recorded 911 emergency telephone call or letter; a live witness is not required. Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. at 455–456, 879 N.E.2d at 112–113.

Limiting Instruction Required. Whenever first complaint evidence is admitted, whether through the complainant or the first complaint witness, the court must give the jury a limiting instruction. Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 219, 247–248, 834 N.E.2d at 1181, 1200–1201. The instruction must be given contemporaneously with the first complaint testimony and again during the final instruction. Id. at 248, 834 N.E.2d at 1201.

Determination of Who Is the First Complaint Witness. The determination of who is the first complaint witness is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge. Commonwealth v. Stuckich, 450 Mass. at 455–456, 879 N.E.2d at 111–113. See Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court.

Scope of the Doctrine. The first complaint doctrine applies only if the complainant is available for cross-examination about the first complaint. Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 247 n.27, 834 N.E.2d at 1200 n.27. “The timing by the complainant in making a complaint will not disqualify the evidence, but is a factor the jury may consider in deciding whether the first complaint testimony supports the complainant’s credibility or reliability.” Id., at 219, 834 N.E.2d at 1181. The first complaint doctrine applies even to cases in which there is a percipient witness (in addition to the victim) to the sexual assault. See Commonwealth v. Hartnett, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 467, 470, 892 N.E.2d 805, 810 (2008). An alleged victim’s inability to recall the details of the first complaint goes to the weight and not the admissibility of the testimony by the first complaint witness. See Commonwealth v. Wallace, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 411, 415, 922 N.E.2d 834, 837–838 (2010).
The first complaint witness may “testify to the details of the complaint itself. By details, we mean that the witness ‘may testify to the complainant’s statements of the facts of the assault.’” Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 244, 834 N.E.2d at 1198, quoting Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 434 Mass. 859, 874, 753 N.E.2d 781, 795 (2001). The witness “may testify to the circumstances surrounding the initial complaint, [including] his or her observations of the complainant during the complaint; the events or conversations that culminated in the complaint; the timing of the complaint; and other relevant conditions that might help a jury assess the veracity of the complainant’s allegations or assess the specific defense theories as to why the complainant is making a false allegation” (citation omitted).

Complete congruence between the testimony of the complainant and the testimony of the first complaint witness is not required; the first complaint witness cannot fill in missing elements in the Commonwealth’s case. Under Section 403, the trial judge has discretion to exclude details absent from the complainant’s testimony. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 581, 586 nn.5–6, 987 N.E.2d 597, 602 nn.5–6 (2013).

The alleged victim is permitted to testify to what he or she told the first complaint witness and why the complaint was made (1) when the first complaint witness or a court-approved substitute first complaint witness testifies at trial to those details, (2) when the first complaint witness is deceased, or (3) when the judge decides there is a compelling reason for the absence of the first complaint witness that is not the Commonwealth’s fault. Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 245 & n.24, 834 N.E.2d at 1199 & n.24.

A statement that qualifies as a spontaneous utterance by the victim reporting the assault also constitutes first complaint evidence such that an additional first complaint witness should not be permitted to testify, even if what that witness has to offer is more detailed or complete. Commonwealth v. McGee, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 502–503, 915 N.E.2d 235, 239 (2009); Commonwealth v. Davis, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 756, 765, 767 N.E.2d 1110, 1119 (2002).

Substitution of a Witness. Where feasible, the first person told of the alleged sexual assault should be the initial or first complaint witness to testify. Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 243–244, 834 N.E.2d at 1198. In Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 445–448, 879 N.E.2d 99, 103–105 (2008), the Supreme Judicial Court identified two exceptions to the first complaint doctrine. A person other than the first recipient of information from the complainant is allowed to testify as the first complaint witness (1) if the victim’s disclosure to the “first person does not constitute a complaint,” or (2) if the victim complains first to an individual who “has an obvious bias or motive to . . . distort the victim’s remarks.” Id. at 446, 879 N.E.2d at 103. The court explained that in Commonwealth v. King, it had not “set forth an exhaustive list of appropriate substitutions.” Id. at 445, 879 N.E.2d at 103. “Other exceptions are permissible based on the purpose and limitations of the first complaint doctrine.” Id. See also Commonwealth v. Hanino, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 491, 975 N.E.2d 876, 880 (2012) (feigning).

Even when the complainant has disclosed information about the sexual assault to a person with no obvious bias against the complainant, the trial judge has discretion to allow the Commonwealth to substitute another witness as the first complaint witness in circumstances “where [that person] is unavailable, incompetent, or too young to testify meaningfully . . . .” Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. at 243–244, 834 N.E.2d at 1198. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roby, 462 Mass. 398, 407–408, 969 N.E.2d 142, 150–151 (2012) (where two child victims initially first told each other about defendant’s inappropriate touching, it was proper to allow first adult [and first noncomplainant] told about the sexual assaults to testify as first complaint witness); Commonwealth v. Thibeault, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 421–423, 931 N.E.2d 1008, 1011–1012 (2010) (child’s mother could be substituted as witness for child’s father where father was first person to whom child complained but he appeared to have fled the Commonwealth and could not be located at time of trial).
**Impeachment of First Complaint Witness.** The court has discretion to permit the Commonwealth to impeach the first complaint witness by means of prior inconsistent statements in circumstances in which the court determines that the witness is feigning a lack of memory as to significant details of the first complaint. See Commonwealth v. Hanino, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 497–498, 975 N.E.2d 876, 883–884 (2012) (testimony of two police officers regarding statements made to them by first complaint witness and inconsistent with witness’s in-court testimony was admissible for limited purpose of impeaching witness’s in-court testimony and thus was not impermissible, multiple complaint hearsay).


“Evidence of a subsequent complaint is not admissible simply because a separate evidentiary rule applies (e.g., the statement is not hearsay, or it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule). If independently admissible evidence . . . serves no purpose other than to repeat the fact of a complaint and therefore corroborate the complainant's accusations, it is inadmissible. However, if that evidence does serve a purpose separate and apart from the first complaint doctrine, the judge may admit it after careful balancing of the testimony’s probative and prejudicial value.” (Quotations and citations omitted.)

Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. at 399–400, 930 N.E.2d at 719–720. See also Commonwealth v. Santos, 465 Mass. 689, 700–701, 991 N.E.2d 1049, 1059–1060 (2013) (mother’s description of son’s appearance and demeanor after alleged sexual assault admissible to show victim’s state of mind at the time); Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 403–404, 989 N.E.2d 426, 433–434 (2013) (claim of fabrication alone is insufficient to open the door to the admission of multiple complaints); Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 67, 958 N.E.2d 37, 45 (2011) (admission of testimony of both complainant and first complaint witness pertaining to subsequent disclosure inadmissible under first complaint doctrine, but error not prejudicial as evidence was properly admitted to rebut the defendant’s suggestion that complainant’s accusations were fabricated); Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 851, 926 N.E.2d 1143, 1157–1158 (2010) (admission of mother’s testimony that she and victim had conversation about assault, even without details of conversation, was error when testimony did not serve “any additional purpose”); Commonwealth v. Starkweather, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 799–803, 950 N.E.2d 461, 468–471 (2011) (applying Dargon and Arana analysis to several aspects of police involvement and investigation); Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 495, 914 N.E.2d 981, 986 (2009) (admission of testimony indicating that complainant had made reports of sexual abuse to his mother, the Department of Social Services, and the district attorney’s office, without any more details, in circumstances where the father was the first complaint witness, was error). Contrast Commonwealth v. Santos, 465 Mass. 689, 701, 991 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (2013) (in a prosecution for rape, the judge did not abuse her discretion in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce testimony from the victim’s mother, a non–first complaint witness, about the victim’s appearance and demeanor to rebut the defense’s theory that the incident was fabricated where the “testimony did not repeat any details of the event, was relevant, and not merely cumulative of the [first complaint witness’s] testimony”); Commonwealth v. Lawton, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 528, 536–538, 976 N.E.2d 160, 168–169 (2012) (victim’s statements to SAIN [Sexual Abuse Intervention Network] interviewer not offered as additional complaint testimony, but were independently relevant to contradict impeachment of victim and to rebut defendant’s theory of suggestibility).

The question whether testimony concerning multiple complaints is permissible “is fact-specific and requires, in the first analysis, a careful evaluation of the circumstances by the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 296, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1155 (2009). In Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 844, 849, 927 N.E.2d 506, 510 (2010), the Appeals Court explained that medical records that included statements by the alleged victim pointing to the defendant as the perpetrator of the sexual assault and statements of hospital personnel repeating the allegations, conclusory statements of rape, and a diagnosis of incest, which the judge found admissible under the hospital records exception to the hearsay rule, should not have been admitted at trial because the judge had not determined that the evidence served a
purpose other than to corroborate the victim and had not carefully balanced its probative value and prejudicial effect.

"In [Commonwealth v.] Arana, [453 Mass. 214, 227, 901 N.E.2d 99, 109 (2009)], further evidence of complaint was admissible in order to rebut the defendant's allegation that the complainant fabricated the accusations to provide a basis for a civil lawsuit. In Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 299, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1156 (2009), such evidence was admissible because the defense exploited discrepancies in the testimony of one of the victims and had 'opened the door on cross-examination'; thus 'the Commonwealth was entitled to attempt to rehabilitate the witness.'"

Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 76 Mass. App. Ct. at 850 n.12, 927 N.E.2d at 511 n.12. See also Commonwealth v. Saunders, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 505, 509, 915 N.E.2d 229, 232 (2009) (defense counsel cross-examined victim about reports she allegedly made that someone other than defendant got her pregnant; this opened the door to permit the Commonwealth to offer evidence of statements made by the victim about the defendant's conduct to persons other than the first complaint witness).

SAIN Evidence. A SANE (sexual abuse nurse examiner) is permitted to testify about the SAIN (Sexual Abuse Intervention Network) evidence kit used in the examination of a person alleged to be the victim of a sexual assault and the sexual assault examination process, provided it is either to provide background for the nurse's testimony about the examination of the alleged victim or to lay a foundation for the admission of physical evidence. See Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. at 398 n.13, 930 N.E.2d at 719 n.13. On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Monteiro, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 493–494, 914 N.E.2d 981, 985 (2009), the Appeals Court found that the inclusion of testimony from a police detective who watched a tape of the SAIN interview and who described the interview process and indicated that as a result he continued with his investigation was error because it suggested that the SAIN interviews take place when persons are thought to be victims of sexual assault and implied that the detective found the complainant credible. In addition, the printed forms that are filled out by the SAIN interviewer (Forms 2 and 3) based on questions put to the alleged victim are not admissible, because the printing suggests that a sexual assault took place. See Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. at 398 n.13, 930 N.E.2d at 719 n.13.
Section 414. Industry and Safety Standards

Safety rules, governmental regulations or ordinances, and industry standards may be offered by either party in civil cases as evidence of the appropriate care under the circumstances.

NOTE


Cross-Reference: Section 803(17), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Statements of Facts of General Interest; Section 803(18), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Learned Treatises.
ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES AND DISQUALIFICATIONS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE


(c) Most Privileges Are Not Self-Executing. Most privileges require “some action by the patient or client . . . to ‘exercise’ the privilege.” Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 331, 780 N.E.2d 453, 458 (2002) (psychotherapist-patient privilege). See Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 441 Mass. 257, 261, 805 N.E.2d 1, 6 (2004) (social worker–client privilege); District Attorney for Plymouth Dist. v. Board of Selectmen of Middleborough, 395 Mass. 629, 633–634, 481 N.E.2d 1128, 1131 (1985) (attorney-client privilege); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 780, 438 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1982) (privilege against self-incrimination). The Legislature can create a privilege that is automatic and that does not require any action on the part of the holder of the privilege. See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. at 331 n.7, 780 N.E.2d at 458 n.7 (“the sexual assault counsellor-victim privilege created by G. L. c. 233, § 20J . . . does not suggest that the victim need do anything to ‘exercise’ the privilege contained therein, or to ‘refuse’ to disclose the communications, or to ‘prevent’ the counsellor from disclosing the communications.”). See also Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 787, 393 N.E.2d 847, 856 (1979) (Code of Professional Responsibility applicable to lawyers is self-executing). In the case of a privilege that is not self-executing, it may be appropriate for the proponent of the privilege to temporarily assert the privilege pending notice to the party which holds the privilege. See Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. at 332 n.8, 780 N.E.2d at 459 n.8.

(d) Confidentiality Versus Privilege. There is a distinction between a duty of confidentiality and an evidentiary privilege. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 227, 229 n.7, 866 N.E.2d 892, 894 n.7 (2007), citing Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 435 Mass. 623, 628 n.7, 760 N.E.2d 724, 729 n.7 (2002). A duty of confidentiality obligates one, such as a professional, to keep certain information, often about a client or patient, confidential. It also may impose an obligation on a State agency. See G. L. c. 66A, §§ 1, 2.

“‘A provider’s obligation to keep matters confidential may stem from a statute imposing such an obligation (oftentimes with a host of exceptions to that obligation), or may arise as a matter of professional ethics.’ Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 438 Mass. 325, 335, 780 N.E.2d 453, 461 (2002). When a duty of confidentiality is set forth in a statute, there may or may not be an accompanying evidentiary privilege. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. at 233–234, 866 N.E.2d at 896–897 (holding that G. L. c. 112, § 172, imposes a duty of confidentiality and creates an evidentiary privilege). Sometimes, the duty of confidentiality and the corresponding evidentiary privilege are set forth in separate statutes. See, e.g., G. L. c. 112, §§ 135A and 135B (social workers), and G. L. c. 112, § 129A, and G. L. c. 233, § 20B (psychologists and psychotherapists). In other cases, the duty of confidentiality and a privilege exist in the same statute. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. at 232, 866 N.E.2d at 896, citing G. L. c. 233, § 20J (sexual assault counselors) and G. L. c. 233, § 20K (domestic violence counselors).

In some circumstances, when a provider breaches a duty of confidentiality, the absence of an accompanying evidentiary privilege may permit a party in litigation to gain access to the information or to offer

(e) Impounding Versus Sealing. In Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 906 N.E.2d 320 (2009), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the difference between impounding and sealing:

“The terms 'impounded' and 'sealed' are closely related and often used interchangeably, but are meaningfully different. Under the Uniform Rules o[n] Impoundment Procedure 1708 (LexisNexis 2008), which governs impoundment in civil proceedings and guides practice in criminal matters as well, 'impoundment' means 'the act of keeping some or all of the papers, documents, or exhibits, or portions thereof, in a case separate and unavailable for public inspection.' Rule 1 of the Uniform Rules o[n] Impoundment Procedure. Consequently, an order of impoundment prevents the public, but not the parties, from gaining access to impounded material, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A document is normally ordered 'sealed' when it is intended that only the court have access to the document, unless the court specifically orders limited disclosure. Therefore, we directed in Commonwealth v. Martin, [423 Mass. 496, 505, 668 N.E.2d 825, 832 (1996),] that the record of the in camera hearing 'should be kept, under seal.' Similarly, we ordered that privileged psychological or counseling records of an alleged victim of a sexual assault be 'retained in court under seal,' but permitted defense counsel to have access pursuant to a strict protective der. Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 419 (2006)."

Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. at 836 n.12, 906 N.E.2d at 328 n.12. Martin hearings are discussed in the note to Section 511(b), Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Privilege of a Witness. The Lampron-Dwyer protocol is summarized in Section 1108, Access to Third-Party Records Prior to Trial in Criminal Cases (Lampron-Dwyer Protocol).

(f) Examples of Relationships in Which There May Be a Duty to Treat Information as Confidential Even Though There Is No Testimonial Privilege. Examples include the following:


2. Student Records. “There is no privilege which would prevent the introduction of relevant school records in evidence at a trial.” Commonwealth v. Beauchemin, 410 Mass. 181, 185, 571 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1991). However, the Legislature has recognized that privacy interests are at stake. School records pertaining to specific individuals are not subject to disclosure under our public records law if disclosure “may constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (c). See also G. L. c. 66, § 10. Access to student records is also restricted under regulations promulgated by the State board of education pursuant to G. L. c. 71, § 34D. See Commonwealth v. Buccella, 434 Mass. 473, 477, 751 N.E.2d 373, 378 (2001) (third persons may access “student records” only with written consent from student or student’s parents unless an exception promulgated by regulation applies).
(3) **Special Needs Student Records.** Records of the clinical history and evaluations of students with special needs created or maintained in accordance with G. L. c. 71B "shall be confidential." G. L. c. 71B, § 3.


(5) **Certain Documents, Records, and Reports.** A nonexhaustive list of confidentiality statutes includes the following:

G. L. c. 4, § 6, Twenty-sixth (documents and records);
G. L. c. 6, § 167 et seq. (Criminal Offender Record Information [C.O.R.I.]);
G. L. c. 41, § 97D (reports of rape and sexual assault);
G. L. c. 66A, §§ 1, 2 (personal data held by Commonwealth agencies);
G. L. c. 111, §§ 70, 70E (hospital records);
G. L. c. 111, § 70F (HIV test results);
G. L. c. 111, § 70G (genetic testing);
G. L. c. 111B, § 11 (alcohol treatment);
G. L. c. 111E, § 18 (drug treatment);
G. L. c. 112, § 129A (psychologist-patient communications);
G. L. c. 119, § 51E (Department of Children and Families records);
G. L. c. 119, §§ 60–60A (juvenile records);
G. L. c. 123, §§ 36–36A (Department of Mental Health records);
G. L. c. 123B, § 17 (Department of Developmental Services records);
G. L. c. 127, § 29 (Department of Correction records);
G. L. c. 127, § 130 (parole board); and
G. L. c. 148, § 32 (fire insurance).

There are also numerous regulations (Code Mass. Regs.) which contain confidentiality requirements.


(h) Nonevidentiary Privileges. There are certain so-called privileges which concern nonevidentiary areas. Basically, they are defenses to suit and include the following:

(1) Immunity from Liability (Litigation Privilege). Written or oral communications made by a party, witness, or attorney prior to, in the institution of, or during and as a part of a judicial proceeding involving said party, witness, or attorney are absolutely privileged even if uttered maliciously or in bad faith. See Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319–321, 572 N.E.2d 7, 10–12 (1991); Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108, 345 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1976); Mezullo v. Malez, 331 Mass. 233, 236, 118 N.E.2d 356, 358 (1954). The absolute privilege applies to statements made in a letter by an employee to a former employer explaining that the reason for his or her resignation was sexual harassment and indicating an intention to pursue the matter with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). Further, the absolute privilege extends to similar statements made in a subsequent filing with the EEOC. Visnick v. Caulfield, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 809, 812–813, 901 N.E.2d 1261, 1263–1264 (2009). The absolute privilege is based on the view that “it is more important that witnesses be free from the fear of civil liability for what they say than that a person who has been defamed by their testimony have a remedy.” Aborn v. Lipson, 357 Mass. 71, 72, 256 N.E.2d 442, 443 (1970). Accord Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 193, 196–198 (1841) (same point with reference to statements by an attorney at trial). Contrast Kobrin v. Gastfriend, 443 Mass. 327, 342 n.17, 821 N.E.2d 60, 71 n.17 (2005) (Anti-SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, supercedes the common-law immunity against allegedly defamatory statements made by an expert witness called by the board of registration in medicine to testify against a medical doctor in a disciplinary proceeding).

A privilege attaches “where a communication to a prospective defendant relates to a proceeding which is contemplated in good faith and which is under serious consideration.” Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. at 109, 345 N.E.2d at 884.

“[A]n attorney’s statements are privileged where such statements are made by an attorney engaged in his function as an attorney whether in the institution or conduct of litigation or in conferences and other communications preliminary to litigation. The litigation privilege recognized in our cases, however, would not appear to encompass the defendant attorneys’ conduct in counselling and assisting their clients in business matters generally.” (Citations, quotation, and footnote omitted.) Kurker v. Hill, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 192, 689 N.E.2d 833, 838–839 (1998). See Harmon Law Offices, P.C. v. Attorney Gen., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 830, 838, 991 N.E.2d 1098, 1106 (2013) (privilege not applicable because law firm failed to establish that documents sought by attorney general related to judicial proceedings contemplated or instituted by law firm).

(2) Legislative Deliberation Privilege. Conduct or speech by a member of the Legislature in the course of exercising the member’s duties as a legislator is absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of any criminal or civil prosecution. See Article 21 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (“[t]he freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the
people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other
court or place whatsoever”). This provision also establishes a privilege applicable to “the giving of a vote, to
the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the

(3) Fair Report Privilege. The fair report privilege is a common-law rule that protects from liability the
republisher of a newsworthy account of one person’s defamation of another so long as it is fair and accurate.
See Howell v. Enterprise Publ. Co., LLC, 455 Mass. 641, 650–651, 920 N.E.2d 1, 13 (2010), and cases
cited.

“The privilege recognizes that (1) the public has a right to know of official government ac-
tions that affect the public interest, (2) the only practic al way many citizens can learn of
these actions is through a report by the news media, and (3) the only way news outlets
would be willing to make such a report is if they are free from liability, provided that their
report was fair and accurate.”


“The privilege is not absolute” and “may be ‘be vitiated by misconduct on the newspapers’ part, but that
misconduct must amount to more than negligent, or even knowing, republication of an inaccurate official
statement. To defeat the privilege, a plaintiff must either show that the publisher does not give a fair and
accurate report of the official statement [or action], or malice.” Howell v. Enterprise Publ. Co., LLC, 455
Mass. at 651 n.8, 920 N.E.2d at 13 n.8, quoting Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 2003). Newspapers
are on “solid ground” when they report on “formal (as opposed to informal) governmental (as op-
posed to private) proceedings and actions.” Howell v. Enterprise Publ. Co., LLC, 455 Mass. at 655–656, 920
N.E.2d at 17. In such cases, “the privilege extends to reports of official actions based on information pro-
vided by nonofficial third-party sources.” Id. at 658, 920 N.E.2d at 18.

“If, however, the source is an unofficial or anonymous one, a report based on that source
runs a risk that the underlying official action will not be accurately and fairly described by the
source, and therefore will not be protected by the privilege, or that the information provided
will go beyond the bounds of the official action and into unprivileged territory” (footnote
omitted).

Id. at 659, 920 N.E.2d at 19. “Whether a report was fair and accurate is a matter of law to be determined by
a judge unless there is a basis for divergent views” (citation omitted). Id. at 661, 920 N.E.2d at 21.

(4) Communications with Board of Bar Overseers and Bar Counsel. In Bar Counsel v. Farber, 464
Mass. 784, 787, 985 N.E.2d 1155, 1158 (2013), the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted S.J.C. Rule 4.01,
§ 9, to provide a complainant with “absolute immunity from any civil liability with respect to his complaint and
its allegations and . . . with respect to testimony that the complainant may provide in the course of a pro-
ceeding before a hearing committee of the board.” Id. at 787, 985 N.E.2d at 1158. The court further ex-
plained that the rule does not extend this immunity to statements made or testimony provided by the com-
plainant “to a person or entity outside a bar discipline proceeding.” Id. This is true even when the
communication to someone outside a bar disciplinary proceeding is identical to the protected communica-
tion. Id. at 793, 985 N.E.2d at 1163.
Section 501. Privileges Recognized Only as Provided

Except as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, rules promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court, or the common law, no person has a privilege to

(a) refuse to be a witness,
(b) refuse to disclose any matter,
(c) refuse to produce any object or writing, or
(d) prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing.

NOTE

This section, which is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 501, reflects Massachusetts practice. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) follow the “longstanding principle that the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence” (quotations omitted). Matter of Roche, 381 Mass. 624, 633, 411 N.E.2d 466, 473 (1980). See also G. L. c. 233, § 20 (“[a]ny person of sufficient understanding, although a party, may testify in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before a person who has authority to receive evidence”).

“A witness may not decline to respond to a proper question on the ground that his answer might embarrass him (or another). . . . Nor can fear of harm to the witness generally be offered as an excuse for declining testimony. Relief of witnesses on this ground would encourage intimidation of those in possession of information and proclaim a sorry confession of weakness of the rule of law” (citation omitted).


The Supreme Judicial Court has the power to create privileges under the common law. Babets v. Secretary of Human Servs., 403 Mass. 230, 234, 526 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (1988). However, the creation of a new privilege or the expansion of an existing privilege is usually left to the Legislature, which is better equipped to weigh competing social policies or interests. Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 597–598, 722 N.E.2d 450, 455–456 (2000).

Address of Witness. A party seeking to elicit information about the home or employment address of a witness must demonstrate that the information is relevant in accordance with Section 402, Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible. However, “the very starting point in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth through cross-examination must necessarily be to ask the witness who he is and where he lives” (quotations and citation omitted). Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968). Nonetheless, such evidence may be excluded if the trial judge makes a preliminary finding that any relevance is outweighed by the risks to the safety of the witness. See Commonwealth v. McGrath, 364 Mass. 243, 250–252, 303 N.E.2d 108, 113–114 (1973). In a criminal case, the trial judge must weigh the safety concerns of the witness against the defendant’s right to confrontation. See McGrath v. Vinzant, 528 F.2d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1976). A witness’s general concerns for privacy or personal safety, without more, are not sufficient to overcome the defendant’s right to confrontation under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 544–547, 313 N.E.2d 571, 577–579 (1974). See also Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353, 357, 734 N.E.2d 315, 321 (2000).
(In a murder case, Supreme Judicial Court relied on McGrath and upheld trial judge’s ruling that “defense counsel could ask Rodriguez whether he was engaged in an occupation other than selling drugs, but not his specific employment or his employment address, and whether he now lived in western Massachusetts or in Connecticut, but not his city of residence or residential address. He also prohibited defense counsel from investigating these matters.”); Commonwealth v. Righini, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 25–26 n.5, 831 N.E.2d 332, 337 n.5 (2005) (relying on reasoning of McGrath to explain why criminal defendants are ordinarily not entitled to obtain dates of birth of police witnesses). The existence of valid safety concerns on the part of a witness may be inherent in the nature of the criminal charges. Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. at 358 n.3, 734 N.E.2d at 322 n.3.
Section 502. Attorney-Client Privilege

(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:

(1) A “client” is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or other entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by an attorney, or who consults an attorney with a view to obtaining professional legal services.

(2) A “representative of the client” may include the client’s agent or employee.

(3) An “attorney” is a person who is authorized to practice law.

(4) A “representative of the attorney” is one used by the attorney to assist the attorney in providing professional legal services.

(5) A communication is “confidential” if it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made to obtain or provide professional legal services to the client, and those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.

(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent others from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of obtaining or providing professional legal services to the client as follows:

(1) between the client or the client’s representative and the client’s attorney or the attorney’s representative,

(2) between the client’s attorney and the attorney’s representative,

(3) between those involved in a joint defense,

(4) between representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, or

(5) among attorneys and their representatives representing the same client.

(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client’s guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization whether or not in existence at the time the privilege is claimed. The attorney or the attorney’s representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.

(d) Exceptions. The attorney-client privilege does not apply to the following:

(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the attorney were sought or obtained to commit or to plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known was a crime or fraud;
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(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or by inter vivos transaction;

(3) Breach of Duty or Obligation. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty between an attorney and client;

(4) Document Attested by an Attorney. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the attorney is an attesting witness;

(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between or among two or more clients if the communication was made by any one of them to an attorney retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between or among any of the clients; or

(6) Public Officer or Agency. [Privilege not recognized]

NOTE

Introduction. The Supreme Judicial Court has defined the attorney-client privilege as follows:

“The classic formulation of the attorney-client privilege . . . is found in 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961): (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. The purpose of the privilege is to enable clients to make full disclosure to legal counsel of all relevant facts . . . so that counsel may render fully informed legal advice with the goal of promot[ing] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” (Quotations and citations omitted.)


“The existence of the privilege and the applicability of any exception to the privilege is a question of fact for the judge. The burden of proving that the attorney-client privilege applies to a communication rests on the party asserting the privilege. This burden extends not only to a showing of the existence of the attorney-client relationship but to all other elements involved in the determination of the existence of the privilege, including (1) the communications were received from a client during the course of the client’s search for legal advice from the attorney in his or her capacity as such; (2) the communications were made in confidence; and (3) the privilege as to these communications has not been waived.” (Citations omitted.)


Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from Ellingsgard v. Silver, 352 Mass. 34, 40, 223 N.E.2d 813, 817 (1967) (“The attorney-client privilege may extend to communications from the client’s agent or employee to the attorney.”). The Supreme Judicial Court has yet to determine the scope of the privilege when the client is an organization such as a corporation. See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Mental Retardation, 424 Mass. 430, 457 n.26, 677 N.E.2d 127, 145 n.26 (1997) (attorney-client privilege not automatically extended to all employees of corporation who communicate with corporation’s attorney). Cf. Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.C. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 436 Mass. 347, 357, 764 N.E.2d 825, 833 (2002) (a lawyer is barred from ex parte contact with employees of a corporation, under the rule of professional responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from communicating with a represented party in the absence of that party’s counsel, only as to employees who exercise managerial responsibility with regard to the subject of pending litigation, those alleged to have committed wrongful actions at issue in the litigation, and employees with authority to make decisions about the course of litigation or having management authority sufficient to speak for and bind the corporation).

Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is derived from Barnes v. Harris, 61 Mass. 576, 576–577 (1851).

Subsection (a)(4). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(4), reflects Massachusetts practice. In Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89 (1831), the court explained that the attorney-client privilege applied to communications to members of the legal profession, and also to those who “facilitate the communication between attorney and client, as interpreters, agents, and attorneys’ clerks” (citations omitted). Id. at 94.

Subsection (a)(5). This subsection is derived from Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 901 N.E.2d 1185 (2009), where the Supreme Judicial Court stated that “information contained within a communication need not itself be confidential for the communication to be deemed privileged; rather the communication must be made in confidence—that is, with the expectation that the communication will not be divulged.” Id. at 305, 901 N.E.2d at 1196. The communication of an otherwise privileged matter to an accountant for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer does not destroy the privilege. Id. at 306–307, 901 N.E.2d at 1196–1197, citing Foster v. Hall, 29 Mass. 89, 92 (1831), and Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. 606, 616, 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (2007). However, in order for the derivative privilege to apply to the communication to an accountant, it must be necessary for effective consultation between client and attorney and not merely useful and convenient. Id. at 308, 901 N.E.2d at 1198 (“We agree with the majority of courts that the Kovel [Kovel v. United States, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)] doctrine applies only when the accountant’s role is to clarify or facilitate communications between attorney and client.”). In Comcast Corp., the Supreme Judicial Court held that an attorney’s communications with an accountant were not privileged because they were not intended to help the lawyer understand the client’s communications to him, but rather to give the lawyer advice about Massachusetts tax law, even though such advice would be helpful to the lawyer in advising his client. Id. at 308–309, 901 N.E.2d at 1198. See also Chambers v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc., 464 Mass. 383, 392, 983 N.E.2d 683, 691 (2013) (attorney-client privilege “does not immunize underlying facts available from another source from discovery just because a client disclosed the facts to an attorney”); Peters v. Wallach, 366 Mass. 622, 627, 321 N.E.2d 806, 809 (1975) (“Communications between an attorney and his client are not privileged, though made privately, if it is understood that the information communicated is to be conveyed to others. The client’s grant of authority to settle must be communicated to the other party to the settlement and is thus not confidential.” [Citations omitted.]).

Subsection (b). Subsections (b)(1), (2), (4), and (5) are derived from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(b), which was cited with approval in Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 424 Mass. 109, 115, 676 N.E.2d 436, 440 (1997) (“The attorney-client privilege applies only when the client’s communication was for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services."). Subsection (b)(3) is derived from Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. 609, 614–617, 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1110–1112 (2007), where the Supreme Judicial Court recognized the “common interest doctrine” and adopted the principle of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76(1) (2000), which states as follows:

“If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as privileged...that relates to the matter is privileged as against third persons. Any such client may invoke the privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the communication.”

This principle expresses the component of the doctrine known as “joint defense agreements,” “joint defense privilege,” or “joint prosecution privilege.” See also Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(b)(3). In Hanover Ins. Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 449 Mass. at 618, 870 N.E.2d at 1113, the Supreme Judicial Court explained that the common-interest doctrine depends on communications that are protected by the attorney-client privilege and is simply an exception to the waiver of the privilege. Thus, there is no requirement of a writing. Id. at 618, 870 N.E.2d at 1113. The court also explained that the legal interests of the parties do not have to be identical in order for the common-interest doctrine to apply. Parties will be deemed to have a common interest when they “share a sufficiently similar interest and attempt to promote that interest by sharing a privileged communication” (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 619, 870 N.E.2d at 1113. Finally, the Supreme Judicial Court also noted that Section 76(2) of the Restatement is consistent with Massachusetts law. Id. at 614 n.4, 870 N.E.2d at 1110 n.4. Section 76(2) states that “[u]nless the clients have agreed otherwise, a communication described in Subsection (1) is not privileged as between clients described in Subsection (1) in a subsequent adverse proceeding between them.” Id., quoting Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76(2) (2000).

Subsection (c). This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(c), reflects Massachusetts practice. See District Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Magraw, 417 Mass. 169, 172–173, 628 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1994). In the case of litigation between a corporation and its shareholders, the corporation may assert the privilege against a shareholder whose interests are opposed to the corporation’s interests, because the privilege belongs to the corporation and not to the individual shareholders. See Chambers v. Gold Medal Bakery, Inc., 464 Mass. 383, 392, 983 N.E.2d 683, 691 (2013); Clair v. Clair, 464 Mass. 205, 218, 982 N.E.2d 32, 42 (2013). A law firm may claim the attorney-client privilege for communications between law firm attorneys and the firm’s in-house counsel against a client who threatens a malpractice claim against the firm if (1) the law firm has designated an attorney or attorneys within the firm to represent the firm in-house counsel; (2) the in-house counsel has not performed any work on the client matter at issue or a substantially related matter; (3) the time spent by the attorneys in these communications with in-house counsel is not billed to a client; and (4) the communications are made in confidence and kept confidential. RFF Family Partnership LLP v. Burns & Levinson LLP, 465 Mass. 702, 703, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1067–1068 (2013).


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Subsection (d)(6). In Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Division of Capital Asset Mgt., 449 Mass. 444, 450, 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (2007), the Supreme Judicial Court held that “confidential communications between public officers and employees and governmental entities and their legal counsel undertaken for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance are protected under the normal rules of the attorney-client privilege.” Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the proposed limitation on the attorney-client privilege for public employees and governmental entities found in Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 502(d)(6). Id. at 452 n.12, 870 N.E.2d at 40 n.12. Additionally, the Supreme Judicial Court held that its decision in General Elec. Co. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 429 Mass. 798, 801–806, 711 N.E.2d 589, 592–595 (1999), which states that under the Massachusetts public records statute, G. L. c. 66, § 10, documents held by a State agency are not protected from disclosure under the attorney work-product doctrine, but rather enjoy the more limited protection of the so-called “deliberative process” exemption found in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d), did not limit the applicability of the attorney-client privilege as to written communications between government officials and entities and their counsel.

"With the attorney-client privilege, the principal focus is on encouraging the client to communicate freely with the attorney; with work-product, it is on encouraging careful and thorough preparation by the attorney. As a result, there are differences in the scope of the protection. For example, the privilege extends only to client communications, while work product encompasses much that has its source outside client communications. At the same time, the privilege extends to client-attorney communications whenever any sort of legal services are being provided, but the work-product protection is limited to preparations for litigation."


Work-Product Doctrine. The work-product doctrine is not an evidentiary privilege, but rather a discovery rule which

“protects a client’s nonlawyer representatives, protecting from discovery documents prepared by a party’s representative ‘in anticipation of litigation.’ The protection is qualified, and can be overcome if the party seeking discovery demonstrates ‘substantial need of the materials’ and that it is ‘unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.’ There is a further limitation: the court is to ‘protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.’ This so-called ‘opinion’ work product is afforded greater protection than ‘fact’ work product.”

The work product doctrine, drawn from the well-known case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), is intended to enhance the vitality of an adversary system of litigation by insulating counsel’s work from intrusions, inferences, or borrowings by other parties as he prepares for the contest. Originally developed in connection with civil litigation, the doctrine has been extended to criminal cases. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1974)." (Citations omitted.)


Initially, the burden is on the party asserting the work-product doctrine to demonstrate that the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation. If that burden is met, the burden shifts to the party seeking access to the document to prove that it cannot obtain the substantial equivalent of the document without undue hardship. If the material is opinion work product, the party seeking access to it must make, at a minimum, a “far stronger showing of necessity and unavailability by other means.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402 (1981). See Commissioner of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 453 Mass. 293, 315, 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1203 (2009).

In Comcast Corp., the Supreme Judicial Court further explained that the phrase “in anticipation of litigation” has been defined by courts in two different ways: (1) whether the documents “are prepared ‘primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation’—a formulation that would potentially exclude documents containing analysis of expected litigation, if their primary, ultimate, or exclusive purpose is to assist in making the business decision,” and (2) whether the documents “were prepared ‘because of’ existing or expected litigation—a formulation that would include such documents, despite the fact that their purpose is not to ‘assist in’ litigation” (citation omitted). Id. at 316, 901 N.E.2d at 1203. In Comcast Corp., the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the second of these two formulations as the law in Massachusetts:

“The ‘because of’ test ‘appropriately focuses on both what should be eligible for the [rule’s] protection and what should not.’ Thus, a document is within the scope of the rule if, in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can be fairly said to have been prepared because of the prospect of litigation.” (citations omitted).

Id. at 316–317, 901 N.E.2d at 1204 (“a litigation analysis prepared so that a party can make an informed business decision is afforded the protections of the work-product doctrine”; additionally, memos prepared for counsel by the accountant that were not protected by the attorney-client privilege also fall within the scope of the opinion work-product doctrine). The formulation of the work-product doctrine in the Federal system may be narrower. See United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009). See also Christian M. Hoffman & Matthew C. Baltay, Maintaining Client Confidences: Developments at the Supreme Judicial Court and First Circuit in 2009, 53 Boston B.J. 4, 20–23 (Fall 2009).

Opinion work product relating to a different case is nonetheless entitled to work-product protection, although it may require a lesser showing to overcome the work-product rule. McCarthy v. Slade Assocs., Inc., 463 Mass. 181, 198 n.37, 972 N.E.2d 1037, 1051 n.37 (2012).

Waiver. For issues relating to waiver, see Section 523, Waiver of Privilege.
Section 503. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:

(1) A “patient” is a person who, during the course of diagnosis or treatment, communicates with a psychotherapist.

(2) A “psychotherapist” is (A) a person licensed to practice medicine who devotes a substantial portion of his or her time to the practice of psychiatry; (B) a person who is licensed as a psychologist by the board of registration of psychologists or a graduate of, or student enrolled in, a doctoral degree program in psychology at a recognized educational institution, who is working under the supervision of a licensed psychologist; or (C) a person who is a registered nurse licensed by the board of registration in nursing whose certificate of registration has been endorsed authorizing the practice of professional nursing in an expanded role as a psychiatric nurse mental health clinical specialist.

(3) “Communications” includes conversations, correspondence, actions, and occurrences relating to diagnosis or treatment before, during, or after institutionalization, regardless of the patient’s awareness of such conversations, correspondence, actions, and occurrences, and any records, memoranda, or notes of the foregoing.

(b) Privilege. Except as hereinafter provided, in any court proceeding and in any proceeding preliminary thereto, and in legislative and administrative proceedings, a patient shall have the privilege of refusing to disclose, and of preventing a witness from disclosing, any communication, wherever made, between said patient and a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental or emotional condition. This privilege shall also apply to patients engaged with a psychotherapist in marital therapy, family therapy, or consultation in contemplation of such therapy. If a patient is incompetent to exercise or waive such privilege, a guardian shall be appointed to act in his or her behalf under this section. A previously appointed guardian shall be authorized to so act.

(c) Effect of Exercise of Privilege. Upon the exercise of the privilege granted by this section, the judge or presiding officer shall instruct the jury that no adverse inference may be drawn therefrom.

(d) Exceptions. The privilege granted hereunder shall not apply to any of the following communications:

(1) Disclosure to Establish Need for Hospitalization or Imminently Dangerous Activity. A disclosure made by a psychotherapist who, in the course of diagnosis or treatment of the patient, determines that the patient is in need of treatment in a hospital for mental or emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently dangerous activity by the patient against himself or herself or another person, and on the basis of such determination discloses such communication either for the purpose of placing or retaining the patient in such hospital, provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall continue in effect after the patient is in said hospital, or placing the patient under arrest or under the supervision of law enforcement authorities;
(2) Court-Ordered Psychiatric Exam. A disclosure made to a psychotherapist in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the court, provided that such disclosure was made after the patient was informed that the communication would not be privileged, and provided further that such communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the patient’s mental or emotional condition but not as a confession or admission of guilt;

(3) Patient Raises the Issue of Own Mental or Emotional Condition as an Element of Claim or Defense. A disclosure in any proceeding, except one involving child custody, adoption, or adoption consent, in which the patient introduces the patient’s mental or emotional condition as an element of a claim or defense, and the judge or presiding officer finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between patient and psychotherapist be protected;

(4) Party Through Deceased Patient Raises Issue of Decedent’s Mental or Emotional Condition as Element of Claim or Defense. A disclosure in any proceeding after the death of a patient in which the patient’s mental or emotional condition is introduced by any party claiming or defending through, or as a beneficiary of, the patient as an element of the claim or defense, and the judge or presiding officer finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between patient and psychotherapist be protected;

(5) Child Custody and Adoption Cases. A disclosure in any case involving child custody, adoption, or the dispensing with the need for consent to adoption in which, upon a hearing in chambers, the judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, determines that the psychotherapist has evidence bearing significantly on the patient’s ability to provide suitable care or custody, and that it is more important to the welfare of the child that the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between patient and psychotherapist be protected; provided, however, that in such cases of adoption or the dispensing with the need for consent to adoption, a judge shall first determine that the patient has been informed that such communication would not be privileged;

(6) Claim Against Psychotherapist. A disclosure in any proceeding brought by the patient against the psychotherapist, and in any malpractice, criminal, or license revocation proceeding, in which disclosure is necessary or relevant to the claim or defense of the psychotherapist; or

(7) Child Abuse or Neglect. A report to the Department of Children and Families of reasonable cause to believe that a child under the age of eighteen has suffered serious physical or emotional injury resulting from sexual abuse, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A.

(8) Exception. In criminal actions, such confidential communications may be subject to discovery and may be admissible as evidence, subject to applicable law.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B.
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Scope of the Privilege. “The privilege gives the patient the right to refuse to disclose and to prevent another witness from disclosing any communication between patient and psychotherapist concerning diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental condition.” Commonwealth v. Clancy, 402 Mass. 664, 667, 524 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1988). The privilege does not protect the facts of the hospitalization or treatment, the dates, or the purpose of the hospitalization or treatment, if such purpose does not implicate communications between the witnesses and the psychotherapist. Id. See Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 395 Mass. 284, 294, 479 N.E.2d 674, 681 (1985) (holding, in context of grand jury investigation into Medicaid fraud, that patient diagnosis is not privileged but portions of records that ‘reflect patients’ thoughts, feelings, and impressions, or contain the substance of the psychotherapeutic dialogue are protected”).


Subsection (c). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B.

Subsection (d)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B(a).

Subsection (d)(2). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B(b). See so Commonwealth v. Lamb, 365 Mass. 265, 270, 311 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1974) (patient’s communications to a psychotherapist in a court-ordered evaluation may not be disclosed against the patient’s wishes absent a warning that the communications would not be privileged).

Subsection (d)(3). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B(c). In Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. 8, 20–21, 972 N.E.2d 1, 11–12 (2012), the Supreme Judicial Court found that the defendant did not put his mental or emotional condition in issue where “the defense was not that the defendant was incapable of forming the intent necessary to support conviction but, rather, that he lacked the requisite intent to harm another.” Id. at 20, 972 N.E.2d at 11. The court held that the “Commonwealth may not introduce against a defendant statements protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege on the ground that the defendant himself placed his mental or emotional condition in issue, unless the defendant has at some point in the proceedings asserted a defense based on his mental or emotional condition, defect, or impairment.” Id. at 21, 972 N.E.2d at 12.

Subsection (d)(4). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B(d).

Subsection (d)(5). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B(e).

Subsection (d)(6). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20B(f).

Subsection (d)(7). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 119, § 51A.

Section 504. Spousal Privilege and Disqualification; Parent-Child Disqualification

(a) Spousal Privilege.

(1) **General Rule.** A spouse shall not be compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint, or other criminal proceeding brought against the other spouse.

(2) **Who May Claim the Privilege.** Only the witness-spouse may claim the privilege.

(3) **Exceptions.** This privilege shall not apply in civil proceedings, or in any prosecution for nonsupport, desertion, neglect of parental duty, or child abuse, including incest.

(b) Spousal Disqualification.

(1) **General Rule.** In any proceeding, civil or criminal, a witness shall not testify as to private conversations with a spouse occurring during their marriage.

(2) **Exceptions.** This disqualification shall not apply to

   (A) a proceeding arising out of or involving a contract between spouses;

   (B) a proceeding to establish paternity or to modify or enforce a support order;

   (C) a prosecution for nonsupport, desertion, or neglect of parental duty;

   (D) child abuse proceedings, including incest;

   (E) any criminal proceeding in which a spouse has been charged with a crime against the other spouse;

   (F) a violation of a vacate, restraining, or no-contact order or judgment issued by a Massachusetts court or a similar protection order from another jurisdiction;

   (G) a declaration of a deceased spouse if the court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant; or

   (H) a criminal proceeding in which the private conversation reveals a bias or motive on the part of a spouse testifying against his or her spouse.

(c) Parent-Child Disqualification.

(1) **Definitions.** As used in this subsection, the following words shall have the following meanings:

   (A) **Minor Child.** A “minor child” is any person under eighteen years of age.

   (B) **Parent.** A “parent” is the natural or adoptive mother or father of the minor child referred to in Subsection (c)(1)(A).
(2) Disqualification. An unemancipated, minor child, living with a parent, shall not testify before a grand jury or at the trial of an indictment, complaint, or other criminal proceeding against said parent where the victim in such proceeding is not a member of said parent’s family and does not reside in the said parent’s household.

NOTE

Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20, Second.

The existence of the privilege depends on whether the spouse who asserts it is then married. The privilege applies even if the spouse was not married at the time of the events that are the subject of the criminal trial, and even if the spouse who asserts the privilege had testified in an earlier proceeding or trial. See Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369, 382, 367 N.E.2d 811, 819 (1977). There is no common-law privilege, similar to the spousal privilege, applicable to unmarried cohabitants. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 422 Mass. 269, 274, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (1996).

The privilege not to testify against a spouse applies regardless of whether the proposed testimony would be favorable or unfavorable to the other spouse. Commonwealth v. Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 578, 511 N.E.2d 529, 533 (1987). The privilege is broad and it applies even though a spouse is called to give testimony concerning “persons other than the spouse.” Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. 88, 97, 849 N.E.2d 797, 804 (2006).

The privilege applies to testimony at trial and not to testimony before a grand jury. See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. at 99, 849 N.E.2d at 805 (court finds it unnecessary to “decide whether, or to what extent, the spousal privilege may be invoked in pretrial [or posttrial proceedings]”). But see Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 864, 933 N.E.2d 633, 641 (2010) (spousal privilege applied at pretrial hearing on motion in limine). The court should conduct a voir dire, outside the presence of the jury, and may inquire of the witness whether he or she will assert the privilege or otherwise refuse to testify. Id. at 864 n.10, 933 N.E.2d at 642 n.10, citing Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 350, 742 N.E.2d 61, 70 (2001). However, a “spouse cannot be forced to testify regarding [his or] her reasons for doing so.” Id.


A spouse may testify against the other spouse if he or she is willing to do so. Commonwealth v. Saltzman, 258 Mass. 109, 110, 154 N.E. 562, 562 (1927). The defendant-spouse has no standing to object to his or her spouse’s testimony. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. at 595, 374 N.E.2d at 95–96. When a spouse decides to waive the privilege and testify against his or her spouse in a criminal proceeding, the judge should be satisfied, outside the presence of the jury, that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Id. at 595 n.9, 374 N.E.2d at 96 n.9.


Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.

The disqualification, unlike the privilege, bars either spouse from testifying to private conversations with the other, even where both spouses wish the communication to be revealed. Gallagher v. Goldstein, 402 Mass. 457, 459, 524 N.E.2d 53, 54 (1988). “The contents of private conversations are absolutely excluded, but the statute does not bar evidence as to the fact that a conversation took place” (citations omitted). Id. The disqualification survives the death of a spouse, see Dexter v. Booth, 84 Mass. 559, 561 (1861), except in civil cases subject to G. L. c. 233, § 65 (“in any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a
deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and wife, as the case may be, if the court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.”). See Section 504(b)(2)(G), Spousal Privilege and Disqualification; Parent-Child Disqualification: Spousal Disqualification: Exceptions.

Whether a conversation was “private” is a question of preliminary fact for the trial judge. See Freeman v. Freeman, 238 Mass. 150, 161–162, 130 N.E. 220, 222 (1921). In the absence of an objection, evidence of private conversations is admissible and may be given its full probative value. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 Mass. 583, 595 n.8, 374 N.E.2d 87, 95 n.8 (1978). However, if there is an objection, the conversation is excluded even if neither spouse objects to the conversation being admitted. Gallagher v. Goldstein, 402 Mass. at 461, 524 N.E.2d at 55; Commonwealth v. Salyer, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 354, 996 N.E.2d 488, 495 (2013).


The Supreme Judicial Court has left open whether the disqualification would bar testimony of a spouse when husband and wife are jointly engaged in criminal activity. Commonwealth v. Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 254 n.4, 780 N.E.2d 26, 33 n.4 (2002).

The defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses may trump the statutory disqualification. “To determine whether the [marital] disqualification should yield to the invoked constitutional rights [in a criminal case the court] look[s] to whether the evidence at issue if admitted might have had a significant impact on the result of the trial” (quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Perl, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 445, 453, 737 N.E.2d 937, 944 (2000) (upholding exclusion of private conversations which would have been cumulative of other evidence).


Subsection (b)(2)(A). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.

Subsection (b)(2)(B). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, First. Spousal disqualification does not apply in any Chapter 209C action. See G. L. c. 209C, § 16(c). It also does not apply to any action to establish paternity, support, or both under the Massachusetts Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Chapter 209D), or to enforce a child support or alimony order. See G. L. c. 209D, § 3-316(h).

Subsection (b)(2)(C). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.

Subsection (b)(2)(E). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.

Subsection (b)(2)(F). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, First.

Subsection (b)(2)(G). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 65.

Subsection (b)(2)(H). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Sugrue, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 175–178, 607 N.E.2d 1045, 1047–1049 (1993), where the Appeals Court explained that the criminal defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation and to a fair trial outweighed the public policy behind the spousal disqualification.

Subsection (c)(1)(A). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 4, § 7, Forty-eighth.

Subsection (c)(1)(B). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.

Subsection (c)(2). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20, Fourth.

The Supreme Judicial Court has declined to recognize a testimonial privilege that parents could exercise to avoid being compelled to testify in criminal proceedings about confidential communications with their children. See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 590–591, 722 N.E.2d 450, 451 (2000) (“the Legislature, in the first instance, is the more appropriate body to weigh the relative social policies and address whether and how such a privilege should be created”).
Section 505. Domestic Violence Victims’ Counselor Privilege

(a) Definitions. The definitions that follow apply to this section unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) Abuse. “Abuse” means causing or attempting to cause physical harm; placing another in fear of imminent physical harm; or causing another to engage in sexual relations against his or her will by force, threat of force, or coercion.

(2) Confidential Communication. A “confidential communication” is information transmitted in confidence by and between a victim and a domestic violence victims’ counselor by a means which does not disclose the information to a person other than a person present for the benefit of the victim, or to those to whom disclosure of such information is reasonably necessary to the counseling and assisting of such victim. The term “information” includes, but is not limited to, reports, records, working papers, or memoranda.

(3) Domestic Violence Victims’ Counselor. A “domestic violence victims’ counselor” is a person who is employed or volunteers in a domestic violence victim’s program; who has undergone a minimum of twenty-five hours of training; who reports to and is under the direct control and supervision of a direct service supervisor of a domestic violence victims’ program; and whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling, or assistance to victims of abuse.

(4) Domestic Violence Victims’ Program. A “domestic violence victims’ program” is any refuge, shelter, office, safe home, institution or center established for the purpose of offering assistance to victims of abuse through crisis intervention, medical, legal, or support counseling.

(5) Victim. A “victim” is a person who has suffered abuse and who consults a domestic violence victims’ counselor for the purpose of securing advice, counseling, or assistance concerning a mental, physical, or emotional condition caused by such abuse.

(b) Privilege. A domestic violence victims’ counselor shall not disclose confidential communications between the counselor and the victim of domestic violence without the prior written consent of the victim. Such confidential communication shall not be subject to discovery in any civil, legislative, or administrative proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim to whom such confidential communication relates, except as provided in Subsection (c).

(c) Exception. In criminal actions, such confidential communications may be subject to discovery and may be admissible as evidence, subject to applicable law.

NOTE

The specific provision in G. L. c. 233, § 20K, for in camera judicial review prior to an order allowing any discovery of material covered by the domestic violence victims' counselor privilege is different from the procedure recently established by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 145–146, 859 N.E.2d at 418–419. See Introductory Note to Article V, Privileges and Disqualifications.
Section 506. Sexual Assault Counselor–Victim Privilege

(a) Definitions. The definitions that follow apply to this section unless the context clearly requires otherwise.

(1) Rape Crisis Center. A “rape crisis center” is any office, institution, or center offering assistance to victims of sexual assault and the families of such victims through crisis intervention, medical, and legal counseling.

(2) Sexual Assault Counselor. A “sexual assault counselor” is a person who (A) is employed by or is a volunteer in a rape crisis center; (B) has undergone thirty-five hours of training; (C) reports to and is under the direct control and supervision of a licensed social worker, nurse, psychiatrist, psychologist, or psychotherapist; and (D) has the primary purpose of rendering advice, counseling, or assistance to victims of sexual assault.

(3) Victim. A “victim” is a person who has suffered a sexual assault and who consults a sexual assault counselor for the purpose of securing advice, counseling, or assistance concerning a mental, physical, or emotional condition caused by such sexual assault.

(4) Confidential Communication. A “confidential communication” is information transmitted in confidence by and between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor by a means which does not disclose the information to a person other than a person present for the benefit of the victim, or to those to whom disclosure of such information is reasonably necessary to the counseling and assisting of such victim. The term includes all information received by the sexual assault counselor which arises out of and in the course of such counseling and assisting, including, but not limited to, reports, records, working papers, or memoranda.

(b) Privilege. A confidential communication as defined in Subsection (a)(4) shall not be disclosed by a sexual assault counselor, is not subject to discovery, and is inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim to whom the report, record, working paper, or memorandum relates. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the defendant’s right of cross-examination of such counselor in a civil or criminal proceeding if such counselor testifies with such written consent.

(c) Exception. In criminal actions, such confidential communications may be subject to discovery and may be admissible as evidence, subject to applicable law.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20J.

This privilege protects only confidential communications between the victim and the counselor and does not extend to the date, time, or fact of the communication. Commonwealth v. Neumyer, 432 Mass. 23, 29, 731 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (2000). The victim’s testimony to the content of a privileged communication under this section does not constitute a waiver of the privilege unless the testimony is given with knowledge of the privilege and an intent to waive it. Id. at 35–36, 731 N.E.2d at 1062. See Section 523(b), Waiver of Privilege: Conduct Constituting Waiver.

Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 145–146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418–419 (2006) (establishing protocol in criminal cases governing access to and use of material covered by privilege). See Introductory Note to Article V, Privileges and Disqualifications.
Section 507. Social Worker–Client Privilege

(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:

(1) **Client.** A “client” is a person with whom a social worker has established a social worker–client relationship.

(2) **Communications.** “Communications” includes conversations, correspondence, actions, and occurrences regardless of the client’s awareness of such conversations, correspondence, actions, and occurrences and any records, memoranda, or notes of the foregoing.

(3) [Reserved]

(4) **Social Worker.** As used in this section, a “social worker” is a social worker licensed pursuant to the provisions of G. L. c. 112, § 132, or a social worker employed in a State, county, or municipal governmental agency.

(b) Privilege. A client shall have the privilege of refusing to disclose and of preventing a witness from disclosing any communication, wherever made, between said client and a social worker relative to the diagnosis or treatment of the client’s mental or emotional condition. If a client is incompetent to exercise or waive such privilege, a guardian shall be appointed to act in the client’s behalf under this section. A previously appointed guardian shall be authorized to so act.

(c) Exceptions. The privilege in Subsection (b) shall not apply to any of the following communications:

(1) if a social worker, in the course of making a diagnosis or treating the client, determines that the client is in need of treatment in a hospital for mental or emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently dangerous activity by the client against himself or herself, or another person, and on the basis of such determination discloses such communication either for the purpose of placing or retaining the client in such hospital; provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall continue in effect after the client is in said hospital, or placing the client under arrest or under the supervision of law enforcement authorities;

(2) if a judge finds that the client, after having been informed that the communications would not be privileged, has made communications to a social worker in the course of a psychiatric examination ordered by the court; provided, however, that such communications shall be admissible only on issues involving the client’s mental or emotional condition but not as a confession or admission of guilt;

(3) in any proceeding, except one involving child custody, adoption, or adoption consent, in which the client introduces his or her mental or emotional condition as an element of a claim or defense, and the judge or presiding officer finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between the client and the social worker be protected;
(4) in any proceeding after the death of a client in which the client’s mental or emotional condition is introduced by any party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the client as an element of the claim or defense, and the judge or presiding officer finds that it is more important to the interests of justice that the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between client and social worker be protected;

(5) in the initiation of proceedings under G. L. c. 119, §§ 23(C) and 24, or G. L. c. 210, § 3, or to give testimony in connection therewith;

(6) in any proceeding whereby the social worker has acquired the information while conducting an investigation pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51B;

(7) in any other case involving child custody, adoption, or the dispensing with the need for consent to adoption in which, upon a hearing in chambers, the judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, determines that the social worker has evidence bearing significantly on the client’s ability to provide suitable care or custody, and that it is more important to the welfare of the child that the communication be disclosed than that the relationship between client and social worker be protected; provided, however, that in such case of adoption or the dispensing with the need for consent to adoption, a judge shall determine that the client has been informed that such communication would not be privileged;

(8) in any proceeding brought by the client against the social worker and in any malpractice, criminal, or license revocation proceeding in which disclosure is necessary or relevant to the claim or defense of the social worker; or

(9) in criminal actions, such privileged communications may be subject to discovery and may be admissible as evidence, subject to applicable law.

NOTE

Subsections (a)(1)–(2). These subsections are taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, § 135.

Subsection (a)(4). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, §§ 135A and 135B. See Bernard v. Commonwealth, 424 Mass. 32, 35, 673 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (1996) (State police trooper employed as a peer counselor qualified as a social worker for purposes of this section).

Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, § 135B. See Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 441 Mass. 257, 261 n.6, 805 N.E.2d 1, 5 n.6 (2004) (characterizing records prepared by clients’ social worker as privileged; privilege is not self-executing).

Subsections (c)(1)–(8). These subsections are taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, § 135B.


Subsection (c)(9). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 145–146, 859 N.E.2d 400, 418–419 (2006) (establishing protocol in criminal cases governing access to and use of
material covered by statutory privilege). See Introductory Note to Article V, Privileges and Disqualifications.
Section 508. Allied Mental Health or Human Services Professional Privilege

(a) Definitions. As used in this section, an “allied mental health and human services professional” is a licensed marriage and family therapist, a licensed rehabilitation counselor, a licensed mental health counselor, or a licensed educational psychologist.

(b) Privilege. Any communication between an allied mental health or human services professional and a client shall be deemed to be confidential and privileged.

(c) Waiver. This privilege shall be subject to waiver only in the following circumstances:

1. where the allied mental health and human services professional is a party defendant to a civil, criminal, or disciplinary action arising from such practice in which case the waiver shall be limited to that action;

2. where the client is a defendant in a criminal proceeding and the use of the privilege would violate the defendant’s right to compulsory process and right to present testimony and witnesses in his or her own behalf;

3. when the communication reveals the contemplation or commission of a crime or a harmful act; and

4. where a client agrees to the waiver, or in circumstances where more than one person in a family is receiving therapy, where each such family member agrees to the waiver.

(d) Exception. In criminal actions, such privileged communications may be subject to discovery and may be admissible as evidence, subject to applicable law.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, § 163. General Laws c. 112, § 165, outlines license eligibility. A licensed educational psychologist must also be certified as a school psychologist by the Massachusetts Department of Education. G. L. c. 112, § 163.

Subsections (b) and (c). These subsections are taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 112, § 172. See Commonwealth v. Vega, 449 Mass. 227, 231, 866 N.E.2d 892, 895 (2007) (the statute creates an evidentiary privilege as well as a confidentiality rule).

These subsections do not prohibit a third-party reimbursor from inspecting and copying any records relating to diagnosis, treatment, or other services provided to any person for which coverage, benefit, or reimbursement is claimed, so long as access occurs in the ordinary course of business and the policy or certificate under which the claim is made provides that such access is permitted. G. L. c. 112, § 172. Further, this section does not apply to access to such records pursuant to any peer review or utilization review procedures applied and implemented in good faith. G. L. c. 112, § 172.
Section 509. Identity of Informer, Surveillance Location, and Protected Witness Privileges

(a) Identity of Informer. The identity of persons supplying the government with information concerning the commission of a crime is privileged in both civil and criminal cases, except there is no privilege under this subsection when

(1) the identity of the informer has been disclosed by the government or by the informer, or is otherwise known, or

(2) the identity of the informer is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a criminal or civil case in which the government is a party. Before the identity of the informer is disclosed, the court must balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare a defense.

(b) Surveillance Location. The exact location, such as the location of a police observation post, used for surveillance is privileged, except there is no privilege under this subsection when a defendant shows that revealing the exact surveillance location would provide evidence needed to fairly present the defendant’s case to the jury.

(c) Protected Witness. The identity and location of a protected witness and any other matter concerning a protected witness or the Commonwealth’s witness protection program is privileged in both civil and criminal cases, except there is no privilege as to the identity and location of the protected witness under this subsection when

(1) the prosecuting officer agrees to a disclosure after balancing the danger posed to the protected witness, the detriment it may cause to the program, and the benefit it may afford to the public or the person seeking discovery, or

(2) disclosure is at the request of a local, State, or Federal law enforcement officer or is in compliance with a court order in circumstances in which the protected witness is under criminal investigation for, arrested for, or charged with a felony.

(d) Who May Claim. These privileges may be claimed by the government.

NOTE


**Amral Hearing.** In keeping with the “four corners rule,” the court should not take any action simply based on an allegation that the affidavit contains false information. Only if the defendant makes an initial showing that “cast[s] a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant concerning a confidential informant” is the court required to act (citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Youngworth, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 30, 38, 769 N.E.2d 299, 307 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1064 (2003). The first step is to conduct an in camera hearing. See Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 416 Mass. 41, 53–54, 617 N.E.2d 983, 989–990 (1993). The informant may be ordered to appear and submit to questions by the court at this “Amral hearing”; however, the identity of the informant is not revealed. The court has discretion to permit the prosecutor to attend this hearing. Neither the defendant nor defense counsel is permitted to attend. See Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. at 525, 554 N.E.2d at 1198. If the court is satisfied that the informant exists and that the defendant’s allegations of false statements are not substantiated, there is no further inquiry. On the other hand, if the defendant makes “a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit,” the court must take the next step (citation omitted). See Commonwealth v. Youngworth, 55 Mass. App. Ct. at 37–38, 769 N.E.2d at 306–307. In this situation, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and to the disclosure of the identity of the informant. The burden of proof at this hearing rests with the defendant to establish that the affiant presented the magistrate with false information purposely or with reckless disregard for its truth. If it is shown that an affidavit in support of a warrant contains false information that was material to the determination of probable cause, suppression of the evidence is required. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–156 (1978); Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. at 519–520, 554 N.E.2d at 1195.

**Subsection (a)(1).** This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Congdon, 265 Mass. 166, 175, 165 N.E. 467, 470 (1928), and Pihl v. Morris, 319 Mass. 577, 579, 66 N.E.2d 804, 806 (1946).

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(1967). See also Commonwealth v. Martin, 362 Mass. 243, 245, 285 N.E.2d 124, 126 (1972) (trial judge “reasonably refused to permit inquiry about an informant who seems merely to have told the police where the defendants were living together”); Commonwealth v. McKay, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 966, 967, 503 N.E.2d 48, 49 (1987) (trial judge was not required to order disclosure of the identity of two inmates who informed on the defendant, although their statements were disclosed and they were not called as witnesses at trial by the Commonwealth). When the informant “is an active participant in the alleged crime or the only nongovernment witness, disclosure [of the identity of the informant] usually has been ordered.” Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. at 572, 548 N.E.2d at 1266.

Where a defendant seeks disclosure of otherwise privileged information to support an entrapment defense, the question is whether the defense has been “appropriately raised . . . by the introduction of some evidence of inducement by a government agent or one acting at his direction.” Commonwealth v. Madigan, 449 Mass. 702, 707, 871 N.E.2d 478, 483 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 651–652, 282 N.E.2d 394, 400 (1972). “The types of conduct that possess the indicia of inducement include ‘aggressive persuasion, coercive encouragement, lengthy negotiations, pleading or arguing with the defendant, repeated or persistent solicitation, persuasion, importuning, and playing on sympathy or other emotion.’” Id. at 708, 871 N.E.2d at 483, quoting Commonwealth v. Tracy, 416 Mass. 528, 536, 624 N.E.2d 84, 89 (1993). See Commonwealth v. Elias, 463 Mass. 1015, 1016, 978 N.E.2d 772, 774–775 (2012) (where defendant’s affidavit states facts sufficient to raise an entrapment defense if informant were an individual named in the affidavit, trial court may require the Commonwealth to affirm whether informant is that individual); Commonwealth v. Mello, 453 Mass. 760, 765, 905 N.E.2d 562, 566 (2009) (reversing trial judge’s order that Commonwealth must disclose the identity of an unnamed informant because the defendant’s proffer showed no more than a solicitation; duty to disclose identity of an undercover police officer or unnamed informant does not carry over to a second unnamed informant unless the second informant participated in the first informant’s inducement).

Unless the relevancy and materiality of the information sought is readily apparent, the party seeking access to the information has the burden to provide the trial judge with the basis for ordering the disclosure. Commonwealth v. Swenson, 368 Mass. 268, 276, 331 N.E.2d 893, 898–899 (1975). When it is not clear from the record whether disclosure of the informant’s identity is required, the court has discretion to hold an in camera hearing to assist in making that determination. Commonwealth v. Dias, 451 Mass. at 472 n.15, 866 N.E.2d at 721 n.15 (“The nature of the in camera hearing is left to the judge.”). In exceptional circumstances, a motion for the disclosure of the identity of an informant may be based on an ex parte affidavit in order to safeguard the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. However, in such a case, before any order of disclosure is made, the Commonwealth must be given a summary or redacted version of the defendant’s affidavit and an opportunity to oppose the defendant’s motion. Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 357–358, 916 N.E.2d 980, 989 (2009).


Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from St. 2006, c. 48, § 1, inserting G. L. c. 263A, entitled “Witness Protection in Criminal Matters.” As for the right of the defense to have access to a Commonwealth witness, see Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 515–518, 209 N.E.2d 308, 314–316 (1965).

Section 510. Religious Privilege

(a) Definitions. As used in this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:

(1) A “clergyman” includes a priest, a rabbi, an ordained or licensed minister of any church, or an accredited Christian Science practitioner.

(2) A “communication” is not limited to conversations, and includes other acts by which ideas may be transmitted from one person to another.

(3) “In his professional character” means in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which the clergyman belongs.

(b) Privilege. A clergyman shall not disclose a confession made to him in his professional character without the consent of the person making the confession. Nor shall a clergyman testify as to any communication made to him by any person seeking religious or spiritual advice or comfort, or as to his advice given thereon in the course of his professional duties or in his professional character, without the consent of such person.

(c) Child Abuse. Any clergyman shall report all cases of child abuse, but need not report information solely gained in a confession or similarly confidential communication in other religious faiths. Nothing shall modify or limit the duty of a clergyman to report a reasonable cause that a child is being injured when the clergyman is acting in some other capacity that would otherwise make him a reporter.

NOTE

Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20A. In Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 454 Mass. 287, 301, 909 N.E.2d 1146, 1158 (2009), the Supreme Judicial Court noted that the privilege is strictly construed and applies only to communications where a penitent “seek[s] religious or spiritual advice or comfort.” In Commonwealth v. Marrero, 436 Mass. 488, 495, 766 N.E.2d 461, 467–468 (2002), the Supreme Judicial Court declined to include the manager of a “Christian rehabilitation center” for drug addicts and alcoholics, who was not an ordained or licensed minister, within the definition of “clergyman.” The court also noted it was not an appropriate case to consider adopting the more expansive definition of “clergyman” found in Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 505(a)(1). Id.


Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20A. See Commonwealth v. Vital. 83 Mass. App. Ct. 669, 673–674, 988 N.E.2d 866, 871 (2013) (a communication by the defendant to his pastor with a request that it be passed on to a person who was the alleged victim of a sexual assault by the defendant was not covered by the privilege because the defendant’s purpose was not to receive “religious or spiritual advice or comfort,” but instead to circumvent the terms of a restraining order).

Subsection (b). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 20A. It is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge whether a communication to a clergyman is within the scope of the privi-
Subsection (c). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 119, § 51A.
Section 511. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

(a) Privilege of Defendant in Criminal Proceeding.

(1) Custodial Interrogation. A person has a right to refuse to answer any questions during a custodial interrogation.

(2) Refusal Evidence.

(A) No Court Order or Warrant. In the absence of a court order or warrant, evidence of a person’s refusal to provide real or physical evidence, or to cooperate in an investigation ordered by State officials, is not admissible in any criminal proceeding.

(B) Court Order or Warrant. When State officials have obtained a court order or warrant for physical or real evidence, a person’s refusal to provide the real or physical evidence is admissible in any criminal proceeding.

(3) Compelled Examination. A defendant has a right to refuse to answer any questions during a court-ordered examination for criminal responsibility.

(4) At a Hearing or Trial. A defendant has a right to refuse to testify at any criminal proceeding.

(b) Privilege of a Witness. Every witness has a right, in any proceeding, civil or criminal, to refuse to answer a question unless it is perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances, that the testimony cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the witness.

(c) Exceptions.

(1) Waiver by Defendant’s Testimony. When a defendant voluntarily testifies in a criminal case, the defendant waives his or her privilege against self-incrimination to the extent that the defendant may be cross-examined on all relevant and material facts regarding that case.

(2) Waiver by Witness’s Testimony. When a witness voluntarily testifies regarding an incriminating fact, the witness may thereby waive the privilege against self-incrimination as to subsequent questions seeking related facts in the same proceeding.

(3) Limitation. A waiver by testimony under Subsection (1) or (2) is limited to the proceeding in which it is given and does not extend to subsequent proceedings.

(4) Required Records. A witness may be required to produce required records because the witness is deemed to have waived his or her privilege against self-incrimination in such records. Required records, as used in this subsection, are those records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established.
(5) Immunity. In any investigation or proceeding, a witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence required may tend to incriminate the witness or subject him or her to a penalty or forfeiture if the witness has been granted immunity with respect to the transactions, matters, or things concerning which the witness is compelled, after having claimed his or her privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence by a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, Appeals Court, or Superior Court.

NOTE

Subsection (a). The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Similarly, Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution provides that "[n]o subject shall . . . be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself." These provisions protect a person from the compelled production of testimonial communications. See Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 758–759, 364 N.E.2d 191, 196 (1977). See also Commonwealth v. Brennan, 386 Mass. 772, 776, 438 N.E.2d 60, 63 (1982). When the privilege is applicable, it may be overcome only by an adequate grant of immunity or a valid waiver. Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. at 761, 364 N.E.2d at 198. Under both Article 12 and the Fifth Amendment, the privilege does not apply to a corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906); Matter of a John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 418 Mass. 549, 552, 637 N.E.2d 858, 860 (1994). Whether the privilege exists, its scope, and whether it has been waived are preliminary questions for the court to decide under Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court.

Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Miranda doctrine, including its accompanying exclusionary rule, has been developed and explained in numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the appellate courts of Massachusetts. See K.B. Smith, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 6.12 et seq. (3d ed. 2007).

In Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1208, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1992), the Supreme Judicial Court opined that legislation permitting the Commonwealth to offer evidence of a person’s refusal to take a breathalyzer test would violate the privilege against self-incrimination under Article 12 because such evidence reveals the person’s thought processes, i.e., it indicates the person has doubts or concerns about the outcome of the test, and thus constitutes testimonial evidence, the admission of which into evidence would violate the privilege under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Federal law and the law of most other States is to the contrary. See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560–561 (1983). See also Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. 139, 142, 714 N.E.2d 343, 348 (1999) (“evidence admitted to show consciousness of guilt is always testimonial because it tends to demonstrate that the defendant knew he was guilty”). The reasoning employed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. at 1208–1211, 591 N.E.2d at 1077–1078, has been extended to other circumstances in which a person refuses to take a test, or to supply the police with real or physical evidence in the absence of a court order or warrant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Conkey, 430 Mass. at 141–143, 714 N.E.2d at 347–348 (evidence of a defendant’s failure to appear at a police station for fingerprinting); Commonwealth v. Hinckley, 422 Mass. 261, 264–265, 661 N.E.2d 1317, 1319–1320 (1996) (evidence of a defendant’s refusal to turn over sneakers for comparison with prints at a crime scene is not admissible); Commonwealth v. McGrail, 419 Mass. 774, 779–780, 647 N.E.2d 712, 715 (1995) (evidence of refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is not admissible); Commonwealth v. Zevitas, 418 Mass. 677, 683, 639 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (1994) (evidence of refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test under G. L. c. 90, § 24, is not admissible); Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 313–315, 597 N.E.2d 36, 39–40 (1992) (evidence of a defendant’s refusal to let his hands be swabbed for the presence of gunpowder residue is not admissible). See also Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209, 214–216, 571 N.E.2d 609, 612–613 (1991) (a suspect may be compelled to provide a handwriting exemplar); Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 534–535, 159 N.E.2d 856, 864 (1959) (defendant may be required to go to the courtroom floor and strike a pose for identification purposes). Contrast Commonwealth v. Delaney, 442 Mass. 604, 607–612 & n.8, 814 N.E.2d 346, 350–353 & n.8 (2004) (explaining that although a warrant involves an element of compulsion, it leaves the individual with no choice other than to comply unlike the compulsion that accompanies a police request for information or evidence during the investigative stage; therefore, the Commonwealth may offer evidence of a defendant’s resistance to a warrant or court order without violating Article 12); Commonwealth v. Brown, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 778–779, 989 N.E.2d 915, 920 (2013) (statements by defendant while performing field sobriety tests expressing difficulty with or inability to do the test are admissible).

Subsection (a)(3). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; G. L. c. 233, § 23B; and Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 364 N.E.2d 191 (1977). At any stage of the proceeding, the trial judge may order a defendant to submit to an examination by one or more qualified physicians or psychologists under G. L. c. 123, § 15(a), on the issue of competency or criminal responsibility.

Competency Examinations. A competency examination does not generally implicate a person’s privilege against self-incrimination because it is concerned with whether the defendant is able to confer intelligently with counsel and to competently participate in the trial of his or her case, and not whether he or she is guilty or innocent. See Seng v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 536, 545, 839 N.E.2d 283, 290–291 (2005). If the competency examination ordered by the court under G. L. c. 123, § 15(a), results in an opinion by the qualified physician or psychologist that the defendant is not competent, the court may order an additional examination by an expert selected by the Commonwealth. G. L. c. 123, § 15(a). “In the circumstances of a competency examination, G. L. c. 233, § 23B, together with the judge-imposed strictures of [Mass. R. Crim. P.] 14(b)(2)(B), protects the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Seng v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. at 548, 839 N.E.2d at 292.

Criminal Responsibility Examination. If a defendant voluntarily submits to an examination on the issue of criminal responsibility by a psychiatrist or a psychologist selected by the defense and decides to offer evidence at trial based on statements made during such an examination, the defendant must give advance notice to the Commonwealth and may be required to submit to an examination and answer ques-
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Subsections by an expert selected by the Commonwealth under a special procedure devised by the Supreme Judicial Court in *Blaisdell v. Commonwealth*, 372 Mass. 753, 364 N.E.2d 191 (1977), and codified in Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(b)(2), whereby the defendant’s statements to the court-ordered examiner are not disclosed to the Commonwealth until the defendant offers evidence at trial based on those statements. In *Blaisdell v. Commonwealth*, 372 Mass. at 766–769, 364 N.E.2d at 200–202, the Supreme Judicial Court held that this procedure was adequate to safeguard the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.

Subsection (a)(4). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; and G. L. c. 233, § 20, Third. Generally, in determining the existence of the privilege, the judge is not permitted to pierce the privilege. See Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court. This privilege is not self-executing. See *Commonwealth v. Brennan*, 386 Mass. 772, 780, 438 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1982).

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; *Wansong v. Wansong*, 395 Mass. 154, 157–158, 478 N.E.2d 1270, 1272 (1985) (civil proceeding); and *Commonwealth v. Baker*, 348 Mass. 60, 62–63, 201 N.E.2d 829, 831–832 (1964) (criminal proceeding). See also *Lefkowitz v. Turley*, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973) (“The [Fifth] Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”). The test used to determine whether an answer might incriminate the witness is the same under both Federal and State law. See *Malloy v. Hogan*, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964). See so *Commonwealth v. Lucien*, 440 Mass. 658, 665, 801 N.E.2d 247, 254 (2004); *Commonwealth v. Funches*, 379 Mass. 283, 289, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (1979). Also, under both Federal and State law, a public employee cannot be discharged or disciplined solely because the employee asserts his or her privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions by the public employer. *Furtado v. Plymouth*, 451 Mass. 529, 530 n.2, 888 N.E.2d 357, 358 n.2 (2008). In *Furtado*, the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the “criminal investigations” exception to G. L. c. 149, § 19B, which forbids the use of lie detector tests in the employment context except in very limited circumstances, as permitting a police chief to require a police officer under departmental investigation to submit to a lie detector test as a condition of his continued employment on grounds that there was an investigation of possible criminal activity, even though the police officer had been granted transactional immunity and could not be prosecuted criminally for that conduct. *Id.* at 532–538, 888 N.E.2d at 359–364. Unlike other testimonial privileges, the privilege against self-incrimination should be liberally construed in favor of the person claiming it. *Commonwealth v. Koonce*, 418 Mass. 364, 367, 378, 636 N.E.2d 1305, 1311 (1994). This privilege is not self-executing. See *Commonwealth v. Brennan*, 386 Mass. 772, 780, 438 N.E.2d 60, 65 (1982).

**Martin Hearing.** Whenever a witness or the attorney for a witness asserts the privilege against self-incrimination, the judge “has a duty to satisfy himself that invocation of the privilege is proper in the circumstances.” *Commonwealth v. Martin*, 423 Mass. 496, 503, 668 N.E.2d 825, 831 (1996). The mere assertion of the privilege is not sufficient. The witness or counsel must show “a real risk” that answers to the questions will tend to indicate “involvement in illegal activity,” as opposed to “a mere imaginary, remote or speculative possibility of prosecution.” *Id.* at 502, 668 N.E.2d at 830. If the court is unable to make the required finding that a basis exists for the assertion of the privilege, it may conduct an in camera hearing (hereafter “Martin hearing”) and require the witness to “open the door a crack.” *Id.* at 504–505, 668 N.E.2d at 832, quoting *In re Brogna*, 589 F.2d 24, 28 n.5 (1st Cir. 1978). “A witness also is not entitled to make a blanket assertion of the privilege. The privilege must be asserted with respect to particular questions, and the possible incriminatory potential of each proposed question, or area which the prosecution might wish to explore, must be considered.” *Commonwealth v. Martin*, 423 Mass. at 502, 668 N.E.2d at 830. If, however, it is apparent that most, if not all, of the questions will expose the witness to self-incrimination, and there is no objection, it is not necessary for the witness to assert the privilege as to each and every question. *Commonwealth v. Sueiras*, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 445–446, 892 N.E.2d 768, 774–775 (2008).
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A Martin hearing should not be conducted when the statements by the witness or counsel in open court are sufficient to support the witness’s claim of privilege. Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 843, 985 N.E.2d 1204 (2013). Neither the defendant nor counsel has a right to be present during a Martin hearing. Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 318, 893 N.E.2d 19, 40 (2008). If the judge rules that there is a valid basis for the witness to assert the privilege, the defendant has no right to call that witness. Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827, 834, 906 N.E.2d 320, 326 (2009). At the conclusion of a Martin hearing, the trial judge should seal the transcript or tape of the hearing, which may be reopened “only by an appellate court on appellate review.” Id., at 836–837, 906 N.E.2d at 328–329. “A person may not seek to obtain a benefit or to turn the legal process to his advantage while claiming the privilege as a way of escaping from obligations and conditions that are normally incident to the claim he makes.” Mello v. Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 421 Mass. 333, 338, 656 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (1995) (party seeking to recover insurance benefits as a result of a fire loss properly had summary judgment entered against him for refusing to submit to an examination required by his policy on grounds that his answers to questions would tend to incriminate him). See also Department of Revenue v. B.P., 412 Mass. 1015, 1016, 593 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (1992) (in paternity case, court may draw adverse inference against party who asserts the privilege and refuses to submit to blood and genetic marker testing); Wansong v. Wansong, 395 Mass. at 157–158, 478 N.E.2d at 1272–1273 (discovery sanction). In addition, the court has discretion to reject claims by parties that they are entitled to continuances of administrative proceedings or civil trials until after a criminal trial because they will not testify for fear of self-incrimination. See Oznemoc, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm’n, 412 Mass. 100, 105, 587 N.E.2d 751, 754–755 (1992); Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. 300, 305–306, 249 N.E.2d 583, 586 (1969). Whenever a court faces a decision about the consequence of a party’s assertion of the privilege in a civil case, “the judge’s task is to balance any prejudice to the other civil litigants which might result . . . against the potential harm to the party claiming the privilege if he is compelled to choose between defending the civil action and protecting himself from criminal prosecution” (citations and quotations omitted). Wansong v. Wansong, 395 Mass. at 157, 478 N.E.2d at 1272.

The existence of the privilege against self-incrimination does not shield a witness, other than a defendant in a criminal case, from being called before the jury to give testimony. See Kaye v. Newhall, 356 Mass. at 305, 249 N.E.2d at 586. The trial judge has discretion to deny a defense request for process to bring an out-of-State witness back for trial based on evidence that there is a factual basis for the witness to assert his or her privilege against self-incrimination and a representation by the witness’s attorney that the witness will invoke his or her privilege if called to testify. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 294–295, 885 N.E.2d 105, 111–112 (2008). The assertion of the privilege by a party or a witness in a civil case may be the subject of comment by counsel, and the jury may be permitted to draw an adverse inference against a party as a result. See Section 525(a), Comment upon or Inference from Claim of Privilege: Civil Case.

Subsection (c)(1). This subsection is derived from Jones v. Commonwealth, 327 Mass. 491, 493, 99 N.E.2d 456, 457 (1951). In such a case, the cross-examination is not limited to the scope of direct examination and may include inquiry about any matters that may be made the subject of impeachment. See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 21; Commonwealth v. Seymour, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 672, 675, 660 N.E.2d 679, 681 (1996).

Subsection (c)(2). This subsection is derived from Taylor v. Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 183, 189–191, 338 N.E.2d 823, 827–828 (1975). Though a witness may waive the privilege against self-incrimination as to subsequent questions by voluntarily testifying regarding an “incriminating fact,” if a question put to the witness poses “a real danger of legal detriment,” i.e., the answer might provide another link in the chain of evidence leading to a conviction, the witness may still have a basis for asserting the privilege against self-incrimination. See Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 290–291 & nn.8–10, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 & nn.8–10 (1979). In Commonwealth v. King, 436 Mass. 252, 258 n.6, 763 N.E.2d 1071, 1078 n.6 (2002), the Supreme Judicial Court explained the scope of this doctrine by stating that “[t]he waiver, once made, waives the privilege only with respect to the same proceeding; the witness may once again invoke the privilege in any subsequent proceeding.” See Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 500–501, 668 N.E.2d 825, 829–830 (1996) (waiver of privilege before grand jury does not waive privilege at trial); Commonwealth
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Subsection (c)(4). This subsection is derived from Stornanti v. Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 518, 521–522, 451 N.E.2d 707, 710 (1983) (“The required records exception applies when three requirements are met: First, the purposes of the State’s inquiry must be essentially regulatory; second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed ‘public aspects’ which render them at least analogous to public documents” [quotations and citation omitted].). See also Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 438–441, 504 N.E.2d 652, 656–658 (1987) (court notes that if the records in question are required to be kept by lawyers there is nothing incriminating about the fact that they exist and are in the possession of the lawyer required to produce them).

Section 512.  Jury Deliberations

See Section 606(b), Competency of Juror as Witness: Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment.
Section 513. Medical Peer Review Privilege

(a) Definitions.

(1) As used in this section, “medical peer review committee” is a committee of a State or local professional society of health care providers, including doctors of chiropractic, or of a medical staff of a public hospital or licensed hospital or nursing home or health maintenance organization organized under G. L. c. 176G, provided the medical staff operates pursuant to written bylaws that have been approved by the governing board of the hospital or nursing home or health maintenance organization or a committee of physicians established pursuant to Section 12 of G. L. c. 111C for the purposes set forth in G. L. c. 111, § 203(f), which committee has as its function the evaluation or improvement of the quality of health care rendered by providers of health care services, the determination whether health care services were performed in compliance with the applicable standards of care, the determination whether the cost of health care services were performed in compliance with the applicable standards of care, determination whether the cost of the health care services rendered was considered reasonable by the providers of health services in the area, the determination of whether a health care provider’s actions call into question such health care provider’s fitness to provide health care services, or the evaluation and assistance of health care providers impaired or allegedly impaired by reason of alcohol, drugs, physical disability, mental instability, or otherwise; provided, however, that for purposes of Sections 203 and 204 of G. L. c. 111, a non-profit corporation, the sole voting member of which is a professional society having as members persons who are licensed to practice medicine, shall be considered a medical peer review committee; provided, further, that its primary purpose is the evaluation and assistance of health care providers impaired or allegedly impaired by reason of alcohol, drugs, physical disability, mental instability, or otherwise.

(2) “Medical peer review committee” also includes a committee of a pharmacy society or association that is authorized to evaluate the quality of pharmacy services or the competence of pharmacists and suggest improvements in pharmacy systems to enhance patient care, or a pharmacy peer review committee established by a person or entity that owns a licensed pharmacy or employs pharmacists that is authorized to evaluate the quality of pharmacy services or the competence of pharmacists and suggest improvements in pharmacy systems to enhance patient care.

(b) Privilege.

(1) Proceedings, Reports, and Records of Medical Peer Review Committee. The proceedings, reports, and records of a medical peer review committee shall be confidential and shall be exempt from the disclosure of public records under Section 10 of G. L. c. 66, shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery prior to the initiation of a formal administrative proceeding pursuant to G. L. c. 30A, and shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery, or introduced into evidence, in any judicial or administrative proceeding, except proceedings held by the boards of registration in medicine, social work, or psychology or by the Department of Public Health pursuant to G. L. c. 111C, and no person who was in attendance at a meeting of
a medical peer review committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such judicial or administrative proceeding, except proceedings held by the boards of registration in medicine, social work, or psychology or by the Department of Public Health pursuant to G. L. c. 111C, as to the proceedings of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, deliberations, or other actions of such committee or any members thereof.

(2) Work Product of Medical Peer Review Committee. Information and records which are necessary to comply with risk management and quality assurance programs established by the board of registration in medicine and which are necessary to the work product of medical peer review committees designated by the patient care assessment coordinator are subject to the protections afforded to materials subject to Subsection (b)(1), except that such information and records may be inspected, maintained, and utilized by the board of registration in medicine, including but not limited to its data repository and disciplinary unit. Such information and records inspected, maintained, or utilized by the board of registration in medicine shall remain confidential, and not subject to subpoena, discovery, or introduction into evidence, consistent with Subsection (b)(1), except that such records may not remain confidential if disclosed in an adjudicatory proceeding of the board of registration in medicine.

(c) Exceptions. There is no restriction on access to or use of the following, as indicated:

(1) Documents, incident reports, or records otherwise available from original sources shall not be immune from subpoena, discovery, or use in any such judicial or administrative proceeding merely because they were presented to such committee in connection with its proceedings.

(2) The proceedings, reports, findings, and records of a medical peer review committee shall not be immune from subpoena, discovery, or use as evidence in any proceeding against a member of such committee who did not act in good faith and in a reasonable belief that based on all of the facts the action or inaction on his or her part was warranted. However, the identity of any person furnishing information or opinions to the committee shall not be disclosed without the permission of such person.

(3) An investigation or administrative proceeding conducted by the boards of registration in medicine, social work, or psychology or by the Department of Public Health pursuant to G. L. c. 111C.

(d) Testimony Before Medical Peer Review Committee. A person who testifies before a medical peer review committee or who is a member of such committee shall not be prevented from testifying as to matters known to such person independent of the committee’s proceedings, provided that, except in a proceeding against a witness in Subsection (c)(2), neither the witness nor members of the committee may be questioned regarding the witness’s testimony before such committee, and further provided that committee members may not be questioned in any proceeding about the identity of any person furnishing information or opinions to the committee, opinions formed by them as a result of such committee proceedings, or about the deliberations of such committee.

(e) Non–Peer Review Records and Testimony. Records of treatment maintained pursuant to G. L. c. 111, § 70, or incident reports or records or information which are not necessary to comply
with risk management and quality assurance programs established by the board of registration in medicine shall not be deemed to be proceedings, reports, or records of a medical peer review committee; nor shall any person be prevented from testifying as to matters known by such person independent of risk management and quality assurance programs established by the board of registration in medicine.

NOTE

Introduction. The medical peer review privilege, unlike so many other privileges, is not based on the importance of maintaining the confidentiality between a professional and a client, but rather was established to promote rigorous and candid evaluation of professional performance by a provider’s peers. See Beth Israel Hosp. Ass’n v. Board of Registration in Med., 401 Mass. 172, 182–183, 515 N.E.2d 574, 579–580 (1987). This is accomplished by requiring hospitals and medical staffs to establish procedures for medical peer review proceedings, see G. L. c. 111, § 203(a), and by legal safeguards against the disclosure of the identity of physicians who participate in peer review and immunity to prevent such physicians from civil liability. See Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 396, 822 N.E.2d 667, 691, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 927 (2005).

Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, § 1.

Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, § 1. A licensed pharmacy is permitted to establish a pharmacy peer review committee:

“A licensed pharmacy may establish a pharmacy peer review committee to evaluate the quality of pharmacy services or the competence of pharmacists and suggest improvements in pharmacy systems to enhance patient care. The committee may review documentation of quality-related activities in a pharmacy, assess system failures and personnel deficiencies, determine facts, and make recommendations or issue decisions in a written report that can be used for contiguous quality improvement purposes. A pharmacy peer review committee shall include the members, employees, and agents of the committee, including assistants, investigators, attorneys, and any other agents that serve the committee in any capacity.”

G. L. c. 111, § 203(g).

Subsection (b). Both Subsection (b)(1), which is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, § 204(a), and Subsection (b)(2), which is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, § 205(b), “shield information from the general public and other third parties to the same extent, [but] only information protected by § 204(a) [Subsection (b)(1)] is shielded from the board [of registration in medicine] prior to the commencement of a G. L. c. 30A proceeding.” Board of Registration in Med. v. Hallmark Health Corp., 454 Mass. 498, 508, 910 N.E.2d 898, 906 (2009). “Determining whether the medical peer review privilege applies turns on the way in which a document was created and the purpose for which it was used, not on its content. Examining that content in camera will therefore do little to aid a judge . . . .” Carr v. Howard, 426 Mass. 514, 531, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1314 (1998). However, the peer review privilege does not prevent discovery into the process by which a given record or report was created in order to determine whether the information sought falls within the privilege. Id.

Subsection (b)(1). This subsection applies to “proceedings, reports and records of a medical peer review committee.” G. L. c. 111, § 204(a). Material qualifies for protection under this subsection if it was created “by, for, or otherwise as a result of a ‘medical peer review committee.’” Board of Registration in Med. v. Hallmark Health Corp., 454 Mass. 498, 509, 910 N.E.2d 898, 907 (2009), quoting Miller v. Milton Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 499, 766 N.E.2d 107, 111 (2002). See Carr v. Howard, 426 Mass. 514, 522 n.7, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1309 n.7 (1998) (asserting privilege of G. L. c. 111, § 204(a), [Subsection (b)(1)] requires evidence that materials sought "were not merely 'presented to [a] committee in connection with its proceedings,' . . . but were, instead, themselves, 'proceedings, reports and records' of a peer review committee under § 204(a)").

Subsection (b)(2). This subsection applies to materials that, while not necessarily "proceedings, reports and records" of a peer review committee, are nonetheless "necessary to comply with risk management and quality assurance programs established by the board and which are necessary to the work product of medical peer review committees." G. L. c. 111, § 205(b). Such materials include "incident reports required to be furnished to the [board] or any information collected or compiled by a physician credentialing verification service operated by a society or organization of medical professionals for the purpose of providing credentialing information to health care entities." Id. The protections afforded to materials covered by Subsection (b)(2) differ from those afforded by Subsection (b)(1) in that documents protected by Subsection (b)(2) "may be inspected, maintained and utilized by the board of registration in medicine, including but not limited to its data repository and disciplinary unit," and this subsection does not require that such access be conditioned on the commencement of a formal adjudicatory proceeding. G. L. c. 111, § 205(b).

Subsection (c). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, § 204(b), and Pardo v. General Hosp. Corp., 446 Mass. 1, 11–12, 841 N.E.2d 692, 700–701 (2006), where the Supreme Judicial Court observed that

"the privilege can only be invaded on some threshold showing that a member of a medical peer review committee did not act in good faith in connection with his activities as a member of the committee, for example did not provide the medical peer review committee with a full and honest disclosure of all of the relevant circumstances, but sought to mislead the committee in some manner."

In Pardo, the court held that the privilege was not overcome by the allegation that a member of the committee initiated an action for a discriminatory reason. Id. See also Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 448 Mass. 425, 447, 862 N.E.2d 11, 21 (2007).

Subsection (d). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, § 204(c).

Subsection (e). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 111, § 205.
Section 514. Mediation Privilege

(a) Definition. For the purposes of this section, a “mediator” shall mean a person not a party to a dispute who enters into a written agreement with the parties to assist them in resolving their disputes and has completed at least thirty hours of training in mediation, and who either (1) has four years of professional experience as a mediator, (2) is accountable to a dispute resolution organization which has been in existence for at least three years, or (3) has been appointed to mediate by a judicial or governmental body.

(b) Privilege Applicable to Mediator Work Product. All memoranda and other work product prepared by a mediator and a mediator’s case files shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding involving any of the parties to any mediation to which such materials apply.

(c) Privilege Applicable to Parties’ Communications. Any communication made in the course of and relating to the subject matter of any mediation and which is made in the presence of such mediator by any participant, mediator, or other person shall be a confidential communication and not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding.

(d) Privilege Applicable in Labor Disputes. Any person acting as a mediator in a labor dispute who receives information as a mediator relating to the labor dispute shall not be required to reveal such information received by him or her in the course of mediation in any administrative, civil, or arbitration proceeding. This provision does not apply to criminal proceedings.

NOTE

Subsections (a), (b), and (c). These subsections are derived from G. L. c. 233, § 23C. Although there are no express exceptions to the privilege set forth in Subsections (a), (b), and (c), the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that the mediation privilege is subject to the doctrine of “at issue” waiver. See Bobick v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 439 Mass. 652, 658 n.11, 790 N.E.2d 653, 658 n.11 (2003), citing Darius v. City of Boston, 433 Mass. 274, 277–278, 741 N.E.2d 52, 54–55 (2001), and cases cited. See also Section 523(b)(2), Waiver of Privilege: Conduct Constituting Waiver.

Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 150, § 10A.
Section 515. Investigatory Privilege

Unless otherwise required by law, information given to governmental authorities in order to secure the enforcement of law is subject to disclosure only within the discretion of the governmental authority.

NOTE


Although this privilege is described as “absolute,” it is qualified by the duty of the prosecutor to provide discovery to a person charged with a crime. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14. Moreover, as to certain kinds of information, the privilege is also qualified by the Massachusetts public records law. See G. L. c. 66, § 10. General Laws c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (f), provides that investigatory materials, including information covered by this privilege, are regarded as a public record and thus subject to disclosure even though the material is compiled out of the public view by law enforcement or other investigatory officials, provided that the disclosure of the investigatory materials would not “so prejudice the possibility of effective law enforcement that such disclosure would not be in the public interest.” Rafuse v. Stryker, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 597, 813 N.E.2d 558, 561 (2004), quoting Bougas v. Chief of Police of Lexington, 371 Mass. 59, 62, 354 N.E.2d 872, 876 (1976). See Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp. v. Chief of Police of Worcester, 436 Mass. 378, 383, 764 N.E.2d 847, 852–853 (2002) (describing the process for determining whether material is exempt from disclosure as a public record).

Section 516. Political Voter Disqualification

A voter who casts a ballot may not be asked and may not disclose his or her vote in any proceeding unless the court finds fraud or intentional wrongdoing.

NOTE

This section is derived from McCavitt v. Registrars of Voters, 385 Mass. 833, 848–849, 434 N.E.2d 620, 630–631 (1982), in which the court held “that the right to a secret ballot is not an individual right which may be waived by a good faith voter.” Id. at 849, 434 N.E.2d at 631.

Cross-Reference: Section 511, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.
Section 517. Trade Secrets

[Privilege not recognized]

NOTE

In *Gossman v. Rosenberg*, 237 Mass. 122, 124, 129 N.E. 424, 425–426 (1921), the Supreme Judicial Court held that a witness could not claim a privilege as to trade secrets. Cf. Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 507. However, public access to information about trade secrets in a public agency's possession may be limited. See G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (g) (excluding from the definition of "public records" any "trade secrets or commercial or financial information voluntarily provided to an agency for use in developing governmental policy and upon a promise of confidentiality"). The confidentiality of trade secrets also may be maintained by means of a protective order whereby a court may protect from disclosure during discovery "a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information." Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 14(a)(5). The court may issue such a protective order on motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought and if good cause is shown. Mass. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
Section 518. Executive or Governmental Privilege

[Privilege not recognized]

NOTE


Access to inter-agency or intra-agency reports, papers, and letters relating to the development of policy is governed by G. L. c. 66, § 10, the public records statute. This law creates a presumption that all records are public, G. L. c. 66, § 10(c), and places on the custodian of the record the burden of establishing that a record is exempt from disclosure because it falls within one of a series of specifically enumerated exemptions set forth in G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth. Id. Under G. L. c. 4, § 7, Twenty-sixth (d), the following material is exempt from public disclosure: “inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters relating to policy positions being developed by the agency; but this subclause shall not apply to reasonably completed factual studies or reports on which the development of such policy positions has been or may be based.” Id. “The Legislature has . . . chosen to insulate the deliberative process from scrutiny only until it is completed, at which time the documents thereby generated become publicly available.” Babets v. Secretary of Human Servs., 403 Mass. at 237 n.8, 526 N.E.2d at 1265 n.8.
Section 519. State and Federal Tax Returns

(a) State Tax Returns.

(1) Disclosure by Commissioner of Revenue. The disclosure by the commissioner, or by any deputy, assistant, clerk or assessor, or other employee of the Commonwealth or of any city or town therein, to any person but the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative, of any information contained in or set forth by any return or document filed with the commissioner is prohibited.

(2) Production by Taxpayer. Massachusetts State tax returns are privileged, and a taxpayer cannot be compelled to produce them in discovery.

(3) Exceptions. Subsection (a)(1) does not apply in proceedings to determine or collect the tax, or to certain criminal prosecutions.

(b) Federal Tax Returns.

(1) General Rule. Federal tax returns are subject to a qualified privilege. The taxpayer is entitled to a presumption that the returns are privileged and are not subject to discovery.

(2) Exceptions. A taxpayer who is a party to litigation can be compelled to produce Federal tax returns upon a showing of substantial need by the party seeking to compel production.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 62C, § 21(a). General Laws c. 62C, § 21(b), sets forth twenty-three exceptions, most of which pertain to limited disclosures of tax information to other government agencies or officials.

The commissioner also has authority to disclose tax information to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and certain tax officials in other jurisdictions. See G. L. c. 62C, § 22.

A violation of G. L. c. 62C, § 21, may be punishable as a misdemeanor. G. L. c. 62C, § 21(c).


Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Finance Comm’n of Boston v. McGrath, 343 Mass. 754, 180 N.E.2d 808, 817 (1962).

Section 520. Tax Return Preparer

(a) Definition. For the purposes of this section, a person is engaged in the business of preparing tax returns if the person advertises, or gives publicity to the effect that the person prepares or assists others in the preparation of tax returns, or if he or she prepares or assists others in the preparation of tax returns for compensation.

(b) Privilege. No person engaged in the business of preparing tax returns shall disclose any information obtained in the conduct of such business, unless such disclosure is consented to in writing by the taxpayer in a separate document, or is expressly authorized by State or Federal law, or is necessary to the preparation of the return, or is made pursuant to court order.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 62C, § 74. A violation of this statute may be punishable as a misdemeanor.
Section 521. Sign Language Interpreter–Client Privilege

(a) Definitions. For the purpose of this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:

(1) Client. A “client” is a person rendered interpreting services by a qualified interpreter.

(2) Qualified Interpreter. A “qualified interpreter” is a person skilled in sign language or oral interpretation and transliteration, has the ability to communicate accurately with a deaf or hearing-impaired person, and is able to translate information to and from such hearing-impaired person.

(3) Confidential Communication. A communication is confidential if a client has a reasonable expectation or intent that it not be disclosed to persons other than those to whom such disclosure is made.

(b) Privilege. A client has a privilege to prevent a qualified interpreter from disclosing a confidential communication between one or more persons where the communication was facilitated by the interpreter.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 221, § 92A. The statute’s definition of a “qualified interpreter” states that “[a]n interpreter shall be deemed qualified or intermediary as determined by the Office of Deafness, based upon the recommendations of the Massachusetts Registry of the Deaf, the Massachusetts State Association of the Deaf and other appropriate agencies.” G. L. c. 221, § 92A.

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 221, § 92A. The portion of G. L. c. 221, § 92A, that establishes the privilege references “a certified sign language interpreter,” but the statute does not specifically define that term. Accordingly, to be consistent with the terms actually defined in G. L. c. 221, § 92A, this subsection uses the term “qualified interpreter.” There is no case law in Massachusetts which defines the scope of this privilege.

Appointment of Interpreter. The interpreter must be appointed by the court as part of a court proceeding. See G. L. c. 221, § 92A (“In any proceeding in any court in which a deaf or hearing-impaired person is a party or a witness . . . such court . . . shall appoint a qualified interpreter to interpret the proceedings”). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 41 (“The judge may appoint an interpreter or expert if justice so requires and may determine the reasonable compensation for such services and direct payment therefor.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(f) (“The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix his reasonable compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed ultimately as costs, in the discretion of the court.”).

Section 522. Interpreter-Client Privilege

(a) Definitions. For the purpose of this section, the following words shall have the following meanings:

(1) Interpreter. An “interpreter” is a person who is readily able to interpret written and spoken language simultaneously and consecutively from English to the language of the non-English speaker or from said language to English.

(2) Non-English Speaker. A “non-English speaker” is a person who cannot speak or understand, or has difficulty in speaking or understanding, the English language, because he or she uses only or primarily a spoken language other than English.

(b) Privilege. Disclosures made out of court by communications of a non-English speaker through an interpreter to another person shall be a privileged communication, and the interpreter shall not disclose such communication without permission of the non-English speaker.

(c) Scope. The privilege applies when the non-English speaker had a reasonable expectation or intent that the communication would not be disclosed.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 221C, § 1.

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 221C, § 4(c). See Section 4.06 of the “Standards and Procedures of the Office of Court Interpreter Services,” 1143 Mass. Reg. 15 (Nov. 13, 2009), which is available at http://www.mass.gov/courts/ocis-standards-procedures.pdf (“Court interpreters shall protect the confidentiality of all privileged and other confidential information.”).

Subsection (c). This subsection is derived nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 221C, § 4(c). There is no case law in Massachusetts that defines the scope of this privilege.

Right to Assistance of an Interpreter. General Laws c. 221C, § 2, states as follows:

“A non-English speaker, throughout a legal proceeding, shall have a right to the assistance of a qualified interpreter who shall be appointed by the judge, unless the judge finds that no qualified interpreter of the non-English speaker’s language is reasonably available, in which event the non-English speaker shall have the right to a certified interpreter, who shall be appointed by the judge.”

See Mass. R. Crim. P. 41 (“The judge may appoint an interpreter or expert if justice so requires and may determine the reasonable compensation for such services and direct payment therefor.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(f) (“The court may appoint an interpreter of its own selection and may fix his reasonable compensation. The compensation shall be paid out of funds provided by law or by one or more of the parties as the court may direct, and may be taxed ultimately as costs, in the discretion of the court.”). See also G. L. c. 221C, § 3 (waiver of right to interpreter).

Procedural Issues. The statute requires the interpreter to swear or affirm to “make true and impartial interpretation using [the interpreter’s] best skill and judgment in accordance with the standards prescribed by
law and the ethics of the interpreter profession." G. L. c. 221C, § 4(a). The statute also states that “[i]n any proceeding, the judge may order all of the testimony of a non-English speaker and its interpretation to be electronically recorded for use in audio or visual verification of the official transcript of the proceedings.” G. L. c. 221C, § 4(b).

Section 523. Waiver of Privilege

(a) Who Can Waist. A privilege holder or his or her legally appointed guardian, administrator, executor, or heirs can waive the privilege.

(b) Conduct Constituting Waiver. Except as provided in Section 524, Privileged Matter Disclosed Erroreously or Without Opportunity to Claim Privilege, a privilege is waived if the person upon whom this Article confers a privilege against disclosure

1) voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter or

2) introduces privileged communications as an element of a claim or defense.

(c) Conduct Not Constituting Waiver. A person upon whom this Article confers a privilege against disclosure does not waive the privilege if

1) the person merely testifies as to events which were a topic of a privileged communication, or

2) there is an unintentional disclosure of a privileged communication and reasonable precautions were taken to prevent the disclosure.

NOTE


Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Matter of the Reorganization of Elec. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. (Bermuda), 425 Mass. 419, 423 n.4, 681 N.E.2d 838, 841 n.4 (1997), where the Supreme Judicial Court noted that Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 510 was consistent with the views of the court.

Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from the concept of an “at issue” waiver which the Supreme Judicial Court recognized in Darius v. City of Boston, 433 Mass. 274, 284, 741 N.E.2d 52, 59 (2001). An “at issue” waiver is not a blanket waiver of the privilege, but rather “a limited waiver of the privilege with respect to what has been put ‘at issue.’” Id. at 283, 741 N.E.2d at 58. See, e.g., Global Investors Agent Corp. v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 818–820, 927 N.E.2d 480, 488–490 (2010) (determining that a limited at-issue waiver of the plaintiff’s attorney-client privilege occurred because its claim for consequential damages was based in part on the advice it received from its attorney in the underlying action). Accord Commonwealth v. Brito, 390 Mass. 112, 119, 453 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (1983) (“Once such a charge [of ineffectiveness of counsel] is made, the attorney-client privilege may be treated as waived at least in part, but trial counsel’s obligation may continue to preserve confidences whose disclosure is not relevant to the defense of the charge of his ineffectiveness as counsel.”). In addition, the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of an “at issue” waiver must establish that the privileged information is not available from any other source. Darius v. City of Boston, 433 Mass. at 284, 741 N.E.2d at 59.
Subsection (c)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Goldman, 395 Mass. 495, 499–500, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1027, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1985). Though a witness does not waive the privilege merely by testifying as to events which were a topic of a privileged communication, a waiver occurs when the witness testifies as to the specific content of an identified privileged communication. Id. In Commonwealth v. Goldman, the Supreme Judicial Court specifically left open the question whether in a criminal case the rule embodied in this subsection would have to yield to the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation. Id. at 502 n.8, 480 N.E.2d at 1028 n.8. See also Commonwealth v. Neumyer, 432 Mass. 23, 29, 731 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (2000) (waiver of sexual assault counselor privilege); Commonwealth v. Clancy, 402 Mass. 664, 668–669, 524 N.E.2d 395, 397–398 (1988) (waiver of patient-psychotherapist privilege).


Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Waivers in Federal Proceedings. On September 19, 2008, Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was enacted. See Pub. L. 110-322, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess. The rule is applicable “in all proceedings commenced after the date of enactment . . . and, insofar as is just and practicable, in all proceedings pending” on that date. The rule was developed in response to concerns about the rising cost of discovery, especially electronic discovery, in Federal proceedings in which among the thousands or hundreds of thousands of documents that are produced by a party in response to a discovery request, the producing party may inadvertently include one or a handful of documents that are covered by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection. Prior to the adoption of this rule, there was no uniform national standard governing the determination of when such a mistake would lead to a ruling that the privilege or protection had been waived. As a result, a party was forced to examine each and every document produced in discovery in order to avoid the risk of an inadvertent waiver.

Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not alter the law that governs whether a document is subject to the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection in the first instance. Under Fed. R. Evid. 501, unless State law, the Federal Constitution, or a Federal statute controls, the existence of a privilege in federal proceedings “shall be governed by the principles of the common law.” However, Fed. R. Evid. 502 does establish a single national standard that protects parties against a determination by a Federal court, a Federal agency, a State court, or a State agency that an inadvertent disclosure of privileged or protected material constitutes a wholesale waiver of the privilege or protection as to other material that has not been disclosed.

Rule 502(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses when a waiver of either the attorney-client privilege or the work-product protection extends to undisclosed material. It provides that a waiver of the privilege or protection does not extend to undisclosed material unless (1) the waiver is intentional, (2) the disclosed and undisclosed material concern the same subject matter, and (3) both the disclosed and undisclosed material should in fairness be considered together. Rule 502(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses inadvertent disclosures. It is similar to Section 523(c)(2), Waiver of Privilege: Conduct Not Constituting Waiver, except that the Federal rule requires that to avoid a waiver the holder of the privilege must promptly take reasonable steps to rectify the erroneous disclosure. Fed. R. Evid. 502(b)(3). Rule 502(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that disclosures made in State court proceedings will not operate as a waiver in Federal proceedings so long as the disclosure is not regarded as a waiver under either Fed. R. Evid. 502(a) or 502(b), or the law of the State where the disclosure occurred. Rule 502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a Federal court order that the privilege or the protection is not waived by a disclosure is binding on both Federal and State courts. Rule 502(e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that an agreement on the effect of the disclosure between the parties in a Federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order. Rule 502(f) of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly makes the rule applicable to State and Federal proceedings, “even if State law provides the rule of decision.” Rule 502(g) of the Federal Rules of Evidence contains definitions of the terms “attorney-client privilege” and “work-product protection.”
Section 524. Privileged Matter Disclosed Erroneously or Without Opportunity to Claim Privilege

A claim of privilege is not defeated by a disclosure erroneously made without an opportunity to claim the privilege.

NOTE

Section 525. Comment upon or Inference from Claim of Privilege

(a) Civil Case. Comment may be made and an adverse inference may be drawn against a party when that party, or in certain circumstances a witness, invokes a privilege.

(b) Criminal Case.

(1) No comment may be made and no adverse inference may be drawn against a defendant who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination or against a defendant for calling a witness who invokes a privilege that belongs to the witness and not to the defendant.

(2) In a case tried to a jury, the assertion of a privilege should be made outside the presence of the jury whenever reasonably possible.

NOTE


In Labor Relations Comm’n v. Fall River Educators’ Ass’n, 382 Mass. 465, 471–472, 416 N.E.2d 1340, 1344–1345 (1981), the Supreme Judicial Court expanded the rule to allow an adverse inference to be drawn against an organizational party as a result of a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination by its officers who had specific knowledge of actions taken on behalf of the organization in connection with the underlying claim. In Lentz v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 23, 26–32, 768 N.E.2d 538, 541–545 (2002), the Supreme Judicial Court expanded the principle even further to include circumstances in which the court finds, as a preliminary question of fact, that the witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination is acting on behalf of or to further the interests of one of the parties. The Supreme Judicial Court also noted that the potential for prejudice can be reduced by limiting the number of questions that may be put to the witness who invokes the privilege, and by a limiting instruction. Id. at 30–31, 768 N.E.2d at 544.


When a nonparty witness is closely aligned with a party in a civil case, and the nonparty witness invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, the jury should be instructed that the witness may invoke the privilege for reasons unrelated to the case on trial, and that they are permitted, but not required, to draw an inference adverse to the party from the witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. The jury is permitted to draw an inference adverse to a party from the witness’s invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Lentz v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. at 26–32, 768 N.E.2d at 541–545.

Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as from G. L. c. 233, § 20, Third, and G. L. c. 278, § 23. See Commonwealth v. Goulet, 374 Mass. 404, 412, 372
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N.E.2d 1288, 1294 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 869–870 n.13, 933 N.E.2d 633, 644 n.13 (2010). In Commonwealth v. Vallejo, 455 Mass. 72, 78–81, 914 N.E.2d 22, 28–30 (2009), the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the reasoning of Commonwealth v. Russo, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 579, 731 N.E.2d 108 (2000), and held that a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination may be violated by comments made by a codefendant’s counsel on the defendant’s pretrial silence or the defendant’s decision not to testify. For a discussion of the numerous cases dealing with the issue of whether a remark by a judge, a prosecutor, or a co-counsel constitutes improper comment on the defendant’s silence, see M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 5.14.8 (8th ed. 2007). A defendant may have the right to simply exhibit a person before the jury without questioning the person. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 Mass. 550, 557–559, 829 N.E.2d 1135, 1141 (2005). When there is a timely request made by the defense, the trial judge must instruct the jury that no adverse inference may be drawn from the fact that the defendant did not testify. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sneed, 376 Mass. 867, 871–872, 383 N.E.2d 843, 845–846 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Rivera, 441 Mass. 358, 371 n.9, 805 N.E.2d 942, 953 n.9 (2004) (“We remain of the view that judges should not give the instruction when asked not to do so. We are merely saying that it is not per se reversible error to do so.”).

Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Martin, 372 Mass. 412, 413, 421 n.17, 362 N.E.2d 507, 508, 512 n.17 (1977) (privilege against self-incrimination), and Commonwealth v. Labbe, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 73, 79–80, 373 N.E.2d 227, 232 (1978) (spousal privilege). “Where there is some advance warning that a witness might refuse to testify, the trial judge should conduct a voir dire of the witness, outside the presence of the jury, to ascertain whether the witness will assert some privilege or otherwise refuse to answer questions.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 350, 742 N.E.2d 61, 70 (2001). If the witness asserts the privilege or refuses to testify before the jury when it was not anticipated, the judge should give a forceful cautionary instruction to the jury. Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 157–159, 434 N.E.2d 1238, 1241–1243 (1982).
Section 526. Unemployment Hearing Privilege

(a) Statutory Bar on the Use of Information from Unemployment Hearing. Subject to the exceptions listed in Subsection (b), information secured during an unemployment hearing is absolutely privileged, is not public record, and is not admissible in any action or proceeding.

(b) Exceptions. Such information may be admissible only in the following actions or proceedings:

1. criminal or civil cases brought pursuant to G. L. c. 151A where the department or Commonwealth is a necessary party,
2. civil cases relating to the enforcement of child support obligations,
3. criminal prosecutions for homicide, and
4. criminal prosecutions for violation of Federal law.

NOTE

This section is derived from G. L. c. 151A, § 46, and Tuper v. North Adams Ambulance Serv., Inc., 428 Mass. 132, 137, 697 N.E.2d 983, 986 (2008) ("Information secured pursuant to [G. L. c. 151A] is confidential, is for the exclusive use and information of the department in the discharge of its duties, is not a public record, and may not be used in any action or proceeding."). A violation of this statute may be punishable as a misdemeanor.
Section 527. Judicial Deliberation Privilege

A judge has an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose the mental impressions and thought processes relied on in reaching a decision, whether harbored internally or memorialized in non-public material.

NOTE

This section is derived from Matter of the Enforcement of a Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162, 972 N.E.2d 1022 (2012). In that case, the Supreme Judicial Court quashed so much of a subpoena issued by the Commission on Judicial Conduct to a judge as related to the judge’s internal thought processes and deliberative communications. Id. at 178, 972 N.E.2d at 1036. The court recognized an absolute judicial deliberation privilege that protects the judge’s “mental impressions and thought processes in reaching a judicial decision, whether harbored internally or memorialized in other nonpublic material.” Id. at 174, 972 N.E.2d at 1033. The court additionally ruled that “the privilege also protects confidential communications among judges and between judges and court staff made in the course of and related to their deliberative processes in particular cases.” Id. This absolute but narrowly tailored privilege “does not cover a judge’s memory of nondeliberative events in connection with cases in which the judge participated. Nor does the privilege apply to inquiries into whether a judge was subjected to improper ‘extraneous influences’ or ex parte communications during the deliberative process.” Id. at 174–175, 972 N.E.2d at 1033. The privilege also does not apply “when a judge is a witness to or was personally involved in a circumstance that later becomes the focus of a legal proceeding.” Id. at 175, 972 N.E.2d at 1033.
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES

Section 601. Competency

(a) Generally. Every person is competent to be a witness, except as otherwise provided by statute or other provisions of the Massachusetts common law of evidence.

(b) Rulings. A person is competent to be a witness if he or she has

(1) the general ability or capacity to observe, remember, and give expression to that which he or she has seen, heard, or experienced, and

(2) an understanding sufficient to comprehend the difference between truth and falsehood, the wickedness of the latter, and the obligation and duty to tell the truth, and, in a general way, belief that failure to perform the obligation will result in punishment.

(c) Preliminary Questions. While the competency of a witness is a preliminary question of fact for the judge, questions of witness credibility are to be resolved by the trier of fact.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 20. See Commonwealth v. Monzon, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 245, 248–249, 744 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (2001). A person otherwise competent to be a witness may still be disqualified from testifying. See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 20 (with certain exceptions, “neither husband nor wife shall testify as to private conversations with the other”; “neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to testify in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding against the other”; “defendant in the trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding shall, at his own request . . . be allowed to testify”; and “an unemancipated, minor child, living with a parent, shall not testify before a grand jury, trial of an indictment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against said parent”). See also Section 504, Spousal Privilege and Disqualification; Parent-Child Disqualification; Section 511, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (witness testimony, and assessment of the competency of a witness, must be done orally in open court).

ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES

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Subsection (c). The initial segment of this subsection is derived from Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 562–563, 703 N.E.2d 1149, 1158 (1998); the remainder of the subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Jackson, 428 Mass. 455, 466, 702 N.E.2d 1158, 1165–1166 (1998). The question of the competency of a potential witness is within the discretion of the trial judge, who has “wide discretion . . . to tailor the competency inquiry to the particular circumstances and intellect of the witness.” Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass. 325, 329–330, 496 N.E.2d 652, 655 (1986). When competency is challenged, a judge usually conducts a voir dire examination of the potential witness, but may require a physician or other expert to examine the potential witness’s mental condition where appropriate. Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. at 563, 703 N.E.2d at 1158. See G. L. c. 123, § 19; G. L. c. 233, § 23E. Cf. Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (will testimony, and assessment of the competency of a witness, must be done orally in open court). “Although competency must of course be determined before a witness testifies, the judge may reconsider his decision, either sua sponte or on motion, if he entertains doubts about the correctness of the earlier ing.” Commonwealth v. Brusgulis, 398 Mass. at 331, 496 N.E.2d at 656.


It is not necessary to suspend all pretrial proceedings because a defendant is not competent. See Abbott A. v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 24, 33, 933 N.E.2d 936, 945 (2010) (concluding it is not a per se violation of due process for the Commonwealth to proceed against incompetent person at bail hearing or dangerousness hearing). Contra Commonwealth v. Torres, 441 Mass. 499, 505–507, 806 N.E.2d 895, 900–901 (2004) (stating due process may be violated if defense counsel is unable to communicate at all with client during bail hearing or hearing on rendition).
Section 602.  Lack of Personal Knowledge

A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness. This section is subject to the provisions of Section 703 relating to opinion testimony by a person qualified by the court as an expert witness.

NOTE


Cross-Reference: Section 104(b), Preliminary Questions: Relevancy Conditioned on Fact; Section 601, Competency; Section 703, Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. Cf. Section 402, Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible; Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence; Section 701, Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
Section 603. Oath or Affirmation

Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness’s conscience and impress the witness’s mind with the duty to do so.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 603 and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 603 and is consistent with Massachusetts law. See G. L. c. 233, §§ 15–19. See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(d) ("Whenever under these rules an oath is required to be taken, a solemn affirmation under the penalties of perjury may be accepted in lieu thereof."). “Although taking [the traditional] oath is the customary method for signifying one’s recognition that consequences attend purposeful falsehood, it is not the only method for doing so. The law requires some affirmative representation that the witness recognizes his or her obligation to tell the truth. See G. L. c. 233, §§17–19." Adoption of Fran, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 455, 467, 766 N.E.2d 91, 101 (2002).

“A child witness does not have to understand fully the obligation of an oath, but must show a general awareness of the duty to be truthful and the difference between a lie and the truth.” Commonwealth v. Ike I., 53 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 909, 760 N.E.2d 781, 783 (2002). "With children, recognition of that obligation [to tell the truth] sometimes is more effectively obtained through careful questioning of the child than through recitation of what to the child may be a meaningless oath or affirmation," Adoption of Fran, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 467 n.17, 766 N.E.2d at 101 n.17. A judge’s exchanges with a child and his or her discretionary conclusion that the child understands the difference between the truth and lying and the importance of testifying truthfully “effectively serve[s] the underlying purpose of the oath, and no more [can] be reasonably required of an infant deemed competent to testify, but manifestly lacking in theological understanding.” Commonwealth v. McCaffrey, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 583, 590, 633 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (1994).
Section 604. Interpreters

An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these sections relating to competency, qualification as an expert, and the administration of an oath or affirmation that he or she will make a true translation.

NOTE

Section 605. Competency of Judge as Witness

The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness.

NOTE

This section states the first sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 605 and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 605. While there are no Massachusetts statutes or cases on point, the proposition appears so clear as to be beyond question. See generally S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Canon 3(E) (judicial disqualification); Glenn v. Aiken, 409 Mass. 699, 703, 569 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1991) (“calling a judge as a witness to opine on what ruling he might have made on a particular hypothesis” is disfavored). Cf. Guardianship of Pollard, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 318, 322–323, 764 N.E.2d 935, 939 (2002) (judge who served as guardian ad litem prior to becoming judge not disqualified from testifying in guardianship proceeding before a different judge and from being cross-examined on her guardian ad litem report).
Section 606. Competency of Juror as Witness

(a) At the Trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury.

(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection, which is taken verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 606(a) and is nearly identical to Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 606(a), reflects Massachusetts practice.


The Doctrine of “Extraneous Matter.” In Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. at 200, 385 N.E.2d at 518, the court held that “if specific facts not mentioned at trial concerning one of the parties or the matter in litigation were brought to the attention of the deliberating jury by a juror . . . such misconduct may be proved by juror testimony.” The court cautioned, however, that “evidence concerning the subjective mental processes of jurors” is not admissible to impeach their verdict. Id. at 198, 385 N.E.2d at 517. The challenge for courts is to make the distinction between “overt factors and matters resting in a juror’s consciousness.” Id. See Commonwealth v. Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 858, 942 N.E.2d 927, 952 (2011) (pressure from other jurors during deliberation was not extraneous influence). In Commonwealth v. Guisti, 434 Mass. 245, 747 N.E.2d 673 (2001), the court offered further guidance by defining the concept of an “extraneous matter.” “An extraneous matter is one that involves information not part of the evidence at trial and raises a serious question of possible prejudice” (citations and quotation omitted). Id. at 251, 747 N.E.2d at 679. Some illustrations of this concept include “(1) unauthorized views of sites by jurors; (2) improper communications to the jurors by third persons; or (3) improper consideration of documents not in evidence” (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. at 197, 385 N.E.2d at 517.

Procedure for Determining Whether Jury Was Influenced by an “Extraneous Matter.” A party alleging that a jury was exposed to a significant extraneous influence “bears the burden of demonstrating that the jury were in fact exposed to the extraneous matter. To meet this burden he may rely on juror tes-
timony.” Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. at 201, 385 N.E.2d at 519. However, lawyers must observe Rule 3.5(d) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, S.J.C. Rule 3:07, which forbids lawyers from initiating contact with a member of the jury after discharge of the jury “without leave of court granted for good cause shown.” Rule 3.5(d) provides further that

“If a juror initiates a communication with such a lawyer, directly or indirectly, the lawyer may respond provided that the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury that are intended only to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence his or her actions in future jury service. In no circumstances shall such a lawyer inquire of a juror concerning the jury’s deliberation processes.”

Id. Further inquiry by the court is not required where “there has been no showing that specific facts not mentioned at trial concerning one of the parties or the matter in litigation were brought to the attention of the deliberating jury” (emphasis and quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Drumgold, 423 Mass. 230, 261, 668 N.E.2d 300, 320 (1996). See Commonwealth v. McQuade, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 827, 833, 710 N.E.2d 996, 1001 (1999). “The question whether the party seeking an inquiry has made such a showing is properly addressed to the discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Dixon, 395 Mass. 149, 152, 479 N.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). Because there is always a danger that when questioned about the existence of an extraneous matter a juror will respond

“with an answer that inappropriately reveals aspects of the deliberations[ g]iving cautionary instructions to each juror at the outset of the inquiry and, if necessary, again during the inquiry will reduce the likelihood of answers that stray into revelation of the jury’s thought process. The jurors can be instructed to respond about any information that was not mentioned during the trial (appropriate), but not to describe how the jurors used that information or the effect of that information on the thinking of any one or more jurors (inappropriate). Once any juror has established that extraneous information was mentioned, by whom, and whether anyone said anything else about the extraneous information (not what they thought about it or did with it), the inquiry of that juror is complete. As soon as the judge determines that the defendant has satisfied his burden of establishing the existence of an extraneous influence, the questioning of all jurors should cease.”


**Ethnic or Racial Bias.** When the defendant files an affidavit from one or more jurors stating that another juror made a statement “that reasonably demonstrates racial or ethnic bias” and the jury’s credibility is at issue, the judge must first determine whether the defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the juror made the biased statement. Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 494, 939 N.E.2d 735, 764 (2010). Second, if the answer to the first question is “yes,” the judge must determine whether the defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence

“that the juror who made the statements was actually biased because of the race or ethnicity of a defendant, victim, defense attorney, or witness. A juror is actually biased where her racial or ethnic prejudice, had it been revealed or detected at voir dire, would have required as a matter of law that the juror be excused from the panel for cause.” (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 495, 939 N.E.2d at 764–765.

“In some instances, the statement made by the juror may establish so strong an inference of a juror’s actual bias that proof of the statement alone may suffice. Generally, though, the judge must determine the precise content and context of the statement to determine whether it reflects the juror’s actual racial or ethnic bias, or whether it was said in jest or otherwise bore a meaning that would fail to establish racial bias. Because actual juror bias affects the essential fairness of the trial, a defendant who has established a juror’s actual
bias is entitled to a new trial without needing to show that the juror’s bias affected the jury’s verdict.” (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 496, 939 N.E.2d at 765. Third, even if the defendant fails to prove that the juror was actually biased, if the answer to the first question is “yes,” the judge must determine “whether the statements so infected the deliberative process with racially or ethnically charged language or stereotypes that it prejudiced the defendant’s right to have his guilt decided by an impartial jury on the evidence admitted at trial” (citations omitted). Id. at 496–497, 939 N.E.2d at 765. Even though racial or ethnic bias is not an extraneous matter, see Commonwealth v. Laguer, 410 Mass. 89, 97, 571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (1991), this third question is subject to the same analysis used to evaluate extraneous influences on the jury. If the defendant meets his or her burden of establishing that the statement was made, “the burden then shifts to the Commonwealth to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced by the jury’s exposure to these statements.” Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. at 497, 939 N.E.2d at 766. In making this determination, the judge must not receive any evidence concerning the effect of the statement on the thought processes of the jurors, but instead must focus on its “probable effect” on a “hypothetical average jury.” Id.

Discharge of a Juror During Empanelment. Even prior to trial, a potential juror who may not be impartial due to the effect of an extraneous matter such as bias or prejudice may be excused by the court. See G. L. c. 234, § 28; G. L. c. 234A, § 39; Mass. R. Crim. P. 20(b)(2). If the jury has not been sworn, the judge has discretion to excuse a juror without a hearing or a showing of extreme hardship based on information that the juror may not be indifferent. See Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 731–732, 933 N.E.2d 50, 62–63 (2010) (juror dismissed based on report by court officer that she was observed in the hallway during a break speaking to persons who then joined a group which included members of the defendant’s family); Commonwealth v. Duddie Ford Inc., 409 Mass. 387, 392, 566 N.E.2d 1119, 1122 (1991). “It is generally within the judge’s discretion . . . to determine when there exists a substantial risk that extraneous issues would influence the jury such that an individual voir dire of potential jurors is warranted.” Commonwealth v. Holloway, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 472, 691 N.E.2d 985, 988 (1998). Although there is a presumption that a peremptory challenge of a prospective juror is proper, the Supreme Judicial Court has established guidelines that must be followed when it is shown that the peremptory challenge constitutes a pattern of excluding members of a discrete community group solely because of their membership in that group. See Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 218–226, 892 N.E.2d 314, 319–326 (2008) (murder conviction reversed because peremptory challenge of a single African-American juror who happened to be the only such person in the venire constituted a pattern of group discrimination and because judge’s finding that “there are race neutral reasons which the Commonwealth has articulated which justify the challenge” was not sufficient).

Discharge of a Juror During Trial. “When a judge determines that the jury may have been exposed during the course of trial to material that ‘goes beyond the record and raises a serious question of possible prejudice,’ [the judge] should conduct a voir dire of jurors to ascertain the extent of their exposure to the extraneous material and to assess its prejudicial effect.” Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. 353, 369–370, 734 N.E.2d 315, 330 (2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. 790, 800, 383 N.E.2d 835, 841 (1978). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alicea, 464 Mass. 837, 848–849, 985 N.E.2d 1197, 1207–1208 (2013) (judge has “considerable discretion” to ensure that jurors remain impartial and indifferent; when jurors reported to court officer that one juror had made up his mind, judge was warranted in giving jury forceful instruction and appointing foreperson early to ensure compliance with instructions, rather than conducting voir dire); Commonwealth v. John, 442 Mass. 329, 339–340, 812 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (2004) (no error in declining to discharge a juror who expressed personal fear due to the nature of the case); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 429 Mass. 502, 506–507, 709 N.E.2d 809, 813 (1999) (judge did not abuse her discretion in removing one juror who expressed fear for her personal safety as a result of evidence of the defendant’s association with a gang).

“The initial questioning concerning whether any juror saw or heard the potentially prejudicial material may be carried on collectively, but if any juror indicates that he or she has seen or heard the material, there must be individual questioning of that juror, outside of the pres-
ence of any other juror, to determine the extent of the juror’s exposure to the material and its effects on the juror’s ability to render an impartial verdict.”

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. at 800–801, 383 N.E.2d at 841–842. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 450 Mass. 25, 39, 875 N.E.2d 846, 859 (2007) (trial judge acted properly in asking jury collectively whether anyone had seen anything while coming into or exiting the courtroom based on a court officer’s report that the door to the lockup had been left open while the defendant was inside a cell). The trial judge must, however, determine the nature of the extraneous matter before exercising discretion as to whether to discharge a juror. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 376 Mass. at 800–801, 383 N.E.2d at 841–842 (individualized questioning of juror appropriate given concerns of exposure to prejudicial media publicity during the trial); Commonwealth v. Fredette, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 259, 776 N.E.2d 464, 469–470 (2002) (judge erred in accepting a juror’s note about a matter of extraneous influence without making inquiry of the juror). A judge has a duty to intervene promptly whenever he or she observes or receives a reliable report that a juror is asleep. Commonwealth v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 77–79, 933 N.E.2d 951, 966 (2010). The judge has discretion as to the nature of the intervention and is not required to conduct a voir dire in every complaint regarding jury attentiveness. Id. at 78, 933 N.E.2d at 966.

Discharge of a Deliberating Juror. The problems associated with the effect of an extraneous matter on the jury also may arise before the jury returns a verdict. General Laws c. 234, § 26B, provides that if, at any time after a case has been submitted to the jury and before the jury have agreed on a verdict, a juror “dies, or becomes ill, or is unable to perform his duty for any other good cause shown to the court,” the judge may discharge the juror, substitute an alternate selected by lot, and permit the jury to renew their deliberations. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 20(d)(3). “[G]ood cause includes only reasons personal to a juror, that is, reasons unrelated to the issues of the case, the juror’s views on the case, or his relationship with his fellow jurors” (quotations omitted). Commonwealth v. Francis, 432 Mass. at 368, 734 N.E.2d at 328. The judge must conduct a voir dire of the affected juror with counsel and the defendant or the parties in a civil case. Commonwealth v. Connor, 392 Mass. 838, 845, 467 N.E.2d 1340, 1346 (1984). See Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 488–489, 939 N.E.2d 735, 759 (2010) (after jury reported it was deadlocked, judge was warranted in removing deliberating juror based on a finding that a “palpable conflict” existed due to the arrest of the father of the juror’s son, who was being prosecuted by the same district attorney’s office that was prosecuting the case on trial). Great care must be taken in such cases that a dissenting juror is not allowed to avoid the responsibility of jury service. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 675–676, 828 N.E.2d 556, 566 (2005) (holding that discharge of deliberating juror was error).
Section 607. Who May Impeach

The credibility of any witness may be impeached by any party. However, a party who calls a witness is not permitted to impeach that witness by evidence of bad character, including reputation for untruthfulness or prior convictions.

NOTE


“A party cannot rely on this statutory right [G. L. c. 233, § 23] to call a witness whom he knows beforehand will offer no testimony relevant to an issue at trial solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness with prior inconsistent statements that would otherwise be inadmissible.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 430 Mass. 483, 489–490, 722 N.E.2d 1, 8 (1999).

When impeaching one’s own witness through a prior inconsistent statement, the proponent must bring the statement to the attention of the witness with sufficient circumstances to alert the witness to the particular occasion the prior statement was made and allow the witness an opportunity to explain the statement. See Section 613, Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility.

This Guide includes specific sections dealing with impeachment by evidence of character (Sections 608 and 609), impeachment by prior inconsistent statements (Section 613), impeachment by reference to bias or prejudice (Section 611[b]), and evidence of religious beliefs (Section 610). Other methods of impeachment—e.g., improper motive, impairment of testimonial faculties, and contradiction—remain available and fall within the scope of Sections 102, Purpose and Construction, 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements, 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence, and 611, Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation.
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§ 608

Section 608. Impeachment by Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness

(a) Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence as to reputation, subject to the following limitations:

(1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and

(2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation evidence or otherwise.

(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In general, specific instances of misconduct showing the witness to be untruthful are not admissible for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’s credibility.

NOTE


Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 288, 461 N.E.2d 1197, 1204 (1984), and Commonwealth v. Grammo, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 447, 455, 395 N.E.2d 476, 482–483 (1979). This limitation does not restrict the right of a defendant in a criminal case to offer evidence of his or her reputation for a character trait that would suggest he or she is not the type of person who would commit the crime charged. See Section 404(a)(1), Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes: Character Evidence Generally: Character of the Accused. Neither “the offering of testimony that contradicts the testimony of a witness” nor “the introduction of prior out-of-court statements of a witness constitute[s] an attack on the witness’s character for truthfulness,” because “[t]he purpose and
only direct effect of the evidence are to show that the witness is not to be believed in [that] stance." Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. at 288–289, 461 N.E.2d at 1204.


The Supreme Judicial Court has "chiseled" a narrow exception to the rule that the testimony of a witness may not be impeached with specific acts of prior misconduct, recognizing that in special circumstances (to date, only rape and sexual assault cases) the interest of justice would forbid its strict tion. Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. at 151–152, 605 N.E.2d at 855–856. In Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94–96, 378 N.E.2d 987, 990–992 (1978), the special circumstances warranting evidence of the prior accusations were that (1) the witness was the victim in the case on trial; (2) the victim/witness’s consent was the central issue at trial; (3) the victim/witness was the only Commonwealth witness on the issue of consent; (4) the victim/witness's testimony was inconsistent and confused; and (5) there was a basis in independent third-party records for concluding that the victim/witness's prior accusation of the same type of crime had been made and was false. Not all of the Bohannon circumstances must be present for the exception to apply. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 332, 337, 639 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (1994).
Section 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime

(a) Generally. A party may seek to impeach the credibility of a witness by means of the court record of the witness’s conviction or a certified copy, but may not make reference to the sentence that was imposed, subject to Section 403 and the following requirements:

(1) Misdemeanor. A misdemeanor conviction cannot be used after five years from the date on which sentence was imposed, unless the witness has subsequently been convicted of a crime within five years of the time he or she testifies.

(2) Felony Conviction Not Resulting in Committed State Prison Sentence. A felony conviction where no sentence was imposed, a sentence was imposed and suspended, a fine was imposed, or a sentence to a jail or house of correction was imposed cannot be used after ten years from the date of conviction (where no sentence was imposed) or from the date of sentencing, unless the witness has subsequently been convicted of a crime within ten years of the time he or she testifies. For the purpose of this paragraph, a plea of guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall constitute a conviction within the meaning of this section.

(3) Felony with State Prison Sentence Imposed. A felony conviction where a sentence to a State prison was imposed cannot be used after ten years from the date of expiration of the minimum term of imprisonment, unless the witness has subsequently been convicted of a crime within ten years of the time he or she testifies.

(4) Traffic Violation. A traffic violation conviction where only a fine was imposed cannot be used unless the witness has been convicted of another crime or crimes within five years of the time he or she testifies.

(5) Juvenile Adjudications of Delinquency or Youthful Offender. Adjudications of delinquency or youthful offender may be used in subsequent delinquency or criminal proceedings in the same manner and to the same extent as prior criminal convictions.

(b) Effect of Being a Fugitive. For the purpose of this section, any period during which the defendant was a fugitive from justice shall be excluded in determining time limitations under the provisions of this section.

NOTE

This section is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 21, except for Section 609(a)(5), which is derived from G. L. c. 119, § 60.

Definition of Conviction. For the purpose of impeachment, a conviction "means a judgment that conclusively establishes guilt after a finding, verdict, or plea of guilty." Forcier v. Hopkins, 329 Mass. 668, 670, 110 N.E.2d 126, 127 (1953), and cases cited. Thus, a case that is continued without a finding, with or without an admission, is not a conviction and may not be used for impeachment under this section. See Wilson v. Honeywell, Inc., 409 Mass. 803, 808–809, 569 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (1991).
Misdemeanors/Probation. A misdemeanor conviction for which a defendant was placed on probation cannot be used for impeachment, because straight probation does not constitute a “sentence” for purposes of the statute. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 422 Mass. 385, 387, 663 N.E.2d 255, 257 (1996).

Probation Violation. The proper use of probation violations is as follows:

“Although convictions within the time frames established by G. L. c. 233, § 21 . . . , may be used to impeach a witness’s character for truthfulness, probation violations may not be so used. Nevertheless, probation violations may be used ‘to show bias on the part of the witness who might want to give false testimony to curry favor with the prosecution with respect to his case.’ Commonwealth v. DiMuro, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 228 (1990).” (Citation omitted.)


Proof of Conviction. The conviction must be proven by production of a court record or a certified copy. Commonwealth v. Puleio, 394 Mass. 101, 104, 474 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (1985). But see Common-
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wealth v. Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 439, 945 N.E.2d 877, 889–900 (2011) (proof of prior conviction for purpose other than to impeach truthfulness of witness does not require court record or certified copy). An attorney must have a reasonable evidentiary basis for any question concerning a prior criminal conviction. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 441 Mass. 1, 5 n.4, 802 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 n.4 (2004). It is presumed that the defendant was represented by counsel in the underlying conviction, and the Commonwealth does not have to prove representation unless the defendant makes a showing that the conviction was obtained without counsel or a waiver of counsel. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 435 Mass. 691, 695–696, 761 N.E.2d 490, 493–494 (2002).


Pardons, Sealing of Record, Expungement, Commutation of Sentence, Appeal Pending. It appears that pardons and the sealing or expungement of one’s criminal record cannot be used for impeachment purposes under this section. See Commonwealth v. Childs, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 33, 35, 499 N.E.2d 299, 300 (1986), aff’d, 400 Mass. 1006, 511 N.E.2d 336 (1987). Cf. G. L. c. 127, § 152 (pardon); G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A–100C (sealing); G. L. c. 94C, §§ 34–35 (sealing). Conversely, it appears that the commutation of a sentence may be used. Rittenberg v. Smith, 214 Mass. 343, 347, 101 N.E. 989, 990 (1913) (“The commutation of the sentence did not do away with the conviction. Only a full pardon could do that.”). It also appears that the pendency of an appeal does not prevent the use of a conviction for impeachment purposes. The fact that a defendant’s prior conviction was vacated after the trial in which it was used to impeach him did not affect its status as a “final judgment” for purposes of G. L. c. 233, § 21. Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 190, 199, 794 N.E.2d 1229, 1236 (2003), judgment rev’d on other grounds, 442 Mass. 423, 813 N.E.2d 516 (2004). See Fed. R. Evid. 609(e); Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 609(f). The term conviction means “a judgment that conclusively establishes guilt after a finding, verdict, or plea of guilty. . . . In a criminal case the sentence is the judgment.” Forcier v. Hopkins, 329 Mass. 668, 670–671, 110 N.E.2d 126, 127 (1953). “The sentence[,] until reversed in some way provided by the law, stands as the
Section 610. Religious Beliefs or Opinions

Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of the witness’s nature his or her credibility is impaired or enhanced.

NOTE

This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Dahl, 430 Mass. 813, 822–823, 724 N.E.2d 300, 307–308 (2000) (citing with approval Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 610), and G. L. c. 233, § 19 (“evidence of [a person’s] disbelief in the existence of God may not be received to affect his credibility as a witness”). Though not admissible as to credibility, evidence that relates to a person’s religious beliefs is not per se inadmissible. See Commonwealth v. Kartell, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 436–437, 790 N.E.2d 739, 746–747 (2003) (evidence of defendant’s religious beliefs admissible for relevant purpose of showing defendant was jealous of victim); Commonwealth v. Murphy, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 145, 718 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1999) (to establish that a child witness is competent to testify, “a question whether the child believes in God and a question whether the child recognizes the witness’s oath as a promise to God are within tolerable limits to test whether the witness’s oath meant anything to the child witness”).
Section 611. Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation

(a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the manner and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence on direct and cross-examination so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. The court has discretion to admit evidence conditionally upon the representation that its relevancy will be established by evidence subsequently offered.

(b) Scope of Cross-Examination.

(1) In General. A witness is subject to reasonable cross-examination on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility and matters not elicited during direct examination. The trial judge may restrict the scope of cross-examination in the exercise of judicial discretion.

(2) Bias and Prejudice. Reasonable cross-examination to show bias and prejudice is a matter of right which cannot be unreasonably restricted.

(c) Leading Questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his or her testimony. Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or an officer or agent of an adverse corporate party, interrogation may be by leading questions.

(d) Rebuttal Evidence. The trial judge generally has discretion to permit the introduction of rebuttal evidence in civil and criminal cases. In certain limited circumstances, a party may introduce rebuttal evidence as a matter of right. There is no right to present rebuttal evidence that only supports a party’s affirmative case.

(e) Scope of Subsequent Examination. The scope of redirect and recross-examination is within the discretion of the trial judge.

(f) Reopening. The court has discretion to allow a party to reopen its case.

(g) Stipulations.

(1) Form and Effect. A stipulation is a voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning some relevant fact, claim, or defense and may include agreements in both civil and criminal cases to simplify the issues for trial. A judge may require a stipulation be reduced to writing. A party is bound by its stipulation in the absence of consideration unless relief is granted by the court. In order to avoid a failure of justice, a court may at any time relieve a party from its stipulation.

(2) Essential Element. A stipulation as to a fact constituting an essential element of a crime or a fact material to the proof of the crime must be presented in some manner to the jury as part of the evidence of the case.
NOTE


Subsection (b)(1).

Reasonable Basis for Cross-Examination. Cross-examination must have a reasonable and good-faith basis. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 441 Mass. 1, 5 n.4, 802 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 n.4 (2004). Attorneys are not permitted to ask questions in bad faith or without any foundation. See Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 458 Mass. 791, 795, 941 N.E.2d 56, 64 (2011) (attorney had good-faith basis for questions, even where source was not called to testify).

Cross-Reference: Section 405(a), Methods of Proving Character: Reputation.

Civil Cases. This subsection as it applies to civil cases is derived from Beal v. Nichols, 68 Mass. 262, 264 (1854), and Davis v. Hotels Statler Co., 327 Mass. 28, 29–30, 97 N.E.2d 187, 188 (1951). This subsection reflects the Massachusetts practice of permitting cross-examination on matters beyond the subject matter of the direct examination. See Nuger v. Robinson, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 959, 959–960, 591 N.E.2d 1116, 1116–1117 (1992). Thus, a party can put its own case before the jury by the cross-examination of witnesses called by the opposing party. See Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. 490, 499 (1835).

Criminal Cases. “There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the Supreme] Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s
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“Where there is no opportunity to cross-examine a witness, because, for example, he is uncooperative, fails to appear, or invokes his privilege against self-incrimination, the striking of any direct testimony by that witness may be constitutionally required. Generally, a witness’s inability to answer questions on cross-examination due to lapse of memory, however, does not require striking his direct testimony.” (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Santiago, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 207, 221, 567 N.E.2d 943, 952 (1991). The defendant’s right to confrontation is not denied when, on cross-examination, a witness refuses to answer questions relating exclusively to collateral matters. See Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 707, 713, 412 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1980). Compare Commonwealth v. Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 607, 897 N.E.2d 14, 22 (2008) (defendant was not denied his right to confront a key identification witness who was unable to recall numerous details; “[i]t was entirely reasonable for the witness to have no memory of some of the information sought by many of the questions”), and Commonwealth v. Amirault, 404 Mass. 221, 234–235, 535 N.E.2d 193, 202 (1989) (lapse of memory by witness on cross-examination did not deny defendant right to confrontation), with Commonwealth v. Funches, 379 Mass. 283, 292, 397 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (1979) (trial judge was required to strike witness’s direct testimony when witness asserted privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination), and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 365 Mass. 534, 543–544, 313 N.E.2d 571, 576–577 (1974) (defendant denied right to confrontation when judge, concerned for safety of witness, ordered witness to not answer questions on cross-examination).


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Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 22; Carney v. Bereault, 348 Mass. 502, 510, 204 N.E.2d 448, 453 (1965); and Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(b). “[T]he decision whether to allow leading questions should be left for the most part to the wisdom and discretion of the trial judge instead of being restricted by the mechanical operation of inflexible rules” (citations and quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass. 455, 467, 287 N.E.2d 420, 430 (1972). See Commonwealth v. Monahan, 349 Mass. 139, 162–163, 207 N.E.2d 29, 43 (1965) (rulings on whether witness is hostile and whether cross-examination of the witness by his or her proponent are permitted are within discretion of trial judge). Some judges in Massachusetts require that when the subject of the cross-examination enters material not covered on direct, the attorney should no longer use leading questions.


The use of leading questions on direct examination of an adverse party is authorized by statute. See G. L. c. 233, § 22 (“A party who calls the adverse party as a witness shall be allowed to cross-examine him. In case the adverse party is a corporation, an officer or agent thereof, so called as a witness, shall be deemed such an adverse party for the purposes of this section.”); Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(b) (“A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate him by leading questions and contradict and impeach him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party.”). When a party calls an adverse witness, that party may inquire by means of leading questions. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(b). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 22. However, such examination is limited by G. L. c. 233, § 23, concerning impeachment of one’s own witness. See Walter v. Bonito, 367 Mass. 117, 122, 324 N.E.2d 624, 627 (1975). If a party is called as an adverse witness by opposing counsel, the trial judge may, in his or her discretion, permit leading questions on cross-examination. See Westland Hous. Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 383–384, 44 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1942).

Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Roberts, 433 Mass. 45, 51, 740 N.E.2d 176, 181 (2000), and Commonwealth v. Guidry, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 909, 491 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1986). A party may not present rebuttal evidence that only “supports a party’s affirmative case.” Drake v. Goodman, 386 Mass. 88, 92, 434 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (1982). In other words, a party may not “present one theory of causation in his case-in-chief and, as a matter of right, present a different theory of causation in rebuttal.” Id. at 93, 434 N.E.2d at 1213. This is especially true when a party is aware of the evidence prior to trial and could have presented it as part of the case-in-chief. Id.


Subsection (f). This subsection is derived from Kerr v. Palmieri, 325 Mass. 554, 557, 91 N.E.2d 754, 756 (1950) (“As a general proposition, the granting of a motion to permit additional evidence to be introduced
after the trial has been closed rests in the discretion of the trial judge.”). See also Commonwealth v. Moore, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 120, 126–127, 751 N.E.2d 901, 905–907 (2001) (“We also add that the decision whether to reopen a case is one that cannot be made in an arbitrary or capricious manner. It would be a wise practice in the future for trial judges to place on the record their reasons for exercising their discretion either for or against reopening the case.”).

**Criminal Cases.** The constitutional rights of the defendant in a criminal case limit the discretion of the court to allow the Commonwealth to reopen. It is only within the court’s discretion

“to permit reopening when mere inadvertence or some other compelling circumstance . . . justifies a reopening and no substantial prejudice will occur. If the court in the exercise of cautious discretion allows the prosecution to reopen its case before the defendant begins its defense, that reopening does not violate either the rules of criminal procedure or the defendant’s right not to be put twice in jeopardy.”


In Mitchell v. Walton Lunch Co., 305 Mass. 76, 80, 25 N.E.2d 151, 154 (1939), the court observed that “[n]othing is more common in practice or more useful in dispatching the business of the courts than for counsel to admit undisputed facts.” Brocklesby v. City of Newton, 294 Mass. 41, 43, 200 N.E. 351, 352 (1936).


Section 612. Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory

(a) While Testifying.

(1) General Rule. When a testifying witness’s memory is exhausted as to a matter about which he or she once had knowledge, the witness’s memory may be refreshed, in the presence of the jury, with any writing or other object that permits the witness to further testify from his or her own memory. The writing or object should not be read from or shown to the jury.

(2) Production and Use.

(A) When a testifying witness uses a writing or object to refresh his or her memory, an adverse party is entitled to the production of the writing or object after it is shown to the witness and before cross-examination, even if it contains information subject to work-product protection.

(B) A party entitled to the production of a writing or object under this section is entitled to examine the writing or so much of it as relates to the case on trial, may cross-examine about it, and may introduce it in evidence to show that it could not or did not aid the witness in any legitimate way.

(b) Before Testifying.

(1) Production. If, before testifying, a witness uses a writing or object to refresh his or her memory for the purpose of testifying, an adverse party has no absolute right to the production and inspection of the writing or object. The trial judge, however, in his or her discretion, may, at the request of the adverse party, order production of the writing or object at the trial, hearing, or deposition in which the witness is testifying if it is practicable and the interests of justice so require.

(2) Admissibility. Where the adverse party at trial calls for a writing or other object from his or her opponent that was used to refresh the witness’s memory prior to trial, does so in front of the jury, and receives and examines it, the writing or other object may be offered in evidence by the producing party when necessary to prevent the impression of evasion or concealment, even though it would have been incompetent if it had not been called for and examined.

(3) Suppressed Statement. If, before testifying in a criminal case, a witness uses a suppressed statement to refresh his or her memory for the purpose of testifying, the judge must conduct a voir dire to establish that the witness has a present recollection of the event to which he or she is testifying.

NOTE

315 Mass. 59, 63, 52 N.E.2d 2, 5 (1943). A witness may use a writing or other object to refresh a failing memory. Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 419 Mass. at 478, 645 N.E.2d at 1175. The witness’s testimony, however, must be the product of present recollection. See Commonwealth v. Hoffer, 375 Mass. 369, 376, 377 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1978). This subsection should not be confused with the doctrine of past recollection recorded.

Cross-Reference: Section 803(5), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Past Recollection Recorded.

Subsection (a)(2)(A). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 419 Mass. 470, 478–480, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1174–1176 (1995). “[W]hen materials protected by the work product doctrine are used by the examiner to refresh a witness’s recollection on the stand, the protection afforded by the work product doctrine is waived and the opponent’s attorney is entitled to inspect the writing.” Id. at 478, 645 N.E.2d at 1175. The Supreme Judicial Court observed in dicta that

“[t]he few State courts that have addressed the issue of the conflict between the rule and protected documents used while the witness is on the stand have reached conclusions similar to the Federal courts, i.e., that use of protected material to refresh a witness’s recollection on the stand constitutes waiver of that protection.”

Id. at 479, 645 N.E.2d at 1176.

Subsection (a)(2)(B). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 62–63, 52 N.E.2d 2, 5 (1943) (allowing adverse party to show that writing or object did not or could not have refreshed the memory of the witness).

Subsection (b)(1). This subsection is derived from Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass. 580, 583–584, 53 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1944), citing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 132 (1942). This rule has been the subject of considerable criticism. See Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 419 Mass. 470, 479 n.5, 645 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 n.5 (1995) (“Presently, the more controversial issue, and the one on which courts are still somewhat unclear, is whether an adverse party has a right under [Fed. R. Evid.] 612 to inspect protected and privileged documents used by the witness to refresh her recollection prior to testifying.”); Commonwealth v. Marsh, 354 Mass. 713, 721–722, 242 N.E.2d 545, 551 (1968) (“It is an artificial distinction to allow inspection of notes used on the stand to refresh recollection and to decline it where the witness inspects his notes just before being called to the stand.”).

Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Leonard v. Taylor, 315 Mass. 580, 581–584, 53 N.E.2d 705, 706–707 (1944). The purpose of this rule is to protect the opposing party from the impression of evasion and concealment from a “bold and dramatic demand” by the adverse party—not to make otherwise inadmissible evidence admissible—and should therefore be used sparingly. See id. at 582–583, 53 N.E.2d at 706–707.

Cross-Reference: Section 106(b), Doctrine of Completeness: Curative Admissibility.

Subsection (b)(3). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720, 731, 964 N.E.2d 956, 966 (2012), where the court stated as follows:

“We do not decide today that it is impermissible for a witness to testify concerning an event after his memory has been refreshed by his review, before taking the stand, of material that is suppressed due to violations of a defendant’s rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. However, before such a witness is permitted to testify, the judge must ensure that the Commonwealth has met its burden of establishing that the witness will testify not from a memory of the suppressed statement, which by definition is not to be placed in evidence, but from an independent memory of the separate event. This requires that the judge conduct a voir dire
through which the basis for the witness’s assertion that he or she has a present recollection of the separate event may be thoroughly examined.”
Section 613. Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility

(a) Prior Inconsistent Statements.

(1) Examining Own Witness. A party who produces a witness may prove that the witness made prior statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony; but before proof of such inconsistent statements is given, the party must lay a foundation by asking the witness if the prior statements were in fact made and by giving the witness an opportunity to explain.

(2) Examining Other Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness, other than a witness covered under Section 613(a)(1), is admissible whether or not the witness was afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistency.

(3) Disclosure of Extrinsic Evidence. In examining a witness, other than a witness covered under Section 613(a)(1), concerning a prior statement made by such witness, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to the witness at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel.

(4) Collateral Matter. Extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on a collateral matter is not admissible as of right, but only in the exercise of sound discretion by the trial judge.

(b) Prior Consistent Statements.

(1) Generally Inadmissible. A prior consistent statement by a witness is generally inadmissible.

(2) Exception. If the court makes a preliminary finding that there is a claim that the witness’s in-court testimony is the result of recent contrivance or a bias, and the prior consistent statement was made before the witness had a motive to fabricate or the occurrence of the event indicating a bias, the evidence may be admitted for the limited purpose of rebutting the claim of recent contrivance or bias.

NOTE


Cross-Reference: Section 607, Who May Impeach.

Subsections (a)(2) and (3). These subsections are derived from Hubley v. Lilley, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 472, 473 n.7, 552 N.E.2d 573, 575–576, 576 n.7 (1990). See also Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 398–402, 989 N.E.2d 426, 430–433 (2013). Opposing counsel has a right to examine the statement before conducting any further inquiry of the witness to prevent selective quotation of the prior statement by the questioner and to insure that the witness has an opportunity to explain or elaborate on the alleged incon-
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istencies. Hubley v. Lilley, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 472, 473 n.7, 552 N.E.2d at 575–576, 576 n.7. This right arises after the examination of the witness under Subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) and does not permit counsel to make a demand for a document before the jury during opposing counsel’s cross-examination. See Section 103(c), Rulings on Evidence, Objections, and Offers of Proof: Hearing of Jury. Such conduct may warrant the court admitting extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement. See Section 612(b)(2), Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory: Before Testifying: Admissibility.


Cross-Reference: Section 525(b), Comment upon or Inference from Claim of Privilege: Criminal Case; Section 104(d), Preliminary Questions: Testimony by Accused.

Prior Statements That Qualify as Inconsistent. “It is not necessary that the prior statement contradict in plain terms the testimony of the witness.” Commonwealth v. Simmonds, 386 Mass. 234, 242, 434 N.E.2d 1270, 1276 (1982). “It is enough if the proffered testimony, taken as a whole, either by what it says or by what it omits to say, affords some indication that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness whom it is sought to contradict.” Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 161, 434 N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (1982). An omission in a prior statement may render that statement inconsistent “when it would have been natural to include the fact in the initial statement.” Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 70, 72, 653 N.E.2d 1119, 1120 (1995). See also Langan v. Pignowski, 307 Mass. 149, 29 N.E.2d 700 (1940). It follows that a witness who denies making an earlier statement may be impeached with it, while a witness who is unable to remember the earlier statement, but does not deny making it, may have his or her recollection refreshed. See Section 612(a)(1), Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory: While Testifying: General Rule. However, “a witness who has actually made a statement contradictory to trial testimony cannot escape impeachment simply by saying she does not remember making the statement.” Commonwealth v. Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 401, 989 N.E.2d 426, 432 (2013). Ordinarily, “[t]here is no inconsistency between a present failure of memory on the witness stand and a past existence of memory” (citation and quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Martin, 417 Mass. 187, 197, 629 N.E.2d 297, 303 (1994). However, if the trial judge makes a preliminary determination (see Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court) that the witness’s present failure of memory is fabricated, the witness’s prior detailed statement is admissible for impeachment purposes. See Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 742–743 & n.7, 740
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N.E.2d 602, 608 & n.7 (2000). Cf. Note “Feigning Lack of Memory” to Section 801(d)(1)(A), Definitions: Statements Which Are Not Hearsay: Prior Statement by Witness: Prior Inconsistent Statement Before a Grand Jury, at a Trial, at a Probable Cause Hearing, or at a Deposition (feigning lack of memory may result in the admission of a prior statement, not simply for impeachment purposes, but also for its truth). A witness who gives a detailed account of an incident at trial but who indicated at some earlier point in time only limited or no memory of the details of the incident may be impeached with that earlier failure of memory. Commonwealth v. Granito, 326 Mass. 494, 500, 95 N.E.2d 539, 543 (1950).

If a witness previously remained “silent in circumstances in which he naturally would have been expected to deny some asserted fact . . . the jury may consider the failure to respond in assessing the veracity of the witness in testifying contrary to the fact that was adoptively admitted by his silence.” Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 57, 434 N.E.2d 992, 994 (1982). In circumstances where it “would not be natural for a witness to provide the police before trial with exculpatory information,” this omission is admissible to impeach the witness at trial only after first establishing “[1] that the witness knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that he possessed exculpatory information, [2] that the witness had reason to make the information available, [and] [3] that he was familiar with the means of reporting it to the proper authorities . . . .” Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 238–239, 914 N.E.2d 904, 911 (2009). See id. at 239–240, 914 N.E.2d at 912 (abolishing requirement that prosecutor needs to “elicit from the witness that she was not asked by the defendant or the defense attorney to refrain from disclosing her exculpatory information to law enforcement authorities”). The Supreme Judicial Court has observed that

“[t]here are some circumstances, though, in which it would not be natural for a witness to provide the police before trial with exculpatory information, such as when the witness does not realize she possesses exculpatory information, when she thinks that her information will not affect the decision to prosecute, or when she does not know how to furnish such information to law enforcement.”

Id. at 238, 914 N.E.2d at 911. The principles applicable to impeachment of a witness by failure to provide exculpatory information apply to tangible evidence as well as oral testimony. Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1, 15–16, 992 N.E.2d 336, 349–350 (2013).

An omission from an earlier statement may qualify as a prior inconsistent statement. Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 699, 954 N.E.2d 1, 16 (2011) (absence of journal entry regarding visit from defendant on night of murder qualified as prior inconsistent statement to trial testimony that defendant visited witness in person on night of murder), and cases cited.

Although there is discretion involved in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence offered for impeachment, when the impeaching evidence is directly related to testimony on a central issue in the case, there is no discretion to exclude it. See Commonwealth v. McGowan, 400 Mass. 385, 390–391, 510 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1987). See Section 611(d), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Rebuttal Evidence.


“Because bias, prejudice, and motive to lie are not considered collateral matters, they may be demonstrated by extrinsic proof as well as on cross-examination. There is no requirement that the opponent cross-examine on the matter as a foundation prior to offering extrinsic evidence.” (Citations ted.) Commonwealth v. Hall, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 213 n.7, 736 N.E.2d 425, 430 n.7 (2000), quoting P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence § 6.9, at 299–300 (7th ed. 1999).


The judge may admit a prior consistent statement on direct examination, prior to any impeachment, if it is obvious that a claim of recent contrivance will be made (e.g., when a party makes a statement in his or her opening statement that he or she will attack the credibility of the witness on cross-examination on the basis of recent contrivance). See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 797–798, 933 N.E.2d 93, 114–115 (2010) (opponent’s opening statement suggested recent contrivance).

A prior consistent statement that does not meet the requirements of this subsection nonetheless may be admissible on other grounds. See Commonwealth v. Tennison, 440 Mass. 553, 562–564, 800 N.E.2d 285, 294–296 (2003) (verbal completeness). The prior consistent statement may be admissible not only if made before the motive to fabricate arose, but also if made at a time when the motive to fabricate no longer exists. Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 69–70, 958 N.E.2d 37, 46–47 (2011) (prior consistent statement made after victim moved back to grandmother’s house admissible to rebut inference that victim had fabricated accusation of abuse to provide basis for moving out of defendant’s home and back to grandmother’s).

Cross-Reference: Section 413, First Complaint of Sexual Assault; Section 611(a), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Control by Court; Note to Section 801(d)(1)(B), Definitions: Statements Which Are Not Hearsay: Prior Statement by Witness; Section 801(d)(1)(C), Definitions: Statements Which Are Not Hearsay: Prior Statement by Witness: Identification; Section 1104, Witness Cooperation Agreements.
Section 614. Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court or Jurors

(a) Calling by Court. When necessary in the interest of justice, the court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.

(b) Interrogation by Court. The court may question a witness in order to clarify an issue, to prevent perjury, or to develop trustworthy testimony, provided that the judge remains impartial.

(c) Objections. Objections to the calling or questioning of witnesses by the court may be made outside the presence of the jury.

(d) Interrogation by Jurors. The court, in its discretion, may allow questions posed by the jury, subject to the following procedures:

1. The judge should instruct the jury that they will be given the opportunity to pose questions to witnesses.

2. Jurors’ questions need not be limited to important matters, but may also seek clarification of a witness’s testimony.

3. The judge should emphasize to jurors that, although they are not expected to understand the technical rules of evidence, their questions must comply with those rules, and so the judge may have to alter or to refuse a particular question.

4. The judge should emphasize that, if a particular question is altered or refused, the juror who poses the question must not be offended or hold that against either party.

5. The judge should tell the jurors that they should not give the answers to their own questions or questions by other jurors a disproportionate weight.

6. These instructions should be given before the testimony begins and repeated during the final charge to the jury before they begin deliberations.

7. All questions should be submitted in writing to the judge, with the juror’s identification number included on each question.

8. On submission of questions, counsel should have an opportunity, outside the hearing of the jury, to examine the questions with the judge, make any suggestions, or register objections.

9. Counsel should be given an opportunity to reexamine a witness after juror interrogation with respect to the subject matter of the juror questions.
NOTE


Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Lucien, 440 Mass. 658, 664, 801 N.E.2d 247, 254 (2004), and Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 380 Mass. 840, 846–847, 406 N.E.2d 389, 395–396 (1980). See Commonwealth v. Festa, 369 Mass. 276, 279 (1976) ("There is no doubt that a judge can properly question a witness, albeit some of the answers may tend to reinforce the Commonwealth's case, so long as the examination is not partisan in nature, biased, or a display of belief in the defendant's guilt."); Commonwealth v. Fiore, 364 Mass. 819, 826–827, 308 N.E.2d 902, 908 (1974) ("The judge has a right, and it is perhaps sometimes a duty, to intervene on occasion in the examination of a witness. . . . Here a discrepancy appeared between the proffered testimony and earlier testimony of the same witnesses. A likely possibility existed that each witness would perjure himself or admit to perjury in his prior statement. As this became evident to the judge, he indulged in no transgression when for the benefit of the witness and to aid in developing the most trustworthy evidence he took a hand in indicating to the witness the extent of the inconsistencies. In this case the questioning by the judge was not clearly biased or coercive." [Citations omitted.]). See also Commonwealth v. Hanscomb, 367 Mass. 726, 732, 388 N.E.2d 880, 885 (1975) (Hennessey, J., concurring) ("The judge need not be mute; he is more than a referee. Justice may require that he ask questions at times. However, the primary principle in jury trials is that he must use this power with restraint."). Compare Commonwealth v. Watkins, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 69, 74, 823 N.E.2d 404, 407 (2005) (trial judge's questions were appropriate because they helped to clarify the testimony), with Commonwealth v. Hassey, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 810–811, 668 N.E.2d 357, 359–361 (1996) (judge's cross-examination of defense witnesses "too partisan" and lacked appropriate foundation).

Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 380 Mass. 840, 846, 406 N.E.2d 389, 395 (1980). Despite "the natural reluctance of trial counsel to object to questions or comments coming from a judge, sometimes trial counsel's duty to protect his client's rights requires him to object, preferably at the bench out of the jury's hearing." Id. Where a party fails to object at trial to questions by the judge, any error by the trial judge is reviewed for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5, 763 N.E.2d 83, 85 (2002).

Subsection (d). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596, 613–614, 744 N.E.2d 1089, 1105–1106 (2001). See also Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692, 701–703, 632 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (1994). In addition to the procedures outlined in Subsection (d), the judge should instruct the jury "not to let themselves become aligned with any party, and that their questions should not be directed at helping or responding to any party"; the judge should also instruct the jurors "not to discuss the questions among themselves but, rather each juror must decide independently any questions he or she may have for a witness." Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. at 613–614, 744 N.E.2d at 1105. Upon counsels' review of the submitted questions, "[t]he judge should rule on any objections at [that] time, including any objection that the question touches on a matter that counsel purposefully avoided as a matter of litigation strategy, and that, if asked, will cause particular prejudice to the party." Id. at 614, 744 N.E.2d at 1105–1106. Finally, the scope of the reexamination of the witness after juror interrogation "should ordinarily be limited to the subject matter raised by the juror question and the witness's answer. The purpose of reexamination is two fold. First, it cures the admission of any prejudicial questions or answers; and second, it prevents the jury from becoming adversary in its interrogation." (Citation omitted.) Id. at 614, 744 N.E.2d at 1106.
Section 615. Sequestration of Witnesses

At the request of a party, or sua sponte, the court may order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. The court may not exclude any parties to the action in a civil proceeding, or the defendant in a criminal proceeding.

NOTE

This section is derived from Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 350 Mass. 485, 487, 215 N.E.2d 652, 653 (1966), and Mass. R. Crim. P. 21 ("Upon his own motion or the motion of either party, the judge may, prior to or during the examination of a witness, order any witness or witnesses other than the defendant to be excluded from the courtroom."). See Commonwealth v. Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 508, 269 N.E.2d 687, 693 (1971) (court may except from general sequestration order a witness deemed "essential to the management of the case").


ARTICLE VII. OPINION AND EXPERT EVIDENCE

Section 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses

If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are

(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness;

(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Section 702.

NOTE


Illustrations. When due to the complexity of expressing the observation such evidence might otherwise not be available, witnesses are permitted, out of necessity, to use “shorthand expressions” to describe observed facts such as the identity, size, distance, and speed of objects; the length of the passage of time; and the age, identity, and conduct of persons. See Commonwealth v. Tracy, 349 Mass. 87, 95–96, 207 N.E.2d 16, 20–21 (1965); Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 129–130, 112 N.E. 850, 851 (1916); Ross v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 222 Mass. 560, 562, 111 N.E. 390, 391 (1916). An experienced police officer, or possibly even a lay witness, could opine on whether a scene was suggestive of a struggle. Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 436 n.8, 879 N.E.2d 63, 76 n.8 (2008).

A police officer or lay witness may provide an opinion, in summary form, about another person’s sobriety, provided there exists a basis for that opinion. Commonwealth v. Orben, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 700, 704, 761 N.E.2d 991, 995–996 (2002). Where a defendant is charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a police officer who observed the defendant may offer an opinion as to the defendant’s level of intoxication but may not offer an opinion as to whether the defendant’s intoxication impaired his
ability to operate a motor vehicle, because the latter comes too close to an opinion on the defendant’s guilt. Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 545, 998 N.E.2d 322, 330–331 (2013). As a lay witness, a police officer may testify to the administration and results of field sobriety tests that measure a person’s balance, coordination, and acuity of mind in understanding and performing simple instructions, as a juror understands from common experience and knowledge that “intoxication leads to diminished balance, coordination, and mental acuity.” Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 187, 675 N.E.2d 370, 372 (1997) (contrasting the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, which requires expert testimony, from “ordinary” field sobriety tests such as a nine-step walk and turn and recitation of the alphabet); id. at 186, 675 N.E.2d at 371 (“Expert testimony on the scientific theory is needed if the subject of expert testimony is beyond the common knowledge or understanding of the lay juror.”).

In Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 133 (1875), the Supreme Judicial Court stated that a witness “may state his opinion in regard to sounds, their character, from what they proceed, and the direction from which they seem to come.” See also McGrath v. Fash, 244 Mass. 327, 329, 139 N.E. 303, 304 (1923) (witness permitted to testify that “all of a sudden this truck came around the corner on two wheels, and zigzagging across the street and appeared to be out of the control of the driver”); Commonwealth v. Rodziewicz, 213 Mass. 68, 69, 99 N.E. 574, 575 (1912) (it was error to permit a police investigator to identify points of origin of a fire based simply on observations about condition of the burned structure).

A lay opinion as to sanity or mental capacity is permitted only by an attesting witness to a will and only as to the testator’s mental condition at the time of its execution. See Holbrook v. Seagrave, 228 Mass. 26, 29, 116 N.E. 889, 890–891 (1917); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 447, 99 N.E. 266, 269–270 (1912).

This section does not permit a witness to express an opinion about what someone was intending or planning to do based on an observation of the person. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 319 Mass. 228, 230, 65 N.E.2d 422, 423–424 (1946).

In some circumstances, lay witnesses are permitted to identify a person in a photograph or on videotape. Compare Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 459–460 & n.29, 381 N.E.2d 582, 600–601 & n.29 (1978) (allowing police officer to testify that a photograph selected by a witness depicted the defendant because his appearance had changed since the date of the offense), and Commonwealth v. Pleas, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 323–329, 729 N.E.2d 642, 644–648 (2000) (allowing police officer to testify that man depicted in a surveillance videotape who was holding the victim was the defendant “because [1] the image in the videotape and the prints made from it were of poor quality . . . [2] the officer had long familiarity with the defendant that enabled him to identify an indistinct picture of the defendant; [3] there was some change in the appearance of the defendant at trial and as he generally presented in everyday life outdoors; and [4] the acquaintanceship of the officer with the defendant, as it was presented to the jury, was social rather than tied to the officer’s duties as a police officer”), with Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 365–366, 657 N.E.2d 458, 463–464 (1995) (excluding testimony of police officer identifying person in a surveillance videotape as the defendant because the jury was equally capable of making the determination), and Commonwealth v. Nassar, 351 Mass. 37, 41–42, 218 N.E.2d 72, 76–77 (1966) (because a sketch and a photograph of the defendant were in evidence the jury did not require any assistance from a witness who was asked whether they were a likeness of the defendant).

Depending on the circumstances, opinion testimony about the value of real or personal property may be given by lay witnesses or expert witnesses. With regard to lay witnesses,

“[t]he rule which permits the owner of real or personal property to testify as to its value does not rest upon the fact that he holds the legal title. The mere holding of the title to property by one who knows nothing about it and perhaps has never even seen it does not rationally and logically give him any qualification to express an opinion as to its value. Ordinarily an owner of property is actually familiar with its characteristics, has some acquaintance with its uses actual and potential and has had experience in dealing with it. It is this familiarity,
knowledge and experience, not the holding of the title, which qualify him to testify as to its value.”


Ultimately, the admission of summary descriptions of observed facts is left to the discretion of the trial judge. Kane v. Fields Corner Grille, Inc., 341 Mass. 640, 647, 171 N.E.2d 287, 292 (1961) (“Trials are not to be delayed and witnesses made inarticulate by too nice objections or rulings as to the use of such descriptive words”).
Section 702. Testimony by Experts

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if

(a) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,

(b) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and

(c) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

NOTE

Introduction. This section, which is based upon Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 702, reflects Massachusetts law. There are two methods by which the judge may satisfy his or her duty as the gatekeeper to ensure that expert witness testimony is reliable: (1) the “Frye” test, i.e., general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, or (2) a Daubert-Lanigan analysis. Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 238, 877 N.E.2d 589, 595–596 (2007). See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585–595 (1993), and Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 24–26, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1348–1349 (1994).

It is important to distinguish between the words used to express the principle of Massachusetts law set forth in this section and the application of the principle in specific cases. As the following notes indicate, the framework used under the Federal rules and in Massachusetts is the same, and each approach is specifically described as flexible. The principal difference is that in Massachusetts, the trial judge satisfies his or her gatekeeper responsibilities under Section 702(b) and (c) once the proponent of the evidence establishes that it is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640–641, 840 N.E.2d 12, 23–24 (2005); Commonwealth v. Sands, 424 Mass. 184, 185–186, 675 N.E.2d 370, 371–372 (1997). Compare Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26, 641 N.E.2d at 1349 (“We accept the basic reasoning of the Daubert opinion because it is consistent with our test of demonstrated reliability. We suspect that general acceptance in the relevant scientific community will continue to be the significant, and often the only, issue.”), and Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 314 n.5, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 n.5 (2000) (“Application of the Lanigan test requires flexibility. Differing types of methodology may require judges to apply differing evaluative criteria to determine whether scientific methodology is reliable. In the Lanigan case, we established various guideposts for determining admissibility including general acceptance, peer review, and testing.”), with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594–595 (“The inquiry envisioned by [Fed. R. Evid.] 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission.”), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“[T]he test of reliability is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.”). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 150 (“Daubert makes clear that the factors it mentions do not constitute a ‘definitive checklist or test.’ [Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.] at 593. And Daubert adds that the gatekeeping inquiry must be ‘tied to the facts’ of a particular ‘case.’ Id. at 591.” [Quotation and citation omitted.]); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 594 (“Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community[,] may properly be viewed with skepticism” [quotation and citation omitted].).
Hearing. An evidentiary hearing is not always necessary to comply with Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994). See Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 111, 842 N.E.2d 916, 925 (2006); Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 1–13, 696 N.E.2d 909, 909–918 (1998) (trial judge properly relied on affidavits and transcripts of testimony from other cases). However, as the Supreme Judicial Court noted, "we have not ‘grandfathered’ any particular theories or methods for all time, especially in areas where knowledge is evolving and new understandings may be expected as more studies and tests are conducted." Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 763 n.15, 919 N.E.2d 1254, 1264 n.15 (2010) (court acknowledged it was prudent for trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing in connection with expert testimony about dissociative amnesia because of "the evolving nature of scientific and clinical studies of the brain and memory"). To preserve an objection to expert testimony on grounds it is not reliable, a defendant must file a pretrial motion and request a hearing on the subject. See Commonwealth v. Sparks, 433 Mass. 654, 659, 746 N.E.2d 133, 137 (2001). A trial judge’s decision on whether expert witness evidence meets the Lanigan standard of reliability is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–143 (1997); Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 311–312, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1048–1049 (2000).


Each of these five foundation requirements is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge to determine under Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court. The trial judge has “broad discretion” in making these determinations. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 Mass. 1, 5, 864 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (2007). In making these preliminary determinations, the trial judge may be required to resolve disputes as to the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. at 647–648, 840 N.E.2d at 28. Expert witness testimony should not be deemed unreliable simply because there is a disagreement of opinion or in terms of the level of confidence among the experts. See Commonwealth v. Torres, 442 Mass. 554, 581, 813 N.E.2d 1261, 1282 (2004).

The judge has no authority to exclude the evidence because he or she disagrees with the expert’s opinion or finds the testimony unpersuasive. See Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 281, 700 N.E.2d 830, 832 (1998) (“Once the expert’s qualifications were established and assuming the expert’s testimony met the standard of Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994), the issue of credibility was for a jury, not the judge.”). When an expert’s opinion is based on the analysis of complex facts, the failure of the expert to account for all the variables goes to its weight and not its admissibility. Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 359–360, 893 N.E.2d 1187, 1206 (2008). See id. at 351–360 (expert witness with doctorate in psychology and mathematics used statistical methods to evaluate large body of employee records to account for missing records and to opine that employer had wrongfully deprived employees of compensation).

Second Foundation Requirement: Qualifications of the Expert. “The crucial issue in determining whether a witness is qualified to give an expert opinion is whether the witness has sufficient education, training, experience and familiarity with the subject matter of the testimony” (quotations and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 183, 667 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1996). Qualification of a witness as an expert in accordance with Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court, does not always require an explicit ruling on the record by the judge. Id. at 184, 667 N.E.2d at 261.

“Whether an expert determined to be qualified in one subject is also qualified to testify in another, related subject will depend on the circumstances of each case, and, where an expert has been determined to be qualified, questions or criticisms as to whether the basis of the expert’s opinion is reliable go to the weight, and not the admissibility, of the testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Crouse, 447 Mass. 558, 569, 855 N.E.2d 391, 401 (2006) (noting that there must always be a first time for every expert witness). However, the trial judge, acting as the gatekeeper, must enforce boundaries between areas of expertise within which the expert is qualified and areas that require different training, education, and experience within which the expert is not qualified. See Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 535, 744 N.E.2d 25, 31 (2001) (social worker qualified to testify as an expert witness that abused children may experience dissociative memory loss and recovered memory, but was not qualified to testify about how trauma victims store and retrieve or dissociate memories).

Third Foundation Requirement: Knowledge of Sufficient Facts or Data in the Record. The basis of expert opinion may include the factors set forth in Section 703, namely: (a) facts observed by the witness or otherwise in the witness’s direct personal knowledge; (b) evidence already in the record or which the parties represent will be presented during the course of the proceedings, which facts may be assumed to be true in questions put to the witness; and (c) facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are independently admissible in evidence and are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion. See Section 703, Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts; LaClair v. Silberline Mfg. Co., 379 Mass. 21, 32, 393 N.E.2d 867, 874 (1979). See also Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 531, 499 N.E.2d 812, 821 (1986). This requirement means the expert witness
“must have sufficient familiarity with the particular facts to reach a meaningful expert opinion. The relevant distinction is between an opinion based upon speculation and one adequately grounded in facts. Although a trial judge has some discretion in making that distinction, it may be an abuse of discretion to disallow expert testimony which is based upon reasonably adequate familiarity with the facts.” (Citations omitted.)


**Fourth Foundation Requirement: Reliability of Principle or Method Used by the Expert.** Both the United States Supreme Court, applying Fed. R. Evid. 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and the Supreme Judicial Court applying the common law in Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 (1994), agree on the fundamental requirement that “[i]f the process or theory underlying [an] . . . expert’s opinion lacks reliability, that opinion should not reach the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26, 641 N.E.2d at 1349. Both the Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court require the trial judge to act as a gatekeeper to ensure that the expert witness testimony that is considered by the jury meets minimum standards of reliability. The variation between the two approaches is that Massachusetts law makes general acceptance the default position and a Daubert analysis an alternative method of establishing reliability. Under Fed. R. Evid. 702, Federal courts must consider five nonexclusive factors in assessing reliability, one of which is the traditional test that looked at whether the principle or method was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). “[G]eneral acceptance in the relevant community of the theory and process on which an expert’s testimony is based, on its own, continues to be sufficient to establish the requisite reliability for admission in Massachusetts courts regardless of other Daubert tors.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. 626, 640, 840 N.E.2d 12, 23 (2005) (latent fingerprint identification theory). See Commonwealth v. Frangipane, 433 Mass. 527, 538, 744 N.E.2d 25, 33 (2001) (Lanigan hearing not necessary where qualified expert testimony has been accepted as reliable in the past in Massachusetts appellate cases). “Where general acceptance is not established by the party offering the expert testimony, a full Daubert analysis provides an alternate method of establishing it.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. at 641, 840 N.E.2d at 23. These alternative, Daubert considerations include the ability to test the theory, existence of peer-reviewed publications supporting it, existence of standards for controlling or maintaining it, and known or potential error rates. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 593–594. “A judge may also look to his own common sense, as well as the depth and quality of the proffered expert’s education, training, experience, and appearance in other courts to determine reliability” (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Pasteur, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 826, 850 N.E.2d 1118, 1132 (2006). See also Commonwealth v. Powell, 450 Mass. 229, 239, 877 N.E.2d 589, 596 (2007) (holding a court may consider an appellate decision from a different jurisdiction).

In making the reliability determination it is also important that

“[a] relevant scientific community must be defined broadly enough to include a sufficiently broad sample of scientists so that the possibility of disagreement exists, . . . and . . . trial judges [must] not . . . define the relevant scientific community so narrowly that the expert’s opinion will inevitably be considered generally accepted. In the context of technical forensic evidence, the community must be sufficiently broad to permit the potential for dissent.”

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 445 Mass. at 643, 840 N.E.2d at 25, quoting from Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. 304, 314 n.6, 733 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 n.6 (2000). See id. at 313–316, 733 N.E.2d at 1049–1052 (holding that the requirement of reliability under Lanigan extends to expert opinions based on personal observations and
clinical experience, including medical expert testimony concerning diagnosis and causation). The requirements of Lanigan, as amplified in Canavan’s Case, do not apply fully as to the standard of care in a medical negligence case. Palandjian v. Foster, 446 Mass. 100, 108–109, 842 N.E.2d 916, 923 (2006) (“How physicians practice medicine is a fact, not an opinion derived from data or other scientific inquiry by employing a recognized methodology. However, when the proponent of expert testimony incorporates scientific fact into a statement concerning the standard of care, that science may be the subject of a Daubert-Lanigan inquiry.” [Quotation and citation omitted.]).

The application of the Daubert-Lanigan factors in cases involving the “hard” sciences may not apply in the same way in cases involving the “soft” sciences. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. at 593–594; Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 25–26, 641 N.E.2d at 1349. See also Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 867 (2005). The Supreme Judicial Court has stated as follows:

“Observation informed by experience is but one scientific technique that is no less susceptible to Lanigan analysis than other types of scientific methodology. The gatekeeping function pursuant to Lanigan is the same regardless of the nature of the methodology used: to determine whether ‘the process or theory underlying a scientific expert’s opinion lacks reliability [such] that [the] opinion should not reach the trier of fact.’ Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15, 26 (1994). Of course, even though personal observations are not excepted from Lanigan analysis, in many cases personal observation will be a reliable methodology to justify an expert’s conclusion. If the proponent can show that the method of personal observation is either generally accepted by the relevant scientific community or otherwise reliable to support a scientific conclusion relevant to the case, such expert testimony is admissible.”

Canavan’s Case, 432 Mass. at 313–314, 733 N.E.2d at 1050. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shanley, 455 Mass. 752, 766, 919 N.E.2d 1254, 1266 (2010) (“[T]he judge’s finding that the lack of scientific testing did not make unreliable the theory that an individual may experience dissociative amnesia was supported in the record, not only by expert testimony but by a wide collection of clinical observations and a survey of academic literature.”).

In several cases, the Supreme Judicial Court has relied on the discussion of forensic methods contained in a 2009 report by the National Research Council entitled Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 134–135 (2009) (NAS Report). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 458 Mass. 137, 149 n.17, 934 N.E.2d 810, 820 n.17 (2010) (citing NAS Report that the “near universal” laboratory test for drug identity is the “gas chromatography-mass spectrometry” test); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 788 n.13, 933 N.E.2d 93, 108 n.13 (2010) (citing NAS Report for proposition that nuclear DNA analysis is the standard against which many other forensic individualization techniques are judged). In Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 724–727, 933 N.E.2d 50, 57–60 (2010), the defendant challenged the scientific basis of the latent fingerprint identification methodology known as ACE-V, which was criticized in the NAS Report. The Supreme Judicial Court observed that “[t]he NAS Report does not conclude that fingerprint evidence is so unreliable that courts should no longer admit it. The Report does, however, stress the subjective nature of the judgments that must be made by the fingerprint examiner at every step of the ACE-V process . . . .”

The Supreme Judicial Court has not addressed the standard to apply to evidence that meets the general acceptance test but is opposed on grounds that it is nonetheless unreliable. “Given that knowledge is constantly expanding, and that scientific principles are frequently modified in light of new discoveries or theories, it is inconsistent with the reliability requirement to permit any theories or methods to be ‘grandfathered’ as admissible evidence.” M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 7.5.1, at 419 (8th ed. 2007).

(2007) (results of otherwise valid breathalyzer test is admissible to establish blood alcohol level at the time of the offense without expert witness testimony on the theory of retrograde extrapolation so long as the test was administered within three hours of the offense); Commonwealth v. McNickles, 434 Mass. 839, 847–850, 753 N.E.2d 131, 138–140 (2001) (disagreement among experts regarding the reliability of the application of a statistical method known as “likelihood ratios” to mixed samples of DNA evidence went to the weight, but not the admissibility, of the expert witness evidence); Smith v. Bell Atlantic, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 702, 718–719, 829 N.E.2d 228, 242–243 (2005) (even though expert witness was qualified and employed a reliable diagnostic method, her lack of knowledge of the details of the patient’s life called into question the reliability of her opinion and justified its exclusion in judge’s discretion).

Certitude of Expert Witness Opinion. In Commonwealth v. Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 942 N.E.2d 927 (2011), the Supreme Judicial Court explained that when an expert witness offers an opinion that is empirically based but subjective in nature, such as whether a cartridge or casing was fired from a particular firearm, it is not permissible for the witness to imply that the opinion has a statistical or mathematical basis. “Phrases that could give the jury an impression of greater certainty, such as ‘practical impossibility’ and ‘absolute certainty’ should be avoided. The phrase ‘reasonable degree of scientific certainty’ should also be avoided because it suggests that forensic ballistics is a science, where it is clearly as much an art as a science.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Id. at 849, 942 N.E.2d at 946. In Heang, the Supreme Judicial Court provided the following examples of the degree of certitude that an expert witness may express when the opinion is empirically based but subjective in nature: for firearm or ballistics identification, a “reasonable degree of ballistics certainty,” id. at 848–849, 942 N.E.2d at 946; for medical examiner and pathologist opinions, a “reasonable degree of medical certainty,” id. at 849, 942 N.E.2d at 945–946, citing Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 383, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (2008); Commonwealth v. DelValle, 443 Mass. 782, 788, 824 N.E.2d 830, 836 (2005); for clinical diagnoses, a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty,” Commonwealth v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 280, 700 N.E.2d 830, 832 (1998); and for psychological opinions, a “reasonable degree of psychological certainty,” Commonwealth v. Wentworth, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 82, 86, 756 N.E.2d 1199, 1203 (2001). It may also be error for a fingerprint expert to state with absolute certainty that a particular latent print matches a known fingerprint. Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. 715, 727–728, 933 N.E.2d 50, 60 (2010). In Heang, the court also noted that there are forensic disciplines that permit expert witness opinion to be expressed to a mathematical or statistical certainty. Commonwealth v. Gambora, 457 Mass. at 715, 933 N.E.2d at 50, citing Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 850–853, 920 N.E.2d 845, 854–856 (2010) (because it is possible to say to mathematical degrees of statistical certainty that one DNA profile matches another, test results and opinions regarding DNA profile must be accompanied by testimony explaining likelihood of that match occurring in general population).

Illustrations.


Battered Woman Syndrome. The Legislature has concluded that battered woman syndrome evidence is of a kind appropriately presented to the fact finder by expert testimony. General Laws c. 233, § 23F, inserted by St. 1996, c. 450, § 248, which replaced G. L. c. 233, § 23E, repealed by St. 1996, c. 450, § 247, on the same subject, states that “[i]n the trial of criminal cases charging the use of force against another where the issue of defense of self or another, defense of duress or coercion, or accidental harm is asserted, a defendant shall be permitted to introduce . . . evidence by expert testimony regarding the common pattern in abusive relationships; . . . the relevant facts and circumstances which form the basis for such opinion; and evidence whether the defendant displayed characteristics common to victims of abuse. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to preclude the introduction of evidence or expert testimony . . . where such evidence or expert testimony is otherwise now admissible.”
ARTICLE VII. OPINION AND EXPERT EVIDENCE

§ 702


Computer Simulations. Evidence consisting of computer-generated models or simulations is treated like other scientific tests; admissibility is conditioned “on a sufficient showing that: (1) the computer is functioning properly; (2) the input and underlying equations are sufficiently complete and accurate (and disclosed to the opposing party, so that they may challenge them); and (3) the program is generally accepted by the appropriate community of scientists.” Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 412 Mass. 545, 549–550, 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1992).


Firearm Identification (Forensic Ballistics). See Commonwealth v. Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 847–848, 942 N.E.2d 927, 944–945 (2011) (adopting “guidelines” for the admissibility of expert firearm identification testimony that [1] require documentation of the basis of the expert’s opinion before trial, which the Commonwealth must disclose to the defense in discovery; [2] require an explanation by the expert to the jury of the theories and methodologies underlying the field of forensic ballistics before offering any opinions; and [3] limit the degree of certitude that the qualified expert may express about whether a particular firearm fired a specific projectile or cartridge to a “reasonable degree of ballistic certainty”).

**ARTICLE VII. OPINION AND EXPERT EVIDENCE**

§ 702


**Valuation of Real Estate.** See *Correia v. New Bedford Redev. Auth.*, 375 Mass. 360, 362–367, 377 N.E.2d 909, 911–914 (1978) (expert witness may use the depreciated reproduction cost method to form an opinion as to the value of real estate when the judge finds that there is a justification for the use of this disfavored approach).


Cross-Reference: Section 703, Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
Section 703.  Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert witness bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the witness at or before the hearing. These include (a) facts observed by the witness or otherwise in the witness’s direct personal knowledge; (b) evidence already in the record or that will be presented during the course of the proceedings, which facts may be assumed to be true in questions put to the witness; and (c) facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are independently admissible in evidence and are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion.

NOTE


"When an expert provides the jury with an opinion regarding the facts of the case, that opinion must rest on a proper basis, else inadmissible evidence might enter in the guise of expert opinion. The expert must have knowledge of the particular facts from firsthand observation, or from a proper hypothetical question posed by counsel, or from unadmitted evidence that would nevertheless be admissible."

Commonwealth v. Waite, 422 Mass. 792, 803, 665 N.E.2d 982, 990 (1996). See id. at 803–804, 665 N.E.2d at 990–991 (psychologist called by the defense in a murder trial could opine on the defendant’s mental impairment at the time of the offense based on the witness’s interview with the defendant five weeks after the killings, and the contents of police and medical records, but not on the basis of a psychiatrist’s earlier “preliminary diagnosis” that was not shown to be reliable and independently admissible). Accord Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 Mass. 1, 15–16, 696 N.E.2d 909, 919 (1998) (“The judge properly prevented the defendants’ experts [as well as the plaintiffs’ experts] from testifying on direct examination to the out-of-court opinions of other scientists in the absence of some specific exception to the hearsay rule [none was shown].”).

Regarding Section 703(b), unless the evidence is capable of only one interpretation, the question to the expert witness must refer to specific portions of the record. See Connor v. O’Donnell, 230 Mass. 39, 42, 119 N.E. 446, 447 (1918).

Regarding Section 703(c), in determining whether facts or data are independently admissible, it is not whether the forms in which such facts or data exist satisfy evidentiary requirements. Rather, the court will determine whether the underlying facts or data would potentially be admissible through appropriate witnesses. Such witnesses need not be immediately available in court to testify. See Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 337–338, 771 N.E.2d 778, 783 (2002), citing Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. at 531, 499 N.E.2d at 820–821.

Limitation on Cross-Examination. On cross-examination of an expert, a judge may exclude evidence as unfairly prejudicial, see Section 403, even if the expert is aware of those facts, if the facts were not relied upon as part of the expert’s opinion, do not clarify or discredit the opinion, and serve only to focus the jury on those facts. Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 667–668, 978 N.E.2d 37, 47–48 (2012) (prior bad acts excluded).
Risk of Inaccurate Forensic Analysis. In Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 933 N.E.2d 93 (2010), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the risk of inaccurate forensic analysis as follows:

“Our common-law rules of evidence protect a defendant in various ways from the risk of inaccurate forensic analysis. Where there is reason to believe that evidence has been mislabeled or mishandled or that data have been fabricated or manipulated, a defendant may challenge the admissibility of an expert opinion relying on such evidence or data in a Daubert-Lanigan hearing, because an opinion must rest on evidence or data that provide ‘a permissible basis’ for an expert to formulate an opinion. A defendant may also challenge the admissibility of an opinion where an expert relies solely on the conclusions of the testing analyst, without knowledge of the procedures employed by the testing analyst or the underlying data and evidence that are generally contained in worksheets, because a conclusory opinion alone may not be a permissible basis on which an expert may rest an opinion. Where an expert opinion survives a Daubert-Lanigan challenge or where . . . the defendant does not challenge the admissibility of the expert’s opinion, the defendant may still . . . cross-examine the testifying expert as to the risk of evidence being mishandled or mislabeled or of data being fabricated or manipulated, and as to whether the expert’s opinion is vulnerable to these risks.” (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 790–791, 933 N.E.2d at 110.

On direct examination, the expert witness may testify to the basis of his or her opinion regarding (1) facts within the witness’s personal knowledge; (2) facts in evidence; or (3) with approval of the court, facts that a party will put in evidence. However, “it is settled that an expert witness may not, under the guise of stating the reasons for his opinion, testify to matters of hearsay in the course of his direct examination unless such matters are admissible under some statutory or other recognized exception to the hearsay rule.” Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 392, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1232 (2008), quoting Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 408 Mass. 269, 273, 557 N.E.2d 1136, 1138–1139 (1990), quoting Kelly Realty Co. v. Commonwealth, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 54, 55–56, 323 N.E.2d 350, 351–352 (1975).

Substituted Experts.

DNA Analyst. A DNA analyst may testify to testing he or she performed on unknown samples, but may not testify about the testing conducted by an absent analyst. In accordance with Section 705, a DNA analyst may testify to his or her opinion even though the basis is in whole or in part evidence collected or created by the absent DNA analyst. See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 583–584, 984 N.E.2d 804, 807–808 (2013).

Medical Examiner. A substitute medical examiner may not testify to the observations, findings, or opinions made by an absent medical examiner. In accordance with Section 705, a medical examiner may testify to his or her opinion even though the basis is in whole or in part evidence collected or created by the absent medical examiner. Commonwealth v. Leng, 463 Mass. 779, 785, 979 N.E.2d 199, 206 (2012); Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 388, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1229 (2008). The Commonwealth is not required to show that the medical examiner who performed an autopsy is unavailable for a substitute medical examiner to testify. Commonwealth v. Reavis, 465 Mass. 875, 881–882, 992 N.E.2d 304, 310–311 (2013).

Cross-Reference: Section 702, Testimony by Experts; Section 705, Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion; Article VIII, Introductory Note.
Section 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue

Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

NOTE

Improper Vouching. Despite the abolition of the common-law doctrine that prohibited expert opinion testimony on the ultimate issue, the admissibility of such testimony in Massachusetts still depends on whether it explains evidence that is beyond the common understanding of the jury. Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 581, 700 N.E.2d 282, 286–287 (1998). See Section 702, Testimony by Experts. Thus, expert witness testimony which simply amounts to an opinion on the credibility of a witness (improper vouching), on whether the defendant was “negligent,” or on the guilt or innocence of the defendant is prohibited. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burgess, 450 Mass. 422, 436, 879 N.E.2d 63, 76 (2008) (“the prosecutor [improperly] asked [the Commonwealth’s expert] to comment on the credibility of the Commonwealth’s theory of the case by asking whether its theory was ‘consistent’ with [the expert’s] observations”); Commonwealth v. Jewett, 442 Mass. 356, 368, 813 N.E.2d 452, 462 (2004) (“in the absence of special circumstances, an expert may not be asked whether a rape or sexual assault has occurred”); Commonwealth v. Richardson, 423 Mass. 180, 185–186, 667 N.E.2d 257, 262 (1996), quoting Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 419 Mass. 750, 759, 647 N.E.2d 413, 420 (1995) (“[a]lthough expert testimony on the general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children is permissible, an expert may not refer or compare the child to those general characteristics”); Birch v. Stout, 303 Mass. 28, 32, 390 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1979) (defendant could not be asked to “pass upon the question of his own negligence”); Commonwealth v. LaCapricia, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 498, 671 N.E.2d 984, 986 (1996) (“Dr. Gelinas went beyond the description of general principles of social or behavioral science that might assist the jury in their deliberations concerning credibility and gave testimony concerning family dynamics that evolved into profile testimony that signaled the jury that the child complainants were sexually abused.”).

At least four different, but related, reasons are given for the exclusion of such evidence. First, such opinions offer no assistance to the fact finders “because the jury are capable of making that assessment without an expert’s aid.” Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 60, 643 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1994). See Commonwealth v. Andujar, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 529, 531, 784 N.E.2d 646, 647–648 (2003). Second, “[o]n such questions, the influence of an expert’s opinion may threaten the independence of the jury’s decision.” Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 105, 431 N.E.2d 556, 566 (1982). Third, such questions call for opinions on matters of law or mixed questions of law and fact, and the jury must be allowed to draw their own conclusions from the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 161–162, 434 N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (1982); Birch v. Stout, 303 Mass. at 32, 20 N.E.2d at 431. Fourth, expert opinion in the form of conclusions about the credibility of a witness or a party are beyond the scope of the witness’s expertise and in

Illustrations. For examples of cases applying this section, see M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 7.3 (8th ed. 2007); 3 M.G. Perlin & D. Cooper, Mottla’s Proof of Cases in Massachusetts § 83.4 (3d ed. 1995).

Operating Under the Influence Cases. In Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541, 998 N.E.2d 322, 330–331 (2013), the court explained that the limitation on testimony that amounts to an opinion as to guilt or innocence applies to the lay witness as well as to the expert witness. Cross-Reference: Section 701, Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.

Opinions About the Law Versus the Facts. Legal questions, as to which testimony is not permitted, should be distinguished from factual conclusions, as to which testimony is proper. The line between a “conclusion of law” and an “ultimate factual issue” is sometimes blurred. Commonwealth v. Little, 453 Mass. 766, 769, 906 N.E.2d 286, 290 (2009) (“Narcotics investigators may testify as experts to describe how drug transactions occur on the street . . . [such as] testimony on the use of lookouts in drug transactions, and the significance of the purity of seized drugs. We have also repeatedly held that there is no error in allowing a police detective to testify that in his opinion the amount of drugs possessed by the defendant was not consistent with personal use but was consistent with an intent to distribute.” [Citations and quotations omitted.]). See Commonwealth v. Roderiques, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 515, 522, 940 N.E.2d 1234, 1239–1240 (2010) (pediatrician allowed to testify that baby's injuries were not accidental). Cf. Commonwealth v. Brady, 370 Mass. 630, 635, 351 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1976) (insurance agent may not testify to applicability of insurance coverage); Perry v. Medeiros, 369 Mass. 836, 842, 343 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1976) (building inspector cannot give opinion interpreting building code); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 366 Mass. 705, 711, 322 N.E.2d 407, 411 (1975) (medical examiner not permitted to testify that death was “homicide”); DeCanio v. School Comm. of Boston, 358 Mass. 116, 125–126, 260 N.E.2d 676, 682–683 (1970) (expert could not testify that “suspension and dismissal of probationary teachers without a hearing ‘would have no legitimate educational purpose’”); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 350 Mass. 664, 666–667, 216 N.E.2d 558, 560 (1966) (doctor in rape prosecution cannot testify to “forcible entry”); S.D. Shaw & Sons v. Joseph Rugo, Inc., 343 Mass. 635, 639, 180 N.E.2d 446, 448 (1962) (witness may not give opinion as to whether certain work was included in contract specification); Commonwealth v. Ross, 339 Mass. 428, 435, 159 N.E.2d 330, 335 (1959) (guilt); Foley v. Hotel Touraine Co., 326 Mass. 742, 745, 96 N.E.2d 698, 699 (1951) (treasurer of corporation could not testify on question whether assistant manager had “ostensible authority” on day of accident); Birch v. Strout, 303 Mass. 28, 32, 20 N.E.2d 429, 431 (1939) (opinion as to negligence).
Section 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion

The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 705, which the Supreme Judicial Court adopted in Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516, 532, 499 N.E.2d 812, 821 (1986).

"The rule is aimed principally at the abuse of the hypothetical question. It does not eliminate the availability of the hypothetical question, but only the requirement of its use. . . . The thrust of the rule is to leave inquiry regarding the basis of expert testimony to cross-examination, which is considered an adequate safeguard."

Id., quoting Advisory Committee’s Note on Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 705. Under Massachusetts law, for purposes of direct examination, there is a “distinction between an expert’s opinion on the one hand and the hearsay information that formed the basis of the opinion on the other, holding the former admissible and the latter inadmissible.” Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 584, 984 N.E.2d 804, 808 (2013). However, on cross-examination, the opposing party may choose to elicit the hearsay basis for an opinion offered on direct examination. See Commonwealth v. Nardi, 452 Mass. 379, 387–395, 893 N.E.2d 1221, 1228–1234 (2008). In Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 785–787, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106–108 (2010), the Supreme Judicial Court stated the direct examination of an expert on facts not in evidence

“is limited to the expert’s opinion and matters of which the expert had personal knowledge, such as her training and experience, and the protocols generally accepted in her field of expertise. Only the defendant can open the door on cross-examination to testimony regarding the basis for the expert’s opinion, which may invite the expert witness to testify to facts or data that may be admissible in evidence but have not yet been admitted in evidence.”


Cross-Reference: Article VIII, Introductory Note.

Limitation on Cross-Examination. Under certain circumstances, the requirement that the expert disclose underlying facts or data on cross-examination may be limited by Section 403 considerations. See Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 668–669, 978 N.E.2d 37, 47–49 (2012). In Anestal, the court held that

“[o]nce the Commonwealth sought to inquire over objection about this prior bad act evidence, it was incumbent on the judge in the sound exercise of his discretion to ascertain whether the evidence was probative and, if so, whether that probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”

Id. at 669, 978 N.E.2d at 48. This inquiry should take place at sidebar, or the judge should conduct a voir dire. Id. at 669 n.20, 978 N.E.2d at 49 n.20.
Section 706. Court Appointed Experts

(a) Appointment. If legally permissible, the court, on its own or at the request of a party, may appoint an expert. Unless mandated by law to accept the assignment, the expert shall have the right to refuse such appointment. The court, after providing an opportunity to the parties to participate, shall inform the expert of his or her duties. The expert may be required to testify.

(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compensation, as set by the court, unless controlled by statute or rule. Except as otherwise provided by law, the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.

(c) Disclosure of Appointment. The fact that the court appointed the expert witness shall not be disclosed to the jury.

(d) Parties’ Experts of Own Selection. Nothing in this section limits the parties in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.

NOTE

ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

(a) Confrontation Clause and Hearsay in Criminal Cases. In considering the following sections, it is necessary to recognize the distinction between hearsay rules and the requirements of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights. The admissibility of an out-of-court statement offered for its truth is determined by a two-step inquiry. First, the statement must be admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence. Second, if offered by the Commonwealth, the statement must satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause.

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004), the United States Supreme Court explained that the Sixth Amendment expressed the common-law right of the defendant in a criminal case to confrontation, and that it was subject only to those exceptions that existed at the time of the amendment's framing in 1791. As a result, the Supreme Court held that "testimonial statements" of a witness for the government in a criminal case who is not present at trial and subject to cross-examination are not admissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 53–54. Accord Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 14, 833 N.E.2d 549, 559 (2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006) ("constitutional provision of the confrontation clause trumps [our own] rules of evidence"). In Commonwealth v. Lao, 450 Mass. 215, 223, 877 N.E.2d 557, 563 (2007), the Supreme Judicial Court held that "the protection provided by art. 12 is coextensive with the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution."

(1) Testimonial Versus Nontestimonial; the Primary Purpose Test. The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court use the primary purpose test to determine whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 Mass. 255, 951 N.E.2d 26 (2011); Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 951 N.E.2d 674 (2011). The primary purpose test's key analysis is whether the statement is procured with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 Mass. at 260–262, 951 N.E.2d at 32–34 (holding that statements are testimonial when "the primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution"). The primary purpose test is objective, and "the relevant inquiry into the parties' statements and actions is not the subjective or actual purpose of the particular parties, but the purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the parties' statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred." Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156. See so Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. at 394, 951 N.E.2d at 683 ("[T]he primary purpose' inquiry [is] objective. The parties' subjective motives or intentions are largely irrelevant."). The following factors are relevant to an analysis under the primary purpose test.

(A) Whether an Emergency Exists. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), the United States Supreme Court held as follows:

"Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."

In Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1158–1160 (2011), the Supreme Court held that "whether an emergency exists and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent inquiry" and explained that "a conversation which begins as an interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance' can 'evolve into testi-
monial statements,” and “[a] conversation that begins with a prosecutorial purpose may nevertheless de-
volve into nontestimonial statements if an unexpected emergency arises.”

In Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 460 Mass. 255, 259–260, 951 N.E.2d 26, 32 (2011), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 460 Mass. 385, 392–393, 951 N.E.2d 674, 682 (2011), both decided after Michigan v. Bryant, the Supreme Judicial Court identified a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether an ongoing emergency exists at the time a declarant makes statements to a law enforcement agent:

- whether an armed assailant poses a substantial threat to the public at large, the victim, or the responding officers;
- the type of weapon that has been employed;
- the severity of the victim’s injuries;
- the formality of the interrogation;
- the involved parties’ statements and actions; and
- whether the victim’s safety is at substantial imminent risk.


In Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011), the Supreme Court additionally explained that “whether an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor—[although] an important factor—that informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation.” “[T]here may be other circum-
cstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Id. at 1155.

(B) The Formality of the Statements and the Actions of the Parties Involved. The formality of an interrogation is an important factor for determining whether a statement was procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160. In Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011), the United States Supreme Court held that questioning that occurred in an exposed, public area, prior to the arrival of emergency medical services (when the declarant had been shot in the abdomen and the armed assailant was still at large), and in a disorganized fashion, was informal and “distinguishable from [a] formal station-house interrogation.” Id. at 1160.

The statements of a declarant and the actions of both the declarant and interrogators also provide objective evidence of the interrogation’s primary purpose. Id. at 1160–1161. The Supreme Court explained that looking to the content of both the questions and the answers is an important factor in the primary purpose test because both interrogators and declarants may have mixed motives. Id. at 1161. Police officers’ dual responsibilities as both first responders and criminal investigators may lead them to act with different motives simultaneously or in quick succession. Id. Likewise, during an ongoing emergency, victims may make statements they think will help end the threat to their safety but may not envision these statements being used for prosecution. Id. Alternatively, a severely injured victim may lack the ability to have any purpose at all in answering questions. Id. The inquiry is still objective, however, and it focuses on the understanding and purpose of a reasonable victim in the actual victim’s circumstances, which prominently include the victim’s physical state. Id.

(C) Whether the Statements Were Made to Non–Law Enforcement Personnel. The United States Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question “whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’” Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 n.3. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 445 Mass. 1, 12–13, 833 N.E.2d 549, 558–559 (2005).

“[W]here statements contained in hospital medical records demonstrate, on their face, that they were included for the purpose of medical treatment, that evident purpose renders the statements both nontes-
(2) Records Admitted Without Live Testimony. Many cases since Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), have challenged the admissibility of certificates attested to by nontestifying experts. In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), the United States Supreme Court held that the reasoning of Crawford applied to certain certificates of analysis that had been frequently introduced in criminal trials to establish that a substance was a “controlled substance” under G. L. c. 94C. The Supreme Court held that a drug certificate in the form of an affidavit by the analyst was a testimonial statement because it was prepared with the knowledge that it would be used at trial, and thus its admission in evidence over the defendant’s objection violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment because the technician or scientist who made the findings set forth in the certificate was not made available for questioning by the defense. As a result, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appeals Court in Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 1114, 870 N.E.2d 676 (2007) (unpublished), and effectively overruled the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 283–285, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705–706 (2005). Analytical certificates made under oath by chemists or ballisticians that a substance is a drug, is of a specific weight, or both, or that a thing is a working firearm, “are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination’” (emphasis deleted). Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. at 310–311, quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006). See also Commonwealth v. Brown, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 361, 363, 914 N.E.2d 332, 333–334 (2009) (applying Melendez-Diaz holding to ballistics certificate).

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 306–309 (2009), the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea that an analyst’s testimony was the only way to prove the chemical composition of a substance. In Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 459 Mass. 148, 945 N.E.2d 260 (2011), the Supreme Judicial Court stated as follows:

“Melendez-Diaz stands for the proposition that if a certificate of drug analysis is used, it must be accompanied by the testimony of an analyst so that the defendant’s right to confrontation is preserved. However, nowhere does the decision state that where . . . a prosecutor uses the opinion testimony of an expert to establish the composition of a drug, that testimony requires corroboration. . . . A prosecutor’s decision to proceed without a certificate of drug analysis does not violate the holding in Melendez-Diaz.”

Id. at 155–156, 945 N.E.2d at 266.

In Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 947 N.E.2d 1060 (2011), the Supreme Judicial Court held that statements contained in an annual certification and accompanying diagnostic records, attesting to the proper functioning of a breath-testing machine used to test the defendant’s blood alcohol content, were not testimonial, and that the defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated by the admission of the certification and records without the live testimony of the technician who had performed the certification test on the machine. Id. at 788–789, 947 N.E.2d at 1069–1070. The critical distinction that “ma[de] all the difference” was that the certificate of analysis in Melendez-Diaz resembled “the type of ‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent’ at the nucleus of the confrontation clause” because it was particularized and performed in aid of a prosecution seeking to prove the commission of a past act, while the Office of Alcohol Testing certification records were generalized and performed prospectively in primary aid of the administration of a regulatory program. Id., quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004).

In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), the United States Supreme Court decided five to four that a blood alcohol analysis report, which certified that the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for aggravated driving while intoxicated under New Mexico law, and which was introduced at trial through the testimony of an analyst who had not performed the certification, was testimonial within the meaning of the confrontation clause. The Supreme Court found that the laboratory report in Bullcoming resembled those in Melendez-Diaz “[i]n all material respects.”
In Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 460 Mass. 1, 948 N.E.2d 883 (2011), the Commonwealth introduced in evidence a certificate from the Registry of Motor Vehicles attesting that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to the defendant; the Commonwealth did not present any testimony from a witness on behalf of the registry. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the certificate was testimonial in nature and that its admission without testimony from the preparers violated the confrontation clause. Id. at 8–9, 948 N.E.2d at 890. The court explained that one "must examine carefully the purpose for which [a document is] created" when "determining the admissibility of a particular business record." Id. at 10, 948 N.E.2d at 891. In Parenteau, the business record was created two months after the criminal complaint was issued and therefore was "plainly" created to establish an element of the statutory offense at trial. Id. at 8, 948 N.E.2d at 890. Importantly, the court noted that "[i]f such a record had been created at the time the notice was mailed and preserved by the registry as part of the administration of its regular business affairs, then it would have been admissible at trial." Id. at 10, 948 N.E.2d at 891. See also Commonwealth v. Ellis, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 330, 945 N.E.2d 983 (2011).

The admission of a properly completed and returned G. L. c. 209A return of service absent the testimony of the officer who completed it does not violate a defendant's confrontation clause rights. Commonwealth v. Shangkuan, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 827, 833–834, 837, 943 N.E.2d 466, 472–473, 475 (2011) ("[T]he primary purpose for which the return of service in this case was created is to serve the routine administrative functions of the court system, ensuring that the defendant received the fair notice to which he is statutorily and constitutionally entitled . . . , establishing a time and manner of notice for purposes of determining when the order expires or is subject to renewal, and assuring the plaintiff that the target of the order knows of its existence. The return of service here was not created for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at a potential future criminal trial."). See also Commonwealth v. Fox, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 244, 246, 961 N.E.2d 611, 613 (2012) (sexual offender registry records are admissible as business records without violation of confrontation clause because they are not created to prove fact at trial). In Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 876, 986 N.E.2d 380, 400 (2013), the Supreme Judicial Court held that a statement by the medical examiner in the death certificate that the victim’s death was the result of a “gunshot wound of the head with fracture of the skull and perforation of the brain” was testimonial based on the obvious purpose for which it will be used in the case of a homicide and the statutory duties of the medical examiner. Id. at 876, 986 N.E.2d at 399.

(3) Expert Testimony. In the years since Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), was decided, the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Judicial Court have considered to what extent that case alters procedures governing the admissibility of expert testimony. That debate is ongoing.


In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), the United States Supreme Court held five to four that admission in evidence of a blood alcohol analysis report, which certified that the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was well above the threshold for aggravated driving while intoxicated under New Mexico law, and which was introduced at trial through the testimony of an analyst who had not performed the certification, violated the confrontation clause. The Supreme Court found that the laboratory report in Bullcoming resembled those in Melendez-Diaz “[i]n all material respects.” Id. at 2717.

In Commonwealth v. Munoz, 461 Mass. 126, 132, 958 N.E.2d 1167, 1173–1174 (2011), vacated and remanded in light of Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), the Supreme Judicial Court opined that Bullcoming did not call Barbosa into question. In Munoz, the court affirmed the distinction between a substitute analyst’s permissible testimony as to independent opinions based on data generated by a non-
testifying analyst and a substitute analyst’s impermissible testimony as to the testing analyst’s reports and conclusions.

Several days after the decision in Munoz, the United States Supreme Court held five to four that the testimony of a forensic specialist identifying a match between the defendant’s blood sample and a DNA sample taken from the victim’s vaginal swab was admissible even where the specialist did not work for the outside lab that had produced the DNA sample. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227 (2012). Writing for four Justices, Justice Alito found that the specialist’s testimony regarding the DNA match was not admitted for its truth, but for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for her own independent expert opinion. Id. at 2236. In the opinion of the same four Justices, the underlying DNA report was nontestimonial since it was prepared to catch an unknown rapist who was still at large, not for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. Id. at 2243. In a concurrence, Justice Thomas found no confrontation clause violation because the underlying DNA report lacked “the requisite ‘formality and solemnity’ to be considered ‘testimonial’ for purposes of the confrontation clause.” Id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring). In dissent, Justice Kagan, joined by three other Justices, found the DNA report to be precisely the sort of testimonial evidence barred by the decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. Id. at 2273–2274, 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

In Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 602, 984 N.E.2d 804, 821 (2013), on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed its earlier ruling and concluded as follows:

“Expert opinion testimony, even that which relies for its basis on the DNA test results of a nontestifying analyst not admitted in evidence, does not violate a criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him under either the Sixth Amendment or art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), is to the contrary.”

(b) Confrontation Clause Inapplicable. Under certain conditions, the confrontation clause of the Federal and State Constitutions does not bar the admission of testimonial statements, introduced for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted, in criminal cases even though the declarant is not available for cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 65 n.12, 913 N.E.2d 850, 861 n.12 (2009). See Commonwealth v. Pelletier, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 69–72, 879 N.E.2d 125, 128–130 (2008) (wife’s statement was properly admitted for a limited purpose other than its truth even though she did not testify at the defendant’s trial).

c) Massachusetts Law Versus Federal Law. Based on differences in the language of the Sixth Amendment (defendant’s right to be “confronted with the witnesses against him”) and Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights (defendant’s right to “meet the witnesses against him face to face”), the State Constitution has been interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court to provide a criminal defendant more protection than the Sixth Amendment in certain respects. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844–850 (1990) (confrontation clause does not guarantee criminal defendants an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against them at trial; upholding constitutionality of a procedure whereby a young child alleged to have been the victim of a sexual assault testified at trial outside the courtroom but was visible to defendant and jury on a monitor), with Commonwealth v. Amirault, 424 Mass. 618, 631–632, 677 N.E.2d 652, 662 (1997) (Article 12 requires that the jury be allowed to assess the encounter between the witness and the accused with the witness testifying in the face of the accused; in certain circumstances, however, the encounter between the defendant and the child witness may take place outside the courtroom and be presented at trial by videotape; see G. L. c. 278, § 16D). See also Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 541–542, 524 N.E.2d 366, 371–372 (1988). However, when the question involves the relationship between the hearsay rule and its exceptions, on the one hand, and the right to confrontation, on the other hand, “the protection provided by art. 12 is coextensive with the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,” Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57 n.1, 849 N.E.2d 218, 221 n.1 (2006), citing Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 28, 696 N.E.2d 540, 545 (1998), and Commonwealth v. Childs, 413 Mass. 252, 260, 596 N.E.2d 351, 356 (1992).
(d) Waiver of Right to Confrontation. The right to confrontation may be waived. See Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. 858, 860–861, 933 N.E.2d 633, 637–639 (2010) (doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing extinguishes right to confrontation); Commonwealth v. Chubbuck, 384 Mass. 746, 751, 429 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (1981) (defendant waived right to be present at trial based on persistent disruptive behavior in the courtroom); Commonwealth v. Flemmi, 360 Mass. 693, 694, 277 N.E.2d 523, 524 (1971) (if defendant is voluntarily absent after trial begins, “the court may proceed without the defendant”). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 18(a)(1) (“If a defendant is present at the beginning of a trial and thereafter absents himself without cause or without leave of court, the trial may proceed to a conclusion in all respects except the imposition of sentence as though the defendant were still present.”). A defendant must be competent to plead guilty in order to waive his or her presence at trial. Commonwealth v. L'Abbe, 421 Mass. 262, 268–269, 656 N.E.2d 1242, 1245–1246 (1995).
Section 801. Definitions

The following definitions apply under this Article:

(a) Statement. A “statement” is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.

(b) Declarant. A “declarant” is a person who makes a statement.

(c) Hearsay. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. The following statements are not hearsay and are admissible for the truth of the matter asserted:

1) Prior Statement by Witness.

(A) Prior Inconsistent Statement Made Under Oath or Penalty of Perjury at Certain Proceedings. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement which is (i) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony; (ii) made under oath before a grand jury, or at an earlier trial, a probable cause hearing, or a deposition, or in an affidavit made under the penalty of perjury in a G. L. c. 209A proceeding; (iii) not coerced; and (iv) more than a mere confirmation or denial of an allegation by the interrogator.

(B) [For a discussion of prior consistent statements, which are not admissible substantively under Massachusetts law, see Section 613(b), Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility: Prior Consistent Statements.]

(C) Identification. A statement of identification made after perceiving the person if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.

2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The following statements offered against a party are not excluded by the hearsay rule:

(A) The party’s own statement.

(B) A statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.

(C) A statement by a party’s agent or servant admitted against the principal to prove the truth of facts asserted in it as though made by the principal, if the agent was authorized to make the statement or was authorized to make, on the principal’s behalf, true statements concerning the subject matter.

(D) A statement by a party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.
(E) A statement of a coconspirator or joint venturer made during the pendency of the cooperative effort and in furtherance of its goal when the existence of the conspiracy or joint venture is shown by evidence independent of the statement.

NOTE


To be hearsay, the statement, whether verbal or nonverbal, must be intended as an assertion. See Bacon v. Charlton, 61 Mass. 581, 586 (1851) (distinguishing between groans and exclamations of pain, which are not hearsay, and anything in the nature of narration or statement).

"[C]onduct can serve as a substitute for words, and to the extent it communicates a message, hearsay considerations apply." Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 443 Mass. 799, 803, 824 N.E.2d 843, 848 (2005). "[O]ut-of-court conduct, which by intent or inference expresses an assertion, has been regarded as a statement and therefore hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Bartlett v. Emerson, [73 Mass. 174, 175–176] (1856) (act of pointing out boundary marker inadmissible hearsay)." Opinion of the Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1209, 591 N.E.2d 1073, 1077 (1992) (legislation that would permit the Commonwealth to admit evidence of a person's refusal to take a breathalyzer test violates the privilege against self-incrimination because it reveals the person's thought process and is thus tantamount to an assertion).

Subsection (b). This subsection is identical to Fed. R. Evid. 801(b). While no Massachusetts case has defined "declarant," the term has been commonly used in Massachusetts case law to mean a person who makes a statement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 57–58, 849 N.E.2d 218, 221 (2006); Commonwealth v. Zagranski, 408 Mass. 278, 285, 558 N.E.2d 933, 938 (1990). See also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 586 (2002), which defines "declarant" as a person "who makes a declaration" and "declaration" as "a statement made or testimony given by a witness."


"The theory which underlies exclusion is that with the declarant absent the trier of fact is forced to rely upon the declarant's memory, truthfulness, perception, and use of language not subject to cross-examination." Commonwealth v. DelValle, 351 Mass. at 491, 221 N.E.2d at 923.

as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted”). Thus, when out-of-court statements are offered for a reason other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted or when they have independent legal significance, they are not hearsay. There are many nonhearsay purposes for which out-of-court statements may be offered, such as the following:

– **Proof of “Verbal Acts” or “Operative” Words.** See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 246, 726 N.E.2d 959, 964 (2000) (“[e]vidence of the terms of that oral agreement was not offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but as proof of an ‘operative’ statement, i.e., existence of a conspiracy’); Charette v. Burke, 300 Mass. 278, 280–281, 15 N.E.2d 194, 195–196 (1938) (father’s remark to a child before leaving the child to go into the house “[Wait where you are while I go inside to get you a cookie” was a “verbal act” and not hearsay); Shimer v. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, LLP, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 310, 795 N.E.2d 599, 605–606 (2003) (evidence of the terms of a contract used to establish lost profits is not hearsay because it is not an assertion).


– **To Show “the State of Police Knowledge.”** Out-of-court statements to a police investigator may sometimes be admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of showing “the state of police knowledge,” because “an arresting or investigating officer should not be put in the false position of seeming just to have happened upon the scene; he should be allowed some explanation of his presence and conduct.” Commonwealth v. Cohen, 412 Mass. 375, 393, 589 N.E.2d 289, 301 (1992). See Commonwealth v. Miller, 361 Mass. 644, 659, 282 N.E.2d 394, 403–404 (1972) (out-of-court statements are admissible when offered to explain why police approached defendant to avoid misimpression that police acted arbitrarily in singling out defendant for investigation). However, “[t]estimony of this kind carries a high probability of misuse, because a witness may relate historical aspects of the case, replete with hearsay statements in the form of complaints and reports[,] even when not necessary to show state of police knowledge.” Commonwealth v. Rosario, 430 Mass. 505, 510, 721 N.E.2d 903, 906 (1999) (quotation omitted). Such evidence, therefore, (1) is permitted only through the testimony of a police officer, who must testify only on the basis of his or her own knowledge; (2) is limited to the facts required to establish the officer’s state of knowledge; (3) is allowed only when the police action or state of police knowledge is relevant to an issue in the case. Id. at 509–510, 721 N.E.2d at 908. Cross-Reference: Section 105, Limited Admissibility.

– **As Circumstantial Evidence of Declarant’s State of Mind.** Where the declarant asserts his or her own state of mind (usually by words describing the state of mind), the statement is hearsay and is admissible only if it falls within the hearsay exception. See Section 803(3)(B), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition, and the accompanying note. However, when the statement conveys the speaker’s state of mind only circumstantially (usually because the words themselves do not describe the state of mind directly), it is not hearsay. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Romero, 464 Mass. 648,
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652 n.5, 984 N.E.2d 853, 855 n.5 (2013) (defendant’s statement that passenger in his vehicle had shown him a gun was admissible to show defendant’s knowledge that gun was in car, as well as being admission of a party-opponent); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 439 Mass. 441, 447–448, 788 N.E.2d 954, 960–961 (2003) (evidence of victim’s statement to her friend was properly admitted to establish victim’s state of mind [concern for her family’s shame and diminished economic circumstances if abuser were removed from her home], which helped explain her delay in reporting an episode of sexual abuse and thus was not hearsay). Contrast Section 803(3)(B)(ii), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: ThenExisting Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.

As Circumstantial Evidence of the Nature of a Place or a Thing. Sometimes out-of-court statements that do not directly describe the nature or character of a place or an object can nevertheless be probative of that nature or character. In such cases, the statements are treated as nonhearsay. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Massod, 350 Mass. 745, 748, 217 N.E.2d 191, 193 (1966) (statements over telephone not hearsay when used to show that telephone was apparatus used for registering bets on horse races); Commonwealth v. DePina, 75 Mass. App. Ct. 842, 850, 917 N.E.2d 781, 788–789 (2009) (conversation of police officer on defendant’s cellular telephone was admissible as evidence of nature of the cellular telephone as instrument used in cocaine distribution); Commonwealth v. Washington, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 199–201, 654 N.E.2d 334, 336–337 (1995) (conversations of police officer with callers to defendant’s beeper not hearsay when used to show that beeper was used for drug transactions). See so Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 452, 945 N.E.2d 372, 382 (2011) (words soliciting sexual act have independent legal significance and are not hearsay); Commonwealth v. Mullane, 445 Mass. 702, 711, 840 N.E.2d 484, 494 (2006) (portion of conversation regarding negotiation for “extras” between police detective and “massage therapist” were not hearsay).

Prior Statements Used to Impeach or Rehabilitate. Ordinarily, the out-of-court statements of a testifying witness are hearsay if they are offered to prove the truth of the statement. Prior inconsistent statements are usually admissible only for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness. But see Subsection 801(d)(1)(A) and the accompanying note. A witness’s prior consistent statements are not admissible substantively under Massachusetts law, but they may be admissible for certain other purposes. See for example Section 413, First Complaint of Sexual Assault, and Section 613(b), Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility: Prior Consistent Statements. Cross-Reference: Section 105, Limited Admissibility.

Nonverbal Conduct Excluded as Hearsay. See Commonwealth v. Todd, 394 Mass. 791, 797, 477 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (1985) (explaining that the destruction of her marriage license could be considered “an extrajudicial, nonverbal assertion of the victim’s intent which, if introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, would be, on its face, objectionable as hearsay”); Bartlett v. Emerson, 73 Mass. 174, 175–176 (1856) (testimony about another person’s act of pointing out a boundary marker was an assertion of a fact and thus inadmissible as hearsay); Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 224, 227, 770 N.E.2d 30, 33–34 (2002) (a business card offered to establish a connection between the defendant and a New York address on the card was hearsay because it was used as an assertion of a fact); Commonwealth v. Kirk, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 229–230, 654 N.E.2d 938, 942 (1995) (conduct of a police officer who served a restraining order on the defendant offered to establish the identity of that person as the perpetrator was hearsay because its probative value depended on the truth of an assertion made in the papers by the victim that the defendant was the same person named in the complaint).

When an out-of-court statement is offered for a nonhearsay purpose, after considering the effectiveness of a Section 105 limiting instruction it is necessary to weigh the risk of unfair prejudice that would likely result if the jury misused the statement. See Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence. In criminal cases, that risk can have confrontation clause implications.

Cross-Reference: Section 105, Limited Admissibility; Section 803(3)(B)(ii), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.
Subsection (d). This subsection addresses out-of-court statements that are admissible for their truth. Section 613, Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility, addresses prior statements for the limited purposes only of impeachment and rehabilitation.

Subsection (d)(1)(A). Massachusetts generally adheres to the orthodox rule that prior inconsistent statements are admissible only for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness’s testimony at trial and are inadmissible hearsay when offered to establish the truth of the matters asserted. See Section 613(a)(1), Prior Inconsistent Statements: Examining Own Witness, and Section 613(a)(2), Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility: Prior Inconsistent Statements: Examining Other Witness. However, in Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 66, 469 N.E.2d 483, 490–491 (1984), the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the principles of Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) allowing prior inconsistent statements made before a grand jury to be admitted substantively. The Daye rule has been extended to cover prior inconsistent statements made in other proceedings as well. See Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 740 N.E.2d 602 (2000) (probable cause hearings); Commonwealth v. Newman, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 868 N.E.2d 946 (2007) (testimony given at an accomplice’s trial). Commonwealth v. Ragland, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 823 n.9, 894 N.E.2d 1147, 1154 n.9 (2008), made it clear in dicta that the same principles would apply to admission of prior inconsistent deposition evidence given under oath. See also Commonwealth v. Belmer, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 62, 64, 935 N.E.2d 327, 329 (2010) (prior inconsistent statement may be admissible for its full probative value where the witness has signed a written affidavit under penalties of perjury in support of an application for a restraining order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A and that witness is subject to cross-examination).

Two general requirements for the substantive use of such statements are (1) that there is an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant and (2) that the prior testimony was in the declarant’s own words and was not coerced. In addition, if the prior inconsistent statement is relied on to establish an essential element of a crime, the Commonwealth must offer at least some additional evidence on that element in order to support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. at 73–75, 469 N.E.2d at 494–496. However, the additional evidence need not be sufficient in itself to establish the element. Commonwealth v. Noble, 417 Mass. 341, 345 & n.3, 629 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 & n.3 (1994). The corroboration requirement thus concerns the sufficiency of the evidence, not its admissibility. Commonwealth v. Clements, 436 Mass. 190, 193, 763 N.E.2d 55, 58 (2002); Commonwealth v. Ragland, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 823, 894 N.E.2d 1147, 1154 (2008).

Feigning Lack of Memory. Upon a determination by the judge that a witness is feigning lack of memory, a prior statement may be admitted substantively as inconsistent with the claimed lack of memory, subject to the requirements of this subsection, Subsection 801(d)(1)(A). Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 745, 740 N.E.2d 602, 607–608 (2000). Before the prior statement may be admitted substantively, the judge must make a preliminary finding of fact under Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court, that the witness is feigning an inability to remember. Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 190, 786 N.E.2d 375, 383 (2003). If supported by evidence, this finding is conclusive. Id. At a party’s request, the judge may conduct a voir dire to make such a finding. Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 739, 740 N.E.2d at 606. A judge’s finding of witness feigning is often based on a careful examination of the witness’s demeanor and testimony in light of the judge’s experience. See Id. at 740, 740 N.E.2d at 606; Commonwealth v. Newman, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 497, 868 N.E.2d 946, 948 (2007). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 451 Mass. 566, 573–574, 576–577, 887 N.E.2d 1040, 1046, 1048 (2008) (judge concluded that witness was feigning when he was able to recall many specific events of the evening in question but was unable to recall the portion of his grand jury testimony in which he said the defendant admitted to shooting someone, and a transcript failed to refresh his memory); Commonwealth v. Tiexeira, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 204, 559 N.E.2d 408, 411 (1990) (judge observed how the witness’s detailed account of the evening was conspicuously vague regarding the defendant’s encounter with the victim). Regardless of the judge’s conclusion at voir dire, the jury shall not be told of the judge’s preliminary determination that the witness is feigning. Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 742 n.6, 740 N.E.2d at 608 n.6.

Cross-Reference: Section 613, Prior Statements of Witnesses, Limited Admissibility.
Subsection (d)(1)(B). In Commonwealth v. Cruz, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 401 & n.10, 759 N.E.2d 723, 731–732 & n.10 (2001), the Appeals Court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has not adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) as to the admission of prior consistent statements as substantive evidence, rather than merely for the purpose of rehabilitating the credibility of a witness-declarant who has been impeached on the ground that his or her trial testimony is of recent contrivance. See also Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 161–162, 706 N.E.2d 669, 680 (1999) (prior consistent statement admissible to rebut suggestion of recent contrivance); Commonwealth v. Kater, 409 Mass. 433, 448, 567 N.E.2d 885, 894 (1991) (“prior consistent statements of a witness may be admitted where the opponent has raised a claim or inference of recent contrivance, undue influence, or bias”); Commonwealth v. Zukoski, 370 Mass. 23, 26–27, 345 N.E.2d 690, 693 (1976) (“a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible where a claim is made that the witness’s in-court statement is of recent contrivance or is the product of particular inducements or bias. . . . Unless admissible on some other ground to prove the truth of the facts asserted, such a prior consistent statement is admissible only to show that the witness’s in-court testimony is not the product of the asserted inducement or bias or is not recently contrived as claimed”).

Cross-Reference: Section 413, First Complaint of Sexual Assault.

Subsection (d)(1)(C). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431, 432, 436–437, 828 N.E.2d 501, 503, 506 (2005), where the Supreme Judicial Court “adopt[ed] the modern interpretation of the rule” expressed in Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C), which, like its Federal counterpart, states that “[a] statement is not hearsay . . . if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . one of identification of a person [made] after perceiving [the person].” It is not necessary that the declarant make an in-court identification. See Commonwealth v. Machorro, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 379–380, 892 N.E.2d 349, 351–352 (2008) (police officer allowed to testify to extrajudicial identification of the assailant by two victims who were present at trial and subject to cross-examination even though one victim could not identify the assailant [although she recalled being present at his arrest and was certain that the person arrested was the assailant] and the other victim was not asked to make an identification at trial). This subsection applies to an out-of-court identification based on a witness’s familiarity with the person identified and is not limited to a photographic array, showup, or other identification procedure. Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 770–776, 941 N.E.2d 1127, 1130–1134 (2011). Multiple versions of an extrajudicial identification may be admissible for substantive purposes. Id. at 773, 941 N.E.2d at 1132.

Under this subsection, whether and to what extent third-party testimony about a witness’s out-of-court identification may be admitted in evidence no longer turns on whether the identifying witness acknowledges or denies the extrajudicial identification at trial. See Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. at 439–440, 828 N.E.2d at 507–509. The third-party testimony will be admitted for substantive purposes, as long as the cross-examination requirement is satisfied. Id. As the court explained, it is for the jury to “determine whose version to believe—the witness who claims not to remember or disavows the prior identification (including that witness’s version of what transpired during the identification procedure), or the observer who testifies that the witness made a particular prior identification.” Id. at 440, 828 N.E.2d at 508. The court concluded that

“evidence of the prior identification will be considered along with all the other evidence that bears on the issue of the perpetrator’s identity. The mere fact that the prior identification is disputed in some manner does not make it unhelpful to the jury in evaluating the over-all evidence as to whether the defendant on trial was the one who committed the charged offense.”

Id.

Facts Accompanying an Identification. In Commonwealth v. Adams, 458 Mass. 766, 772, 941 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (2011), the Supreme Judicial Court held as follows:

“Absent context, an act or statement of identification is meaningless. . . . [I]dentity evidence must be accompanied either by some form of accusation relevant to the issue
before the court, or some form of exclusionary statement, in order to be relevant to the case. The extent of the statement needed to provide context will vary from case to case. . . . We emphasize that the rule [is] not intended to render a witness’s entire statement admissible but only so much as comprises relevant evidence on the issue of identification.”


Subsection (d)(2)(A). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Marshall, 434 Mass. 358, 365–366, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (2001), quoting P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence § 8.8.1 (7th ed. 1999). See also Commonwealth v. McCowen, 458 Mass. 461, 485–486, 939 N.E.2d 735, 757–758 (2010) (defendant’s out-of-court statement offered for its truth is hearsay and not admissible when not offered by the Commonwealth); Care & Protection of Sophie, 449 Mass. 100, 110 n.14, 865 N.E.2d 789, 798 n.14 (2007) (no requirement that the statement of a party-opponent be contradictory or against the party-opponent’s interest); Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 Mass. 327, 347, 140 N.E.2d 140, 156 (1957) (“An admission in a criminal case is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, which although insufficient in itself to warrant a conviction tends in connection with proof of other facts to establish his guilt”); Hopkins v. Medeiros, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 600, 613, 724 N.E.2d 336, 346 (2000) (“The evidence of [the defendant’s] admission to sufficient facts was admissible as an admission of a party opponent.”); Section 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements. Compare Commonwealth v. Nawn, 394 Mass. 1, 4, 474 N.E.2d 545, 549 (1985) (The “longstanding rule [is] that if a defendant is charged with a crime and unequivocally denies it, that denial is not admissible in evidence.”), with Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 410 Mass. 641, 649, 574 N.E.2d 1000, 1006 (1991) (“It is well-settled that false statements made by a defendant are admissible to show consciousness of guilt.”). In Lavalley, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that the Commonwealth could show that a defendant’s failure to include certain facts in his pretrial statement to the police that the defendant included in his testimony at trial was evidence of his consciousness of guilt and did not amount to an impermissible comment on his denial or failure to deny the offense. Id. at 649–650, 574 N.E.2d at 1005–1006. See also Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 Mass. 119, 127, 987 N.E.2d 1218, 1225–1226 (2013) (when the defendant’s statement is ambiguous but could be construed as consciousness of guilt ["I’ll beat this"], it is admissible, and it is left to the parties to argue what meaning it should be given). However, if an extrajudicial statement of the defendant is an unequivocal denial of an accusation, that statement and the accusation it denies are inadmissible as hearsay. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 46, 987 N.E.2d 205, 217 (2013).


Criminal Cases. The principle that the admission of a party-opponent, without more, is admissible is superceded by the requirements of the confrontation clause:
W]here a nontestifying codefendant’s statement expressly implicates the defendant, leaving no doubt that it would prove to be powerfully incriminating, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been offended, notwithstanding any limiting instruction by the judge that the jury may consider the statement only against the codefendant.


Admission by Silence. For an admission by silence to be admissible it must be apparent that the party has heard and understood the statement, had an opportunity to respond, and the context was one in which the party would have been expected to respond. Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 416 Mass. 707, 719, 625 N.E.2d 529, 537 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 835 (1994). See Leone v. Doran, 363 Mass. 1, 16, 292 N.E.2d 19, 31, modified on other grounds, 363 Mass. 886, 297 N.E.2d 493 (1973). “Because silence may mean something other than agreement or acknowledgment of guilt (it may mean inattention or perplexity, for instance), evidence of adoptive admissions by silence must be received and applied with caution.” Commonwealth v. Babbitt, 430 Mass. 700, 705, 723 N.E.2d 17, 22 (2000). See generally Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 61 n.6, 434 N.E.2d 992, 996 n.6 (1982) (cautioning against the use of a defendant’s prarest silence to show consciousness of guilt and indicating such evidence is admissible only in “unusual circumstances”). Accordingly, adoption by silence can be imputed to a defendant only for statements that “clearly would have produced a reply or denial on the part of an innocent son.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 394 Mass. 510, 515, 476 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1985).

“[N]o admission by silence may be inferred, however, if the statement is made after the accused has been placed under arrest[,] see Commonwealth v. Kenney, 53 Mass. 235, 238 (1847); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 632, 634, 305 N.E.2d 518, 520 (1973); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 653, 657, 382 N.E.2d 1105, 1108–1109 (1978)], after the police have read him his Miranda rights[, see Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 363 Mass. 311, 316, 293 N.E.2d 919, 923 (1973)], or after he has been so significantly deprived of his freedom that he is, in effect, in police custody[, see Commonwealth v. Corridori, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 469, 480, 417 N.E.2d 969, 977 (1981)]."


Admission by Conduct. “An admission may be implied from conduct as well as from words.” Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 Mass. 327, 348, 140 N.E.2d 140, 156 (1957). For instance,

“[A]ctions and statements that indicate consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant are admissible and together with other evidence, may be sufficient to prove guilt. . . . [T]his theory usually has been applied to cases where a defendant runs away . . . or makes intentionally false and misleading statements to police . . . or makes threats against key witnesses for the prosecution . . . ."
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This subsection covers the admissibility of statements by an agent who has been authorized by the principal to speak on his behalf. See Simonoko v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 376 Mass. 929, 929, 383 N.E.2d 505, 506 (1978) (concluding there was no showing of the manager’s authority to speak for the defendant). Contrast Section 801(d)(2)(D), Definitions: Statements Which Are Not Hearsay: Admission by Party- Opponent, which deals with statements of agents.


To determine whether a statement qualifies as a vicarious admission, the judge first must decide as a preliminary question of fact whether the declarant was authorized to act on the matters about which he or she spoke. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass. App. Ct. 779, 791, 667 N.E.2d 907, 916 (1996). If the judge finds that the declarant was so authorized, the judge must then decide whether the probative value of the statement was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Id. In so doing,

“the judge should consider the credibility of the witness; the proponent’s need for the evidence, e.g., whether the declarant is available to testify; and the reliability of the evidence offered, including consideration of whether the statement was made on firsthand knowledge and of any other circumstances bearing on the credibility of the declarant. Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, [401 Mass.] at 422–423, 517 N.E.2d 152, [155]” (footnote and quotation omitted).


“This exception to the rule against hearsay is premised on a belief that ‘[t]he community of activities and interests which exists among the coventurers during the enterprise tends in some degree to assure that their statements about one another will be minimally believable.” Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. [703], 712, 352 N.E.2d 904 [(1976)]."


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838, 844, 724 N.E.2d 683, 689–690 (2000). See also Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 Mass. 241, 246, 726 N.E.2d 959, 963–964 (2000). The judge is not required to make a preliminary finding that a joint criminal enterprise existed and may admit the evidence "subject to a later motion to strike if the prosecution fails to show that the defendant was part of a joint enterprise." Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 543–544, 562 N.E.2d 797, 806 (1990). The judge must also instruct the jury that they can only consider evidence of the hearsay statements if they find, on the basis of all the other evidence, not including the hearsay statements, that a joint venture existed. Commonwealth v. Boyer, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 598, 755 N.E.2d 767, 773 (2001).

This exception extends to situations where "the joint venturers are acting to conceal the crime that formed the basis of the criminal enterprise[.]" Commonwealth v. Ali, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 561, 684 N.E.2d 1200, 1208 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 415 Mass. 502, 519, 615 N.E.2d 155, 166 (1993), but it "does not apply after the criminal enterprise has ended, as where a joint venturer has been apprehended and imprisoned." Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. at 543, 562 N.E.2d at 806. Thus, a confession or admission of a coconspirator or joint venturer made after the termination of the conspiracy or joint venture is not admissible as a vicarious statement of another member of the conspiracy or joint venture. Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. at 340 n.11, 455 N.E.2d at 1192 n.11, citing Commonwealth v. White, 370 Mass. at 708–712, 352 N.E.2d at 908–910. Cf. Commonwealth v. Leach, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 766, 901 N.E.2d 708, 715–716 (2009) (although statements made by codefendants occurred after they were in custody, statements were made shortly after the crime and for the purpose of concealing the crime and thus became admissible against each defendant).
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Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule as provided by case law, statute, or rule prescribed by the Supreme Judicial Court.

NOTE


In addition to exceptions established by case law, several Massachusetts statutes and rules provide exceptions to the rule against hearsay, including, but not limited to the following:

G. L. c. 79, § 35 (assessed valuation of real estate);
G. L. c. 111, § 195 (certain lead inspection reports);
G. L. c. 119, § 24 (court investigation reports);
G. L. c. 119, §§ 51A, 51B (Department of Children and Families reports);
G. L. c. 123A, §§ 6A, 9 (sexually dangerous person statute);
G. L. c. 152, §§ 20A, 20B (medical reports);
G. L. c. 175, § 4(7) (report of Commissioner of Insurance);
G. L. c. 185C, § 21 (housing inspection report);
G. L. c. 233, § 65 (declaration of deceased person);
G. L. c. 233, § 65A (answers to interrogatories of deceased party);
G. L. c. 233, § 66 (declarations of testator);
G. L. c. 233, § 69 (records of other courts);
G. L. c. 233, § 70 (judicial notice of law);
G. L. c. 233, § 79B (publicly issued compilations of fact);
G. L. c. 233, § 79C (treatises in malpractice actions);
G. L. c. 233, § 79F (certificate of public way);
G. L. c. 233, § 79G (medical and hospital bills);
G. L. c. 233, § 79H (medical reports of deceased physicians);
G. L. c. 239, § 8A, ¶ 3 (board of health inspection report if certified by inspector who conducted the inspection);
Mass. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3) (depositions); and
Mass. R. Crim. P. 35(g) (depositions).

If no objection to the hearsay statement is made and it has been admitted, it "may be weighed with the other evidence, and given any evidentiary value which it may possess." Mahoney v. Harley Private Hosp., Inc., 279 Mass. 96, 100, 180 N.E. 723, 725 (1932). In a criminal case, the admission of such a statement will be reviewed to determine whether its admission created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Keevan, 400 Mass. 557, 562, 511 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1987).
Section 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) Present Sense Impression. [Exception not recognized]

(2) Excited Utterance (Spontaneous Utterance). A spontaneous utterance if (A) there is an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer, and (B) the declarant’s statement was a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought.

(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.

(A) Expressions of present physical condition such as pain and physical health.

(B) (i) Statements of a person as to his or her present friendliness, hostility, intent, knowledge, or other mental condition are admissible to prove such mental condition.

(ii) Statements, not too remote in time, which indicate an intention to engage in particular conduct, are admissible to prove that the conduct was, in fact, put in effect. Statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed do not fall within this exception.

(iii) Declarations of a testator cannot be received to prove the execution of a will, but may be shown to show the state of mind or feelings of the testator.

(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment describing medical history, pain, symptoms, condition, or cause, but not as to the identity of the person responsible or legal significance of such symptoms or injury.

(5) Past Recollection Recorded.

(A) A past recorded statement may be admissible if (i) the witness has insufficient memory to testify fully and accurately, (ii) the witness had firsthand knowledge of the facts recorded, (iii) the witness can testify that the statement was truthful when made, and (iv) the witness made or adopted the recording when the events were fresh in the witness’s memory.

(B) The recorded statement itself may be admitted in evidence, although the original of the statement must be produced if procurable.

(6) Business and Hospital Records.
(A) Entry, Writing, or Record Made in Regular Course of Business. A business record shall not be inadmissible because it is hearsay or self-serving if the court finds that (i) the entry, writing, or record was made in good faith; (ii) it was made in the regular course of business; (iii) it was made before the beginning of the civil or criminal proceeding in which it is offered; and (iv) it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, or within a reasonable time thereafter.

(B) Hospital Records. Records kept by hospitals pursuant to G. L. c. 111, § 70, shall be admissible as evidence so far as such records relate to the treatment and medical history of such cases, but nothing contained therein shall be admissible as evidence which has reference to the question of liability. Records required to be kept by hospitals under the law of any other United States jurisdiction may be admissible.

(C) Medical and Hospital Services.

(i) Definitions.

(a) Itemized Bills, Records, and Reports. As used in this section, “itemized bills, records, and reports” means itemized hospital or medical bills; physician or dentist reports; hospital medical records relating to medical, dental, hospital services, prescriptions, or orthopedic appliances rendered to or prescribed for a person injured; or any report of any examination of said injured person including, but not limited to, hospital medical records.

(b) Physician or Dentist. As used in this section, “physician or dentist” means a physician, dentist, or any person who is licensed to practice as such under the laws of the jurisdiction within which such services were rendered, as well as chiropodists, chiropractors, optometrists, osteopaths, physical therapists, podiatrists, psychologists, and other medical personnel licensed to practice under the laws of the jurisdiction within which such services were rendered.

(c) Hospital. As used in this section, “hospital” means any hospital required to keep records under G. L. c. 111, § 70, or which is in any way licensed or regulated by the laws of any other State, or by the laws and regulations of the United States of America, including hospitals of the Veterans Administration or similar type institutions, whether incorporated or not.

(d) Health Maintenance Organization. As used in this section, “health maintenance organization” shall have the same meaning as defined in G. L. c. 176G, § 1.

(ii) Admissibility of Itemized Bills, Records, and Reports. In any civil or criminal proceeding, itemized bills, records, and reports of an examination of or for services rendered to an injured person are admissible as evidence of the fair and reasonable charge for such services, the necessity of such services or treatments, the diagnosis, prognosis, opinion as to the proximate cause of the condition so diagnosed, or the
opinion as to disability or incapacity, if any, proximately resulting from the condition so diagnosed, provided that

(a) the party offering the evidence gives the opposing party written notice of the intention to offer the evidence, along with a copy of the evidence, by mailing it by certified mail, return receipt requested, not less than ten days before the introduction of the evidence;

(b) the party offering the evidence files an affidavit of such notice and the return receipt is filed with the clerk of the court after said receipt has been returned; and

(c) the itemized bill, record, or report is subscribed and sworn to under the penalties of perjury by the physician, dentist, authorized agent of a hospital or health maintenance organization rendering such services, or by the pharmacist or retailer of orthopedic appliances.

(iii) Calling the Physician or Dentist as a Witness. Nothing contained in this subsection limits the right of a party to call the physician or dentist, or any other person, as a witness to testify about the contents of the itemized bill, record, or report in question.

(7) Absence of Entry in Records Kept in Accordance with Provisions of Section 803(6). The absence of an entry in records of regularly conducted activity, or testimony of a witness that he or she has examined records and not found a particular entry or entries, is admissible for purposes of proving the nonoccurrence of the event.

(8) Official/Public Records and Reports.

(A) Record of Primary Fact. A record of a primary fact, made by a public officer in the performance of an official duty, is competent evidence as to the existence of that fact.

(B) Prima Facie Evidence. Certain statutes provide that the admission of facts contained in certain public records constitute prima facie evidence of the existence of those facts.

(C) Record of Investigations. Record of investigations and inquiries conducted, either voluntarily or pursuant to requirement of law, by public officers concerning causes and effects involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclusions are not admissible in evidence as public records, unless specifically authorized by statute.

(9) Records of Vital Statistics. The record of the town clerk relative to a birth, marriage, or death shall be prima facie evidence of the facts recorded, but nothing contained in the record of a death which has reference to the question of liability for causing the death shall be admissible in evidence.

(10) Absence of Public Record or Entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and pre-
served by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Section 902, Self-Authentication, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.

(11) Records of Religious Organizations. [Exception not recognized]

(12) Marriage, Baptismal, and Similar Certificates. [Exception not recognized]

(13) Family Records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.

(14) Records or Documents Affecting an Interest in Property. A registry copy of a document purporting to prove or establish an interest in land is admissible as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person who signed it. However, the grantee or entity claiming present ownership interest of the property must account for the absence of the original document before offering the registry copy.

(15) Statements in Documents Affecting an Interest in Property. Statements of a person’s married or unmarried status, kinship or lack of kinship, or of the date of the person’s birth or death which relate or purport to relate to the title to land and are sworn to before any officer authorized by law to administer oaths may be filed for record and shall be recorded in the registry of deeds for the county where the land or any part thereof lies. Any such statement, if so recorded, or a certified copy of the record thereof, insofar as the facts stated therein bear on the title to land, shall be admissible in evidence in support of such title in any court in the Commonwealth in proceedings relating to such title.

(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. Statements in a document in existence thirty years or more the authenticity of which is established.

(17) Statements of Facts of General Interest. Statements of facts of general interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, book, or other compilation, issued to the public, shall, in the discretion of the court, if the court finds that the compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation and commonly is used and relied upon by them, be admissible in civil cases as evidence of the truth of any fact so stated.

(18) Learned Treatises.

   (A) Use in Medical Malpractice Actions. Statements of facts or opinions on a subject of science or art contained in a published treatise, periodical, book, or pamphlet shall, insofar as the court shall find that the said statements are relevant and that the writer of such statements is recognized in his or her profession or calling as an expert on the subject, be admissible in actions of contract or tort for malpractice, error, or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals, and sanitariums, as evidence tending to prove said facts or as opinion evidence; provided, however, that the party intending to offer as evidence any such statements shall, not less than thirty days before the trial of the
(B) Use in Cross-Examination of Experts. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence, but may not be received as exhibits.

(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. Reputation within a family as to matters of pedigree, such as birth, marriage, and relationships between and among family members, may be testified to by any member of the family.

(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. Evidence of a general or common reputation as to the existence or nonexistence of a boundary or other matter of public or general interest concerning land or real property.

(21) Reputation as to Character. A witness with knowledge may testify to a person’s reputation as to a trait of character, as provided in Sections 404, Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes, 405, Methods of Proving Character, and 608, Impeachment by Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness.

(22) Judgment of Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or confinement in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Commonwealth in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown, but does not affect admissibility.

(23) Judgment as to Personal, Family, or General History, or Boundaries. [Exception not recognized]

(24) Out-of-Court Statement of Child Describing Sexual Contact in Proceeding to Place Child in Foster Care.

(A) Admissibility in General. Any out-of-court statements of a child under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed on or with the child, or the circumstances under which it occurred, or identifying the perpetrator offered in an action brought under G. L. c. 119, §§ 23(C) and 24, shall be admissible; provided, however that

(i) the person to whom the statement was made, or who heard the child make the statement, testifies;
(ii) the judge finds that the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact and is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable effort;

(iii) the judge finds pursuant to Section 803(24)(B) that such statement is reliable; and

(iv) the judge’s reasons for relying on the statement appear in the judge’s findings pursuant to Section 803(24)(C).

(B) Reliability of Statement. A judge must assess the reliability of the out-of-court statement by considering the following factors:

(i) the timing of the statement, the circumstances in which it was made, the language used by the child, and the child’s apparent sincerity or motive in making the statement;

(ii) the consistency over time of a child’s statement concerning abuse, expert testimony about a child’s ability to remember and to relate his or her experiences, or other relevant personality traits;

(iii) the child’s capacity to remember and to relate, and the child’s ability to perceive the necessity of telling the truth; and

(iv) whether other admissible evidence corroborates the existence of child abuse.

(C) Findings on the Record. The judge’s reasons for relying on the statement must appear clearly in the specific and detailed findings the judge is required to make in a care and protection case.

(D) Admissibility by Common Law or Statute. An out-of-court statement admissible by common law or by statute shall remain admissible notwithstanding the provisions of this section.

NOTE

Confrontation Clause. In a criminal case, a hearsay statement offered against the accused must satisfy both the confrontation clause and one of the hearsay exceptions. For a discussion of the relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions stated in Section 803, refer to the Introductory Note to Article VIII.

Subsection (1). To date, the present sense impression exception has not been adopted in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass. 393, 398 n.3, 436 N.E.2d 912, 916 n.3 (1982).

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436 Mass. 252, 255, 763 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (2002). The proponent of the evidence is not required to show that the spontaneous utterance qualifies, characterizes, or explains the underlying event as long as the court is satisfied that the statement was the product of a startling event and not the result of conscious reflection. See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. at 624–627, 774 N.E.2d at 147–148.

“[T]he nexus between the statement and the event that produced it is but one of many factors to consider in determining whether the declarant was, in fact, under the sway of the exciting event when she made the statement . . . . It illuminates the second aspect of the test; it is not an independent requirement, in the same respect that the lapse of time between the startling event and the declarant’s statement is not an independent requirement.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 437 Mass. at 625–626, 774 N.E.2d at 147.


A writing may qualify as a spontaneous utterance. See Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 238–240, 692 N.E.2d at 49–51. However, “[b]ecause a writing is more suspect as a spontaneous exclamation than is an oral statement, the circumstances of the writing would have to include indicia of reliability even more persuasive than those required for an oral statement before [the court] could conclude that the writing qualified as a spontaneous exclamation.” Id. at 239, 692 N.E.2d at 50.

A bystander’s spontaneous utterance may be admissible. See Commonwealth v. Harbin, 435 Mass. 654, 657–658, 760 N.E.2d 1216, 1219–1220 (2002). “Although witnesses may not testify unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that they have personal knowledge of the matter about which they are testifying, there is no requirement that the declarant have been a participant in the exciting event” (citation omitted). Id. at 657, 760 N.E.2d at 1220.


Confrontation in Criminal Cases. “When the Commonwealth in a criminal case seeks to admit the excited utterance of a declarant who is not a witness at trial or has completed his testimony at trial, the judge should conduct a careful voir dire, evidentiary if needed, before admitting the excited utterance in evidence.” Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. 53, 68 n.14, 913 N.E.2d 850, 863 n.14 (2009) (statement, if testimonial, would be barred by the confrontation clause).


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Subsection (3)(B). The principle contained in the following three subsections is also known as the “state-of-mind exception.” This exception applies only to statements that assert the declarant’s own state of mind at time employment actions were taken; Commonwealth v. White, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 949, 949, 590 N.E.2d 716, 716 (1992) (in prosecution for sexual abuse of a child, mother’s out-of-court statement that, even if defendant didn’t do it, “I still hope that all sorts of nasty things happen to him” was admissible under state-of-mind exception as an expression of her hostility toward defendant to prove her bias as prosecution witness). But see Commonwealth v. Whitman, 453 Mass. 331, 341–342, 901 N.E.2d 1206, 1215–1216 (2009) (defendant’s statement that he heard voices inadmissible, as it pertained to the past, not the present). For statements that convey the declarant’s state of mind circumstantially or that are probative of another’s state of mind, see the note to Section 801(c) entitled Evidence Admitted for Nonhearsay Purpose.

Evidence of a person’s state of mind, whether hearsay (and offered under this exception) or non-hearsay, is admissible only if the state of mind is relevant and if the probative value of the proffered evidence is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the opponent. See Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence. Statements offered to show state of mind often include assertions of facts that led to that state of mind (e.g., the victim’s out-of-court statements describing the defendant’s threats or assaults offered as evidence of the victim’s determination to end the relationship with the defendant). The out-of-court statement of those facts would ordinarily be inadmissible hearsay, and the trier of fact’s reliance on the truth of those facts would therefore be unfairly prejudicial to the opponent. This danger is especially acute in criminal cases, where confrontation clause rights are also at stake when hearsay is admitted against a defendant. See Introductory Note to Article VIII. Before such evidence is admitted, the trial court must conduct a careful review of the probative value of the evidence and the risk of unfair prejudice under Section 403. See Commonwealth v. Magraw, 426 Mass. 589, 690 N.E.2d 400 (1998) (new trial granted because of erroneous admission of murder victim’s statements to show her fear of defendant). In addition to carrying this enhanced risk of unfair prejudice, evidence of the victim’s state of mind often has limited probative value. A murder victim’s statements of fear of the defendant alone are not relevant to prove motive. Commonwealth v. Qualls, 425 Mass. 163, 169, 680 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1997). When a victim’s state of mind is offered to prove a defendant’s motive, it is usually not relevant unless the state of mind was known to the defendant, and the defendant was likely to respond to it. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Borodine, 371 Mass. 1, 7–9, 353 N.E.2d 649, 653–654 (1976) (victim’s intention to end relationship with defendant). However,

“[a] murder victim’s state of mind becomes a material issue if the defendant opens the door by claiming that the death was a suicide or a result of self-defense, that the victim would voluntarily meet with or go someplace with the defendant, or that the defendant was on friendly terms with the victim.”


“Where evidence of the victim’s state of mind is admitted, it may only be used to prove that state of mind, and not to prove the truth of what was stated or that the defendant harbored certain thoughts or acted in a certain way. Therefore, on the defendant’s request, the jury must be given an instruction on the limited use of state of mind evidence.”


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180, 183–184, 31 N.E. 961, 962–963 (1892) (murder conviction reversed because trial judge improperly excluded evidence that victim, who was unmarried and pregnant at time of her death, told fortune teller the day before her drowning that she was going to drown herself). See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 463 Mass. 402, 409–410, 974 N.E.2d 1079, 1085–1086 (2012) (murder victim told family she was going to go meet defendant after dinner); Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 427 Mass. 90, 95, 692 N.E.2d 3, 7 (1998) (“A declarant’s threat to ‘get’ or kill someone is admissible to show that the declarant had a particular state of mind and that he carried out his intent.”); Commonwealth v. Vermette, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 789, 801–802, 686 N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (1997) (proper to admit statement of intention to lie and confess to shooting for purpose of showing that declarant carried out that intent). In a prosecution for murder, a victim’s statement of intent to meet with the defendant, made immediately before the murder, is sometimes admissible. See Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 90, 987 N.E.2d 558, 562 (2013) (admission of victim’s statement that he was going to meet defendant to get his money not error, as statement did not necessarily mean that defendant had previously agreed to a meeting, and it was cumulative of other evidence of a preplanned meeting). See also Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 463 Mass. 402, 409–410, 974 N.E.2d 1079, 1085–1086 (2012) (murder victim’s statement to daughter that she was going to pick up defendant at a restaurant admissible, because statement expressed only victim’s “present intent to act,” not defendant’s, and there was other evidence that defendant was with victim at time of murder). In each of the above cases, there was independent evidence of the of the defendant’s presence at the place in question.


Subsection (3)(B)(iii). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Mahan v. Perkins, 274 Mass. 176, 179–180, 174 N.E. 275, 276 (1931). See id. at 180, 174 N.E. at 276–277 (“[Testator’s] declarations showing her intention, plan or purpose should not be received to support the proponent’s contention that the will was signed by her and attested by [the witness].”)


While the appellate cases cited in this note related to physicians, nothing in the reasoning of those cases exclude other health care professionals. See Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 527–528, 381 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 (1978).

Cross-Reference: Section 803(6)(C), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records: Medical and Hospital Services.


“As to the fourth element of the foundation, where the recording was made by another, it must be shown that the witness adopted the writing ‘when the events were fresh in [the witness’s] mind’ (emphasis omitted). Commonwealth v. Evans, 439 Mass. 184, 189–190, 786 N.E.2d 375, 382–383 (2003), quot-
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Subsection (5)(B). This subsection is derived from Fisher v. Swartz, 333 Mass. 265, 267–271, 130 N.E.2d 575, 577–579 (1955). In Fisher, the court cautioned that it was not

“laying down a hard and fast rule that in every ‘past recollection recorded’ situation the writing used by the witness must always be admitted in evidence, and that it is error to exclude it . . . . It is conceivable that there might be situations where the probative value of the writing as evidence might be outweighed by the risk that its admission might create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of misleading the jury. In such a case the trial judge in the exercise of sound discretion might be justified in excluding the writing.”

Id. at 270, 130 N.E.2d at 579. See Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. 657, 664, 436 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (1982) (error to admit grand jury testimony of the witness as past recollection recorded). The witness may read from the writing during the witness’s testimony, or the writing may be admitted.

The past recollection recorded exception should not be confused with the doctrine of refreshing memory. See Section 612, Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory. For a discussion of the distinction between the two, see Fisher v. Swartz, 333 Mass. at 267, 130 N.E.2d at 577.


The trial judge may, as a condition to admissibility of business records, require the party offering the business record into evidence to call a witness who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the record. G. L. c. 233, § 78. See Burns v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 92, 373 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (1978). A trial judge must first determine if the writing itself qualifies as a business record, and then determine "whether all or only some of the material and information contained in the document qualifies as being within the scope of the statutory exception." Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 408, 432 N.E.2d 474, 479 (1982) (Liacos, J., concurring). A business record is admissible even when its preparer has relied on the statements of others because the personal knowledge of the entrant or maker affects only the weight of the record, not its admissibility. Id. at 406, 432 N.E.2d at 478. However, "unless statements on which the preparer relies fall within some other exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must show that all persons in the chain of communication, from the observer to the preparer, reported the information as a matter of business duty or business routine." Id. See NationsBanc Mtge. Corp. v. Eisenhauer, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 733–735, 733 N.E.2d 557, 562–563 (2000) (where records made by one business were trans-
ferred to another, latter business unable to admit the records under business record exception because records were made by former business). But see Commonwealth v. Albino, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 736, 738, 967 N.E.2d 645, 647 (2012) (business record of one business may be admissible as business record of second business where record is integrated into records of second business and relied on by that business), citing Beal Bank SSB v. Eurich, 444 Mass. 813, 815, 831 N.E.2d 909, 911–912 (2005).

"[T]he business records hearsay exception in [G. L. c. 233,] § 78 may not be used to expand the scope of the hearsay exception for hospital medical records." Commonwealth v. Irene, 462 Mass. 600, 606, 970 N.E.2d 291, 304 (2012). "The admissibility of statements in medical records is limited by the provisions in G. L. c. 233 relating to hospital records, including §§ 79 and 79G." Id.


Criminal Cases. A record or report that qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule under this subsection may nevertheless be inadmissible if it contains testimonial statements in violation of the confrontation clause. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–311 (2009).


"[V]oluntary statements of third persons appearing in the record are not admissible unless they are offered for reasons other than to prove the truth of the matter contained therein or, if offered for their truth, come within another exception to the hearsay rule . . . ." Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. at 531, 381 N.E.2d at 1300. The Supreme Judicial Court has noted that G. L. c. 233, § 79, "may be read to permit the admission of a medical history taken from a person with reason to know of the patient’s medical history by virtue of his or her relationship to the patient. Such a history may contain personal knowledge gained from observation or knowledge gained from an intimate relationship. We think that [G. L. c. 233, § 79] should be read to
include such statements if made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and if the declarant's relationship to the patient and the circumstances in which the statements are made guarantees their trustworthiness."

Id. at 531, 381 N.E.2d at 1299.

"[General Laws c. 233, § 79.] has long been construed to permit the admission of a record that relates directly and primarily to the treatment and medical history of the patient, 'even though incidentally the facts recorded may have some bearing on the question of liability.' . . . In application this liberal construction has permitted the admission in evidence of statements in hospital records bearing on criminal culpability that seem to relate at most only incidentally to medical treatment" (citations omitted).


"[General Laws c. 233, § 79.] relies on a 'pragmatic test of reliability' that permits the introduction of records containing even second level hearsay provided the information in the record is of a nature that is relied on by medical professionals in administering health care. . . . While creating an exception to the hearsay rule, the statute does not permit the admission of hospital records that are facially unreliable."


Illustrations. Notations on Form 2 in the “Sexual Assault Evidence Collection Kit” made by the SANE (sexual assault nurse examiner) based on statements by the complainant about how he or she received his or her injuries are admissible because they assist the SANE in conducting the examination, even though the information is also collected to assist investigators. Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387, 396, 930 N.E.2d 707, 717 (2010). However, the printed form should not be admitted because it suggests a sexual assault occurred. Id. Notations on hospital intake forms stating that a patient was “assaulted” should be redacted. Commonwealth v. DiMonte, 427 Mass. at 241–242, 692 N.E.2d at 51–52. In DiMonte, several references to the facts of the alleged assault, including "Pt. struck in the face [with] fist" and "reports having a plastic container thrown [at] her which struck her [right] forehead," were admissible. Id. at 241, 692 N.E.2d at 51. Statements consisting of self-diagnosis should be redacted. Commonwealth v. Hartman, 404 Mass. 306, 316–317, 534 N.E.2d 1170, 1177 (1989). In Commonwealth v. Concepcion, 362 Mass. 653, 654–655, 290 N.E.2d 514, 514–515 (1972), hospital records where (a) under the heading “Nature of Illness” appeared the words “? Assaulted- ? Raped,” (b) under the heading “History and Physical Exam” appeared the words “History of recent rape,” and (c) under the heading “Diagnosis” appeared the notation “? Rape,” the doctor’s opinions were related to the treatment and medical history. Blood tests bearing on the patient’s degree of intoxication are admissible; entries made by observing nurses are also admissible. Commonwealth v. McCreary, 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 524, 739 N.E.2d at 272–273. In Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 202, 509 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1987), a “[d]iagnosis” of “sexual molestation,” a term “synonymous to laymen with indecent assault and battery,” should have been redacted. Cf. Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 934 N.E.2d 236 (2010) (SAIN [Sexual Abuse Intervention Network] report may be admissible in probation violation hearings).

Subsection (6)(C). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79G. The text in this subsection places the statutory language in more straightforward language and also incorporates the case law. The practitioner, however, is cautioned to check the precise statutory language.

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“reports admissible under § 79G may include the ‘opinion of such physician . . . as to proximate cause of the condition so diagnosed, . . .’ and ‘the opinion of such physician . . . as to disability or incapacity, if any, proximately resulting from the condition so diagnosed. . . .’. These are not matters usually found in a medical record but do pertain to issues commonly involved in personal injury claims and litigation. Thus, the concerns that require redaction of information not germane to the patient’s treatment in medical records under § 79, see, e.g., Bouchie v. Murray, 376 Mass. 524, 531 (1978), are overridden by express language in § 79G.”

Commonwealth v. Schutte, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 799–800, 756 N.E.2d at 51–52. Also, since the term “report” is not defined in G. L. c. 233, § 79G, a properly attested letter from a person’s treating physician explaining the patient’s medical condition and its effects based on the physician’s personal observations can be qualified as a report. Id.

The full amount of a medical or hospital bill is admissible as evidence of the reasonable value of the services rendered to the injured person, even where the amount actually paid by a private or public insurer is less than that amount. Law v. Griffith, 457 Mass. 349, 353–354, 930 N.E.2d 126, 130–131 (2010), citing G. L. c. 233, § 79G.

Cross-Reference: G. L. c. 233, § 79H (medical records of deceased physicians); Section 411(b), Insurance: Limited Admissibility; Section 902(k), Self-Authentication: Certified Copies of Hospital and Other Records of Treatment and Medical History.

Requirements for Admissibility. Reports offered under G. L. c. 233, § 79G, as opposed to G. L. c. 233, § 78, are admissible even if prepared in anticipation of litigation. See O’Malley v. Soske, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 498–499, 923 N.E.2d 552, 555–556 (2010); Commonwealth v. Schutte, 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 799 n.3, 756 N.E.2d at 52 n.3. Medical reports which deal with an injured person’s “diagnosis, prognosis, opinion as to the proximate cause of the condition so diagnosed, or the opinion as to disability or incapacity,” see Section 803(6)(C)(ii), must be by a physician, as that term is defined in the subsection, who treated or examined the injured person. See Ortiz v. Stein, 31 Mass. App. Ct. at 645–646, 582 N.E.2d at 561–562. See also Gompers v. Finnell, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 91, 93, 616 N.E.2d 490, 492 (1993) (“Nothing in § 79G authorizes one not a physician or dentist to offer an expert opinion that a patient’s physical symptoms resulted from a particular accident or incident.”). If a record contains such an opinion, however, it may satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proof on the issue of causation in a medical negligence case. See Bailey v. Cataldo Ambulance Serv., Inc., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 228, 234–236, 832 N.E.2d 12, 17–18 (2005) (explaining that there is no requirement that an expert opinion on causation contain the phrase “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty”).

General Laws c. 233, § 79G, requires that a party who seeks to offer the report of a physician or dentist at trial must serve opposing counsel at least ten days in advance of trial with notice and a copy of the report by the physician or dentist. See Adoption of Seth, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 343, 351–352, 560 N.E.2d 708, 713 (1990). However, the attestation by the physician or dentist does not have to be included with the notice so long as it is present when the evidence is offered at trial. See Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 408 Mass. at 274,
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Cross-Reference: G. L. c. 233, § 79H; Section 902(k), Self-Authentication: Certified Copies of Hospital and Other Records of Treatment and Medical History.


The following statutes provide for the admission of facts contained in public records as prima facie evidence (examples of the records covered are in parentheses): G. L. c. 46, § 19 (birth, marriage, and death records); G. L. c. 79, § 35 (assessed valuation of real property); G. L. c. 90, § 30 (records of the Registry of Motor Vehicles); G. L. c. 111, § 13 (certificate of chemical analyses); G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c) (public records at trial on whether person is sexually dangerous); and G. L. c. 185C, § 21 (report of housing inspector). But see Commonwealth v. Almonte, 465 Mass. 224, 242, 988 N.E.2d 415, 428–429 (2013) (the preferred practice is to redact means and manner of death before admitting death certificate into evidence). Conclusions contained in public records may be made admissible by statute. Shamlian v. Equitable Acc. Co., 226 Mass. 67, 69–70, 115 N.E. 46, 47 (1917).

Mortality Tables. In Harlow v. Chin, 405 Mass. 697, 714, 545 N.E.2d 602, 612 (1989), the Supreme Judicial Court addressed the admissibility of mortality tables:

“Mortality tables, though not conclusive proof of life expectancy, help furnish a basis for the jury’s estimation. The tables themselves are admissible regardless of the poor health or extra-hazardous occupation of the person whose life expectancy is being estimated. When
the opposing side believes that the person in question, because of poor health, has a lower life expectancy than that reflected in the mortality tables, the usual remedy is to offer evidence to that effect and argue the point to the jury." (Citations omitted.)

**Criminal Cases.** A record or report that qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule under this subsection may nevertheless be inadmissible if it contains testimonial statements in violation of the confrontation clause. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310–311 (2009). See also Introductory Note to Article VIII.

**Subsection (9).** This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 46, § 19. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 144, 546 N.E.2d 159, 165 (1989), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1126 (1997). See also Miles v. Edward Tabor M.D., Inc., 387 Mass. 783, 786, 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (1982). Records from foreign countries are not admissible under G. L. c. 46, § 19, or G. L. c. 207, § 45. Vergnani v. Guidetti, 308 Mass. 450, 457, 32 N.E.2d 272, 276 (1941). Cf. G. L. c. 46, § 19C (“The commissioner of public health shall use the seal of the department of public health for the purpose of authenticating copies of birth, marriage and death records in his department, and copies of such records when certified by him and authenticated by said seal, shall be evidence like the originals.”). General Laws c. 46, § 19, makes the town clerk certificate admissible in evidence, but not with respect to liability. See Wadsworth v. Boston Gas Co., 352 Mass. 86, 93, 223 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1967). See also G. L. c. 207, § 45 (“The record of a marriage made and kept as provided by law by the person by whom the marriage was solemnized, or by the clerk or registrar, or a copy thereof duly certified, shall be prima facie evidence of such marriage.”).

**Subsection (10).** This subsection, which is taken nearly verbatim from Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803(10), reflects Massachusetts practice. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(b); Mass. R. Crim. P. 40(b); Blair’s Foodland, Inc. v. Shuman’s Foodland, Inc., 311 Mass. 172, 175–176, 40 N.E.2d 303, 306 (1942).

**Subsection (11).** No cases or statutes were located on this issue. Cf. Section 803(6)(A), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records: Entry, Writing, or Record Made in Regular Course of Business.


**Subsection (12).** No cases or statutes were located on this issue. Cf. Section 804(b)(7), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable: Hearsay Exceptions: Religious Records; Kennedy v. Doyle, 92 Mass. 161, 168 (1865) (baptismal record admissible where maker is deceased).


**Subsection (14).** This subsection is derived from Scanlan v. Wright, 30 Mass. 523, 527 (1833), and Commonwealth v. Emery, 68 Mass. 80, 81–82 (1854).

**Subsection (15).** This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 183, § 5A.

**Subsection (16).** This subsection is derived from Cunningham v. Davis, 175 Mass. 213, 219, 56 N.E. 2, 4 (1900) (“It is a general rule that deeds appearing to be more than 30 years old, which come from the proper custody, and are otherwise free from just grounds of suspicion, are admissible without any proof of execution.”). See Whitman v. Shaw, 166 Mass. 451, 460–461, 44 N.E. 333, 337 (1896) (ancient plan and field notes); Drury v. Midland R.R. Co., 127 Mass. 571, 581 (1879) (old plans admitted for purposes of estab-
Cross-Reference: Section 403, Grounds for Excluding Relevant Evidence; Section 805, Hearsay within Hearsay.


See generally G. L. c. 106, § 2-724 (“Whenever the prevailing price or value of any goods regularly bought and sold in any established commodity market is in issue, reports in official publications or trade journals or in newspapers or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports of such market shall be admissible in evidence. The circumstances of the preparation of such a report may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility.”).


“When determining the admissibility of a published treatise under G. L. c. 233, § 79C, we interpret the ‘writer of such statements’ to mean the treatise author, not the author of each individual item incorporated into the treatise text.” Brusard v. O'Toole, 429 Mass. 597, 606, 710 N.E.2d 588, 594 (1999). “[T]he ‘writer’ of a statement contained in an authored treatise is the author of the treatise, and the ‘writer’ of a statement contained in a periodical or similarly edited publication is the author of the specific article in which the statement is contained.” Id. The biographical data about the author in the front of the treatise may not be used to establish the expertise of the author, see Reddington v. Clayman, 334 Mass. 244, 247, 134 N.E.2d 920, 922 (1956), but an opponent witness who admits that the author of the treatise is a recognized expert in the field is sufficient, see Thomas v. Ellis, 329 Mass. 93, 98, 100, 106 N.E.2d 687, 690, 691 (1952). “The statutory notice of the intent to introduce a treatise required by G. L. c. 233, § 79C, requires that ‘the date of publication’ of the treatise be specified. The edition of a treatise, if applicable, should be specified, and parties should be permitted to introduce statements from only that edition.” Brusard v. O'Toole, 429 Mass. at 606 n.13, 710 N.E.2d at 594 n.13.

Subsection (18)(B). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Sneed, 413 Mass. 387, 396, 597 N.E.2d 1346, 1351 (1992), in which the Supreme Judicial Court adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 803(18). Treatises are not available to bolster direct examination. Brusard v. O'Toole, 429 Mass. 597, 601 n.5, 710 N.E.2d 588, 591 n.5 (1999). But see Commonwealth v. Sneed, 413 Mass. at 396 n.8, 597 N.E.2d at 1351 n.8 (“We can imagine a situation in which, in fairness, portions of a learned treatise not called to the attention of a witness during cross-examination should be admitted on request of the expert’s proponent in order to explain, limit, or contradict a statement ruled admissible under [Section] 803[(18)].”). This subsection
“contemplates that an authored treatise, and not the statements contained therein, must be established as a reliable authority.” *Brusard v. O’Toole*, 429 Mass. at 602–603, 710 N.E.2d at 592.

“[The] opponent of the expert witness [must] bring to the witness’s attention a specific statement in a treatise that has been established, to the judge’s satisfaction, as a reliable authority. The witness should be given a fair opportunity to assess the statement in context and to comment on it, either during cross-examination or on redirect examination. The judge, of course, will have to determine the relevance and materiality of the statement and should consider carefully any claimed unfairness or confusion that admission of the statement may create.”

*Commonwealth v. Sneed*, 413 Mass. at 396, 597 N.E.2d at 1351. This is a preliminary question of fact for the judge. See Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court.


**Subsection (20).** This subsection is derived from *Enfield v. Woods*, 212 Mass. 547, 551–552, 99 N.E. 331, 332 (1912) (admitting reputation evidence regarding existence or nonexistence of public ownership of land). See G. L. c. 139, § 9 (“For the purpose of proving the existence of the nuisance the general reputation of the place shall be admissible as evidence.”). See *Commonwealth v. United Food Corp.*, 374 Mass. 765, 767 n.2, 374 N.E.2d 1331, 1336 n.2 (1978) (G. L. c. 139, § 9, is a statutory exception to hearsay rule).

**Subsection (21).** This exception deals only with the hearsay aspect of evidence of reputation. For additional restrictions on the use of such evidence, see Sections 404, Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes, 405, Methods of Proving Character, and 608, Impeachment by Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness, and the accompanying notes.


**Subsection (23).** No cases or statutes were located on this issue.

**Subsection (24)(A).** Subsections (24)(A) through (A)(ii) are taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 83(a). Subsections (24)(A)(iii) and (iv) are derived from *Care & Protection of Rebecca*, 419 Mass. 67, 78, 80, 643 N.E.2d 26, 33, 34 (1994). There is no requirement that the child be unavailable. *Id.* at 76–77, 643 N.E.2d at 32. When a care and protection proceeding is joined with a petition to dispense with consent to adoption, admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statements should comply with the stricter requirements of G. L. c. 233, § 82, not § 83. *Adoption of Tina*, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 733, 701 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1998).

Subsection (24)(C). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Care & Protection of Rebecca, 419 Mass. 67, 80, 643 N.E.2d 26, 34 (1994).

Subsection (24)(D). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 83(b).
Section 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable

(a) Definition of Unavailability. “Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the declarant

(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement, or

(2) refuses to testify [exception not recognized], or

(3) testifies to a lack of memory [exception not recognized], or

(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then-existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or

(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance by process or other reasonable means.

A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the unavailability is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.

(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Prior Recorded Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another trial or hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and a similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.

(2) Statement Made Under Belief of Impending Death. In a prosecution for homicide, a statement made by a declarant-victim under the belief of imminent death and who died shortly after making the statement, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be the declarant’s own impending death or that of a co-victim.

(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. In a criminal case, the exception does not apply to a statement that is offered to exculpate the defendant or that is offered by the Commonwealth to inculpate the defendant, and that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability, unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthy of the statement.

(4) Statement of Personal History.
(A) A statement concerning the declarant’s own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, or ancestry, even if the declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated.

(B) A statement regarding foregoing matters concerning another person to whom the declarant is related [exception not recognized].

(5) Statutory Exceptions in Civil Cases.

(A) Declarations of Decedent. In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or as private conversation between husband and wife, as the case may be, if the court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.

(B) Deceased Party’s Answers to Interrogatories. If a party to an action who has filed answers to interrogatories under any applicable statute or any rule of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure dies, so much of such answers as the court finds have been made upon the personal knowledge of the deceased shall not be inadmissible as hearsay or self-serving if offered in evidence in said action by a representative of the deceased party.

(C) Declarations of Decedent in Actions Against an Estate. If a cause of action brought against an executor or administrator is supported by oral testimony of a promise or statement made by the testator or intestate of the defendant, evidence of statements, written or oral, made by the decedent, memoranda and entries written by the decedent, and evidence of the decedent’s acts and habits of dealing, tending to disprove or to show the improbability of the making of such promise or statement, shall be admissible.

(D) Reports of Deceased Physicians in Tort Actions. In an action of tort for personal injuries or death, or for consequential damages arising from such personal injuries, the medical report of a deceased physician who attended or examined the plaintiff, including expressions of medical opinion, shall, at the discretion of the trial judge, be admissible in evidence, but nothing therein contained which has reference to the question of liability shall be so admissible. Any opposing party shall have the right to introduce evidence tending to limit, modify, contradict, or rebut such medical report. The word “physician” as used in this section shall not include any person who was not licensed to practice medicine under the laws of the jurisdiction within which such medical attention was given or such examination was made.

(E) Medical Reports of Disabled or Deceased Physicians as Evidence in Workers’ Compensation Proceedings. In proceedings before the industrial accident board, the medical report of an incapacitated, disabled, or deceased physician who attended or examined the employee, including expressions of medical opinion, shall, at the discretion of the member, be admissible as evidence if the member finds that such medical report was made as the result of such physician’s attendance or examination of the employee.

(6) Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party who forfeits, by virtue of wrongdoing, the right to object to its admission based on findings by the court that (A) the
witness is unavailable; (B) the party was involved in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability of the witness; and (C) the party acted with the intent to procure the witness’s unavailability.

(7) Religious Records. Statements of fact made by a deceased person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization to perform a religious act, contained in a certificate that the maker performed such act, and purporting to be issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.


(A) Admissibility in General. An out-of-court statement of a child under the age of ten describing an act of sexual contact performed on or with the child, the circumstances under which it occurred, or which identifies the perpetrator shall be admissible as substantive evidence in any criminal proceeding; provided, however, that

(i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact and is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts,

(ii) the person to whom the statement was made or who heard the child make the statement testifies,

(iii) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(8)(B) that the child is unavailable as a witness,

(iv) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(8)(C) that the statement is reliable, and

(v) the statement is corroborated pursuant to Section 804(b)(8)(D).

(B) Unavailability of Child. The proponent of such statement shall demonstrate a diligent and good-faith effort to produce the child and shall bear the burden of showing unavailability. A finding of unavailability shall be supported by specific findings on the record, describing facts with particularity, demonstrating that

(i) the child is unable to be present or to testify because of death or physical or mental illness or infirmity;

(ii) by a ruling of the court, the child is exempt on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of such statement;
(iii) the child testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of such statement;

(iv) the child is absent from the hearing and the proponent of such statement has been unable to procure the attendance of the child by process or by other reasonable means;

(v) the court finds, based upon expert testimony from a treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician, that testifying would be likely to cause severe psychological or emotional trauma to the child; or

(vi) the child is not competent to testify.

(C) Reliability of Statement. If a finding of unavailability is made, the out-of-court statement shall be admitted if the judge further finds,

(i) after holding a separate hearing, that such statement was made under oath, that it was accurately recorded and preserved, and that there was sufficient opportunity to cross-examine, or

(ii) after holding a separate hearing and, where practicable and where not inconsistent with the best interests of the child, meeting with the child, that such statement was made under circumstances inherently demonstrating a special guarantee of reliability.

For the purposes of finding circumstances demonstrating reliability pursuant to this subsection, a judge may consider whether the relator documented the child witness’s statement and shall consider the following factors:

(a) the clarity of the statement, meaning the child’s capacity to observe, remember, and give expression to that which such child has seen, heard, or experienced; provided, however, that a finding under this clause shall be supported by expert testimony from a treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician;

(b) the time, content, and circumstances of the statement; and

(c) the child’s sincerity and ability to appreciate the consequences of such statement.

(D) Corroborating Evidence. The out-of-court statement must be corroborated by other independently admitted evidence.

(E) Admissibility by Common Law or Statute. An out-of-court statement admissible by common law or by statute shall remain admissible notwithstanding the provisions of this section.

(9) Out-of-Court Statement of Child Describing Sexual Contact in Civil Proceeding, Including Termination of Parental Rights.

(A) Admissibility in General. The out-of-court statements of a child under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed on or with the child, the circumstances
under which it occurred, or which identifies the perpetrator shall be admissible as substantive evidence in any civil proceeding, except proceedings brought under G. L. c. 119, §§ 23(C) and 24; provided, however, that

(i) such statement is offered as evidence of a material fact and is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts,

(ii) the person to whom such statement was made or who heard the child make such statement testifies,

(iii) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(9)(B) that the child is unavailable as a witness,

(iv) the judge finds pursuant to Section 804(b)(9)(C) that such statement is reliable, and

(v) such statement is corroborated pursuant to Section 804(b)(9)(D).

(B) Unavailability of Child. The proponent of such statement shall demonstrate a diligent and good-faith effort to produce the child and shall bear the burden of showing unavailability. A finding of unavailability shall be supported by specific findings on the record, describing facts with particularity, demonstrating that

(i) the child is unable to be present or to testify because of death or existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;

(ii) by a ruling of the court, the child is exempt on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of such statement;

(iii) the child testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of such statement;

(iv) the child is absent from the hearing and the proponent of such statement has been unable to procure the attendance of the child by process or by other reasonable means;

(v) the court finds, based upon expert testimony from a treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician, that testifying would be likely to cause severe psychological or emotional trauma to the child; or

(vi) the child is not competent to testify.

(C) Reliability of Statement. If a finding of unavailability is made, the out-of-court statement shall be admitted if the judge further finds,

(i) after holding a separate hearing, that such statement was made under oath, that it was accurately recorded and preserved, and that there was sufficient opportunity to cross-examine, or
(ii) after holding a separate hearing and, where practicable and where not inconsistent with the best interests of the child, meeting with the child, that such statement was made under circumstances inherently demonstrating a special guarantee of reliability.

For the purposes of finding circumstances demonstrating reliability pursuant to this subsection, a judge may consider whether the relator documented the child witness’s statement and shall consider the following factors:

(a) the clarity of the statement, meaning the child’s capacity to observe, remember, and give expression to that which such child has seen, heard, or experienced; provided, however, that a finding under this clause shall be supported by expert testimony from a treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinician;

(b) the time, content, and circumstances of the statement;

(c) the existence of corroborative evidence of the substance of the statement regarding the abuse, including either the act, the circumstances, or the identity of the perpetrator; and

(d) the child’s sincerity and ability to appreciate the consequences of the statement.

(D) Corroborating Evidence. The out-of-court statement must be corroborated by other independently admitted evidence.

(E) Admissibility by Common Law or Statute. An out-of-court statement admissible by common law or by statute shall remain admissible notwithstanding the provisions of this section.

NOTE

Confrontation Clause. In a criminal case, a hearsay statement offered against the accused must satisfy both the confrontation clause and one of the hearsay exceptions. For a discussion of the relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions stated in Section 804, refer to the Introductory Note to Article VIII.

Introduction. Section 804 defines hearsay exceptions that are conditioned upon a showing that the declarant is unavailable. Section 804(a) defines the requirement of unavailability that applies to all the hearsay exceptions in Section 804(b). The second paragraph of Section 804(a) is consistent with the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. 526, 540, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (2005).

The exceptions that apply when the declarant of the out-of-court statement is unavailable address only the evidentiary rule against hearsay, except in the context of forfeiture by wrongdoing. See Section 804(b)(6), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable: Hearsay Exceptions: Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. In criminal cases, the admissibility at trial of an out-of-court statement against the defendant also requires consideration of the constitutional right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. For a discussion of the relationship between the
confrontation clause and the hearsay exceptions stated in Section 804, refer to the Introductory Note to Article VIII.

A defendant invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only makes himself or herself unavailable to another party, but the defendant is not unavailable as to himself or herself. See Commonwealth v. Labelle, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 698, 701, 856 N.E.2d 876, 879 (2006). It should not be presumed that an absent witness may invoke his or her privilege against self-incrimination. See Commonwealth v. Lopera, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 133, 137 n.3, 674 N.E.2d 1340, 1343 n.3 (1997). But where the declarant is a codefendant and joint venturer in the crimes charged against the defendant, and the declarant’s out-of-court statements directly implicate the declarant in the criminal enterprise, the unavailability requirement is satisfied because the defendant undoubtedly would invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. See Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. 672, 677–679, 704 N.E.2d 1137, 1143–1144 (1999).


**Subsection (a)(2).** The Supreme Judicial Court has not yet adopted Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 804(a)(2), which, like the Federal rule, provides that a witness who persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his or her statement may be deemed to be unavailable. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 433 Mass. 340, 355–356, 742 N.E.2d 61, 74 (2001) (explaining that absent the assertion of a privilege against self-incrimination, a witness’s refusal to testify does not render the witness unavailable for purposes of the hearsay exception for prior recorded testimony).

**Subsection (a)(3).** Massachusetts law does not recognize lack of memory of the subject matter of the testimony as a basis for finding that the witness is unavailable. Commonwealth v. Bray, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 758, 477 N.E.2d 601 (1985). Cf. A.T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 239 Mass. 59, 61, 131 N.E. 217, 218 (1921) (declining to extend doctrine of past recollection recorded to permit introduction of prior recorded testimony that witness had no present memory of but recalled was the truth).

**Subsection (a)(4).** This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385 Mass. 733, 742, 434 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1982) (“death or other legally sufficient reason”), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 491–492, 233 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1968) (death of witness). In Ibanez v. Winston, 222 Mass. 129, 130, 109 N.E. 814, 814 (1915), the Supreme Judicial Court observed that although the death or insanity of a witness would supply the basis for a finding of unavailability, the mere fact that a witness had returned to Spain, without more, did not demonstrate that he was unavailable. However, in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 295, 647 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1995), the Appeals Court noted that

"[w]hen a witness is outside of the borders of the United States and declines to honor a request to appear as a witness, the unavailability of that witness has been conceded because a State of the United States has no authority to compel a resident of a foreign country to attend a trial here."

**Subsection (a)(5).** This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. 672, 678, 704 N.E.2d 1137, 1143 (1999) ("We accept as a basis of unavailability the principles expressed in Rule 804[a][5] of the Federal Rules of Evidence [1985]"). In Commonwealth v. Sena, 441 Mass. 822, 832, 809 N.E.2d 505, 514 (2004), the Supreme Judicial Court noted that
“Before allowing the Commonwealth to introduce prior recorded testimony, the judge must be satisfied that the Commonwealth has made a good faith effort to locate and produce the witness at trial. Whether the Commonwealth carries its burden on the question of sufficient diligence in attempting to obtain the attendance of the desired witness depends upon what is a reasonable effort in light of the peculiar facts of the case.” (Citations and quotation omitted.)


“The prior recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule applies ‘where the prior testimony was given by a person, now unavailable, in a proceeding addressed to substantially the same issues as in the current proceeding, with reasonable opportunity and similar motivation on the prior occasion for cross-examination of the declarant by the party against whom the testimony is now being offered.’”


The Supreme Judicial Court has applied this hearsay exception when the prior recorded testimony was given at a probable cause hearing, see Commonwealth v. Mustone, 353 Mass. 490, 492–494, 233 N.E.2d 1, 3–4 (1968), and at a pretrial dangerousness hearing under G. L. c. 276, § 58A. See Commonwealth v. Hurley, 455 Mass. at 63 & n.9, 913 N.E.2d at 860 & n.9 (noting that there is “no general rule that a witness’s prior testimony at a pretrial detention hearing is always admissible at trial if that witness becomes unavailable.”). See also id., at 66–67, 913 N.E.2d at 861–862 (when an excited utterance is admitted at a pretrial hearing as an exception to the hearsay rule in circumstances in which the defendant is not given an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about the facts described in the excited utterance, the admission of the evidence violates the confrontation clause). Cf. Commonwealth v. Arrington, 455 Mass. 437, 442–445, 917 N.E.2d 734, 738–740 (2009) (upholding order that excluded from trial the alleged victim’s testimony at a pretrial dangerousness hearing under G. L. c. 276, § 58, on grounds that due to her medical condition [late stage cancer], defense counsel was deprived of reasonable opportunity for cross-examination).
In Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 313–315, 893 N.E.2d 19, 37–38 (2008), the Supreme Judicial Court held that this hearsay exception is not generally applicable to prior recorded testimony before the grand jury because the testimony of such witnesses is usually far more limited than at trial and is often presented without an effort to corroborate or discredit it. "If, however, the party seeking the admission of the grand jury testimony can establish that the Commonwealth had an opportunity and similar motive to develop fully a (now unavailable) witness’s testimony at the grand jury, that earlier testimony would be admissible." Id. at 315, 893 N.E.2d at 38.


Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 497, 193 N.E. 68, 69 (1934), and Commonwealth v. Vona, 250 Mass. 509, 511, 146 N.E. 20, 20 (1925). This common-law exception is not subject to the defendant’s right to confrontation. See Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236, 251, 892 N.E.2d 299, 311 (2008) (“Thus, in the unique instance of dying declarations, we ask only whether the statement is admissible as a common-law dying declaration, and not whether the statement is testimonial.”). The “dying declaration” allows testimony as to the victim’s statements concerning the circumstances of the killing and the identity of the perpetrator. Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. at 500, 193 N.E.2d at 70. It may be in the form of oral testimony, gestures, or a writing made by the victim. See Commonwealth v. Casey, 65 Mass. 417, 422 (1853) (victim who was mortally wounded and unable to speak, but conscious, confirmed identity of perpetrator by squeezing the hand of her treating physician who asked her if it was “Mr. Casey, who worked for her husband”). The Supreme Judicial Court has left open the question whether a defendant’s right to confrontation is applicable to the current, expanded concept of the dying declaration exception. See Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. at 252 n.17, 892 N.E.2d at 312 n.17, citing G. L. c. 233, § 64 (addressing admissibility of dying declarations of a female whose death results from an unlawful abortion in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 19), and Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 26, 407 N.E.2d 327, 332–333 (1980) (expanding the common-law exception by admitting a dying declaration to prove the homicides of other common victims).

The declarant’s belief of impending death may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, including the character of the injury sustained. See Commonwealth v. Moses, 436 Mass. 598, 602, 766 N.E.2d 827, 830 (2002) (“Jenkins had been shot four times shortly before making the statement. Two bullets had pierced his chest, one of which had lodged in his spine. When police and emergency personnel arrived, he was ‘very frightened,’ grimacing in pain, bleeding, and asking for oxygen. He asked a treating emergency medical technician if he were going to die. She told him that ‘it didn’t look too good’ for him. In the circumstances, it was not error for the judge to find that Jenkins believed at the time he made the statements that death was imminent.”); Commonwealth v. Niemic, 427 Mass. 718, 724, 696 N.E.2d 117, 122 (1998) (“The evidence showed that, when the officer found the victim, he had been stabbed in the heart and was bleeding profusely. There was also testimony that, at the hospital, he was ‘breathing heavily’ and ‘appeared to be having a hard time’ and that the officer questioning him ‘had to work to get his attention to focus.’ It was permissible to infer from this that the victim was aware that he was dying.”).

Before admitting the dying declaration, the trial judge must first determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the requisite elements of a dying declaration are satisfied. Commonwealth v. Green, 420 Mass. 771, 781–782, 652 N.E.2d 572, 579 (1995). If the statement is admitted, the judge must then instruct the jury that they must also find by a preponderance of the evidence that the same elements are satisfied before they may consider the substance of the statement. Id.


A declarant’s narrative may include self-inculpative and self-exculpatory elements.

"[A]ppllication of the evidentiary rule concerning declarations against penal interest to a full narrative requires breaking out which parts, if any, of the declaration are actually against the speaker’s penal interest. Further, application of the hearsay exception requires determination whether the declaration has an evidentiary connection and linkage to the matters at hand in the trial.”


The judge’s role in determining the admissibility of a statement against interest is to determine “whether, in light of the other evidence already adduced or to be adduced, there is some reasonable likelihood that the statement could be true.” Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 76, 489 N.E.2d 1233, 1241 (1986). This means that in accordance with Section 104(b), Preliminary Questions: Relevancy Conditioned on Fact, the question whether to believe the declarant’s statement is ultimately for the jury. Id.

A statement may qualify for admission as a declaration against penal interest even though it supplies circumstantial, and not direct, evidence of the declarant’s guilt. See Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. at 679, 704 N.E.2d at 1144. In Commonwealth v. Charles, the Supreme Judicial Court also indicated that even though the exception does not explicitly require corroboration when the statement is introduced against the defendant, it would follow the majority rule and require it in such cases. Id. at 679 n.2, 704 N.E.2d at 1144 n.2. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pope, 397 Mass. 275, 280, 491 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1986) (reversing defendant’s conviction based on erroneous admission of extrajudicial statement of a deceased witness; “[w]e do not believe that concern for penal consequence would inspire a suicide victim to truthfulness”).

In criminal cases, “[i]n applying the corroboration requirement, judges are obliged to . . . consider as relevant factors the degree of disinterestedness of the witnesses giving corroborating testimony as well as the plausibility of that testimony in the light of the rest of the proof.” Commonwealth v. Carr, 373 Mass. at 624, 369 N.E.2d at 974. The Supreme Judicial Court has explained that

"behind the corroboration requirement of [Fed. R. Evid.] 804(b)(3) lurks a suspicion that a reasonable man might sometimes admit to a crime he did not commit. A classic example is an inmate, serving time for multiple offenses, who has nothing to lose by a further conviction, but who can help out a friend by admitting to the friend’s crime.”

Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. at 74 n.8, 489 N.E.2d at 1240 n.8. The Supreme Judicial Court has stated that
“[o]ther factors the judge may consider are: the timing of the declaration and the relationship between the declarant and the witness, the reliability and character of the declarant, whether the statement was made spontaneously, whether other people heard the out-of-court statement, whether there is any apparent motive for the declarant to misrepresent the matter, and whether and in what circumstances the statement was repeated” (citation omitted).

Id. at 76, 489 N.E.2d at 1241. However,

“[i]n determining whether the declarant’s statement has been sufficiently corroborated to merit its admission in evidence, the judge should not be stringent. A requirement that the defendant corroborate the declarant’s entire statement, for example, may run afoul of the defendant’s due process rights . . . . If the issue of sufficiency of the defendant’s corroboration is close, the judge should favor admitting the statement. In most such instances, the good sense of the jury will correct any prejudicial impact.” (Citation omitted.)


Subsection (b)(4)(A). This subsection is derived from Haddock v. Boston & Maine R.R., 85 Mass. 298, 300–301 (1862), and Butrick v. Tilton, 155 Mass. 461, 466, 29 N.E. 1088, 1089–1090 (1892). In Haddock v. Boston & Maine R.R., 85 Mass. at 298–299, the court allowed a witness to testify that she came into ownership of the property through her mother and grandmother even though the only basis for her knowledge was what the person she alleged to be her mother said to her. In Butrick v. Tilton, 155 Mass. at 466, 29 N.E. at 1089–1090, also a dispute over title to real property, the court permitted the alleged owner’s granddaughter to testify as to how her grandfather came into ownership of the real estate, and that a cousin who owned the property before her grandfather died without children, based exclusively on what other family members told her and without any personal knowledge. See also Section 803(13), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Family Records; Section 803(19), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History.

Subsection (b)(4)(B). Massachusetts has not yet had occasion to consider Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(4)(B), which extends the principle of Section 804(b)(4)(A) to others to whom the declarant is related by “blood, adoption or marriage,” or to whom the declarant is so “intimately associated with . . . as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the matter declared.”

The only ground of unavailability is the death of the declarant. G. L. c. 233, § 65. In the absence of a finding of good faith, the statement is not admissible. See Barbosa v. Hopper Feeds, Inc., 404 Mass. 610, 620, 537 N.E.2d 99, 105 (1989) (excluding declaration because it was made after the injury suffered by the plaintiff and at the time when the now-deceased person had an incentive to fabricate). “In general [the declarations] must be derived from the exercise of the declarant’s own senses as distinguished from opinions based upon data observed by him or furnished by others.” Little v. Massachusetts N.E. St. Ry. Co., 223 Mass. 501, 504, 112 N.E. 77, 78 (1916). “The declarations of the deceased may be in writing and need not be reproduced in the exact words used by the declarant” (citations omitted). Bellamy v. Bellamy, 342 Mass. 534, 536, 174 N.E.2d 358, 359 (1961). See id. (oral statements also admissible).


Subsection (b)(5)(C). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 66. In Rothwell v. First Nat’l Bank, 286 Mass. 417, 421, 190 N.E. 812, 814 (1934), the Supreme Judicial Court explained the difference between Section 65 and Section 66 of G. L. c. 233. “[Section 66] is narrower than the other, in that it relates to the declarations or conduct of one person in one sort of case. But it requires no preliminary finding of good faith or other conditions. These two statutes operate concurrently and independently.” Id. See Greene v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 255 Mass. 519, 524, 152 N.E. 107, 108 (1926).

Subsection (b)(5)(D). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 79H.

Subsection (b)(5)(E). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 152, § 20B. The statutory exception, however, might not overcome the further objection that it contains hearsay-within-hearsay in the form of statements to the employee’s physician about how an injury occurred. See Fiander’s Case, 293 Mass. 157, 164, 199 N.E. 309, 312 (1936).


“By requiring that the defendant actively assist the witness in becoming unavailable with the intent to make her unavailable, our doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing is at least as demanding as Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), which permits a finding of forfeiture where the defendant ‘acquiesced’ in conduct that was intended to, and did, make the witness unavailable to testify.”


“A defendant’s involvement in procuring a witness’s unavailability need not consist of a criminal act, and may include a defendant’s collusion with a witness to ensure that the witness will not be heard at trial.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. at 540, 830 N.E.2d at 170. In Edwards, the Supreme Judicial Court elaborated on the scope of this exception.

“A finding that a defendant somehow influenced a witness’s decision not to testify is not required to trigger the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine where there is collusion in implementing that decision or planning for its implementation. Certainly, a defendant must have contributed to the witness’s unavailability in some significant manner. However, the causal link necessary between a defendant’s actions and a witness’s una-
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§ 804

Availability may be established where (1) a defendant puts forward to a witness the idea to avoid testifying, either by threats, coercion, persuasion, or pressure; (2) a defendant physically prevents a witness from testifying; or (3) a defendant actively facilitates the carrying out of the witness’s independent intent not to testify. Therefore, in collusion cases (the third category above) a defendant’s joint effort with a witness to secure the latter’s unavailability, regardless of whether the witness already decided ‘on his own’ not to testify, may be sufficient to support a finding of forfeiture by wrongdoing.” (Footnote omitted.)

Id. at 540–541, 830 N.E.2d at 171. “[W]here the defendant has had a meaningful impact on the witness’s unavailability, the defendant may have forfeited confrontation and hearsay objections to the witness’s out-of-court statements, even where the witness modified the initial strategy to procure the witness’s silence.” Id. at 541, 830 N.E.2d at 171. See also Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. at 865–866, 933 N.E.2d at 641–642 (evidence that defendant married alleged victim of his assault with the intent to enable her to exercise her spousal privilege at trial supported application of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing and thus the use of his wife’s hearsay statements made before the marriage, even though it may not have been defendant’s sole or primary purpose).

The proponent of the statement must prove that the opposing party procured the witness’s unavailability by a preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 444 Mass. at 542, 830 N.E.2d at 172. “[P]rior to a determination of forfeiture, the parties should be given an opportunity to present evidence, including live testimony [and the unavailable witness’s out-of-court statements], at an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence.” Id. at 545, 830 N.E.2d at 174. The trial judge should make the findings required by Commonwealth v. Edwards either orally on the record or in writing. Commonwealth v. Szerlong, 457 Mass. at 864 n.9, 933 N.E.2d at 641 n.9.

Subsection (b)(7). This subsection is derived from Kennedy v. Doyle, 92 Mass. 161, 168 (1865) (where the court admitted a baptismal record showing child’s date of birth as evidence of the person’s age when a contract had been made, in circumstances in which the entry was in the hand of the parish priest who had been the custodian of the book; Supreme Judicial Court observed that “[a]n entry made in the performance of a religious duty is certainly of no less value than one made by a clerk, messenger or notary, an attorney or solicitor or a physician, in the course of his secular occupation.”). Contrast Derinza’s Case, 229 Mass. 435, 443, 118 N.E. 942, 946 (1918) (copies of what purported to be a marriage certificate from a town in Italy not admitted in evidence; Supreme Judicial Court observed that there was no “evidence respecting their character, the circumstances under which the records were kept, or the source from which the certificates came. No one testified that they were copies of an official original. There was no authentication of them as genuine by a consular officer of the United States. There was absolutely nothing beyond the bare production of the copies of the certificates. In the absence of a statute making such certificates admissible by themselves, or something to show that they were entitled to a degree of credence, they were not competent.”). See Section 803(6), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records.


Subsection (b)(8)(B). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 81(b). See Section 804(a), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarat Unavailable: Definition of Unavailability. A judge’s reasons for finding a child


Subsection (b)(8)(E). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 81(d).

Subsection (b)(9)(A). Subsections (b)(9)(A)(i) through (iv) are taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 82, and Subsection (b)(9)(A)(v) is derived from Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 893, 678 N.E.2d 1325, 1332 (1997). See Commonwealth v. Colin C., 419 Mass. 54, 64–64, 643 N.E.2d 19, 25–26 (1994) (establishing additional procedural requirements for admitting hearsay statements of child under G. L. c. 233, § 81). The Department of Children and Families must give prior notice to the parents that it will seek to admit hearsay statements under this statute. Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. at 893, 678 N.E.2d at 1332. It must also show a compelling and necessary need to use this procedure by more than a preponderance of evidence. Id. See also Adoption of Arnold, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 743, 752, 741 N.E.2d 456, 463 (2001); Adoption of Tina, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 733–734, 701 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1998) (recognizing additional procedural requirements). When a care and protection proceeding is joined with a petition to dispense with consent to adoption, admissibility of a child’s hearsay statements should comply with the stricter requirements of G. L. c. 233, § 82, not § 83. Adoption of Tina, 45 Mass. App. Ct. at 733 n.10, 701 N.E.2d at 676 n.10. The phrase “child under the age of ten” refers to the age of the child at the time the statement was made, not the child’s age at the time of the proceeding. Adoption of Daisy, 460 Mass. 72, 78, 948 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (2011).

Subsection (b)(9)(B). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 82(b). See Adoption of Sean, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 266, 630 N.E.2d 604, 607 (1994). See also Section 804(a), Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable: Definition of Unavailability.


Subsection (b)(9)(E). This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 233, § 82(d).
Section 805. Hearsay Within Hearsay

Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded by the prohibition of hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with a hearsay exception in accordance with the common law, statutes, and rules of court.

NOTE

Section 806. Attacking and Supporting Credibility of Hearsay Declarant

When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.

NOTE

ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

Section 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification

(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this section:

   (1) Testimony of Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.

   (2) Nonexpert Opinion on Handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of litigation.

   (3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.

   (4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.

   (5) Voice Identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.

   (6) Telephone Conversations. A telephone conversation, by evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular person or business, if,

      (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or

      (B) in the case of a business, the conversation related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.

   (7) Public Records or Reports.

      (A) Originals. Evidence that an original book, paper, document, or record authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public place, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from a public office where items of this nature are kept is admissible.
(B) Copies. A copy of any of the items described in subsection (A), if authenticated by the attestation of the officer who has charge of the item, shall be admissible on the same terms as the original.

(8) Ancient Documents. Evidence that a document
(A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity;
(B) was in place where it, if authentic, would likely be; and
(C) has been in existence thirty years or more at the time it was offered.

(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.

(10) Methods Provided by Statute or Rule. Any method of authentication or identification provided by a rule of the Supreme Judicial Court of this Commonwealth, by statute, or as provided in the Constitution of the Commonwealth.

(11) Electronic or Digital Communication. Electronic or digital communication, by confirming circumstances that would allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that this evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. Neither expert testimony nor exclusive access is necessary to authenticate the source.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. 700, 704, 369 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 (1977), where the court acknowledged that a police witness at the trial properly authenticated a fingerprint card by his testimony that it was the same card he used to record the defendant’s prints at the time of the defendant’s arrest. “[P]roof of authenticity usually takes the form of testimony of a qualified witness either (1) that the thing is what its proponent represents it to be, or (2) that circumstances exist which imply that the thing is what its proponent represents it to be.” Commonwealth v. LaCorte, 373 Mass. at 704, 369 N.E.2d at 1009, quoting W.B. Leach & P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence 265 (4th ed. 1967). See Commonwealth v. Duddie Ford Inc., 28 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 435 n.10, 551 N.E.2d 1211, 1217 n.10 (1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 409 Mass. 387, 566 N.E.2d 1119 (1991), quoting Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 901(a). This principle is applicable to photographs as well as other forms of documentary evidence. Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 641, 646, 779 N.E.2d 669, 673 (2002) (“Photographs usually are authenticated directly through competent testimony that the scene they show is a fair and accurate representation of something the witness actually saw. But authenticity also can be established circumstantially by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 901(a).” [Quotation and citations omitted.]). See also Commonwealth v. Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 855–856, 942 N.E.2d 927, 950 (2011) (store surveillance video properly authenticated by testimony of customer who had been there several hours before shootings, as well as by detective’s description of process by which videotape was copied from store’s system).

ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION

§ 901


Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Ryan, 355 Mass. 768, 770–771, 247 N.E.2d 564, 565–566 (1969). See also Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 438 Mass. 658, 667, 783 N.E.2d 417, 425–426 (2003). Before the lay opinion evidence is admitted, the trial judge must determine that the witness has sufficient familiarity with the genuine handwriting of the person in question to express an opinion that the specimen was written by that person. Nunes v. Perry, 113 Mass. 274, 276 (1873). See Section 104(b), Preliminary Questions: Relevancy Conditioned on Fact. However, when the evidence includes both authentic samples of the person's handwriting and samples of questionable origin, and where the witness has no prior familiarity, there is no necessity for lay opinion testimony and it should not be admitted. See Noyes v. Noyes, 224 Mass. 125, 130, 112 N.E. 850, 851 (1916) (“The opinion of the jury under such circumstances is quite as good as that of the witness of ordinary experience who has no particular acquaintance with the genuine handwriting. There is, under such circumstances, no occasion for the opinion of the outsider of only ordinary intelligence.”).

Subsection (b)(3). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. O'Connell, 438 Mass. 658, 662–663, 783 N.E.2d 417, 422–423 (2003). Whether a specimen of handwriting is genuine, i.e., the handwriting of a named person, is a preliminary question of fact for the trial judge. See Davis v. Meenan, 270 Mass. 313, 314–315, 169 N.E. 145, 145 (1930). See also Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court. In a criminal case, if this issue is disputed, the trial judge also should submit the question to the jury. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 Mass. 457, 473–474, 76 N.E. 127, 133 (1905). If a genuine specimen of handwriting is in evidence, the jury is capable of comparing a specimen of handwriting to it to determine whether the specimen is genuine. Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 209, 843 N.E.2d 617, 633–634 (2006). In the discretion of the court, the testimony of an expert witness may be admissible. Moody v. Rowell, 34 Mass. 490, 496–497 (1835).


Subsection (b)(7)(A). This subsection is derived from Kaufmann v. Kaitz, 325 Mass. 149, 151, 89 N.E.2d 505, 506 (1949). See Bowes v. Inspector of Bldgs. of Brockton, 347 Mass. 295, 296, 197 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1964) (authentication of city ordinance by city clerk). See also G. L. c. 233, § 73 (foreign oaths and affidavits, if taken or administered by a duly authorized notary public "within the jurisdiction for which he is commissioned, 218
and certified under his official seal, shall be as effectual in this commonwealth as if administered or taken and certified by a justice of the peace therein”; G. L. c. 233, § 74 (“Acts of incorporation shall be held to be public acts and as such may be declared on and given in evidence.”). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 75 (“[P]rinted copies of any city ordinances . . . shall be admitted without certification or attestation, but, if their genuineness is questioned, the court shall require such certification or attestation thereof as it deems necessary.”).

There are a number of statutory provisions dealing with authentication. See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 69 (admissibility of records and court proceedings of a court of another State or of the United States if authenticated “by the attestation of the clerk or other officer who has charge of the records of such court under its seal.”); G. L. c. 233, § 73 (foreign oaths and affidavits); G. L. c. 233, § 74 (acts of incorporation); G. L. c. 233, § 75 (municipal ordinances); G. L. c. 233, § 76 (documents filed with governmental departments); G. L. c. 233, § 76A (documents filed with Securities and Exchange Commission); G. L. c. 233, § 76B (documents filed with Interstate Commerce Commission); G. L. c. 233, § 77 (copies of records, books, and accounts of banks and trust companies).


“[A]n attested copy of a document is one which has been examined and compared with the original, with a certificate or memorandum of its correctness signed by the persons who have examined it. Thus, to qualify as an attested copy there must be a written and signed certification that it is a correct copy. The attestation of an official having custody of an official record is the assurance given by the certifier that the copy submitted is accurate and genuine as compared to the original.” (Citations and quotations omitted.)

Id. In Commonwealth v. Deramo, the Supreme Judicial Court held that “[m]erely making a copy of the original attestation along with a copy of the underlying record does not serve the purpose of the attestation requirement.” Id. at 48, 762 N.E.2d at 821. See id. (concluding that a copy of the defendant’s driver history from the Registry of Motor Vehicles was improperly admitted into evidence because it was not supported by an original attestation, but only by a copy of the attestation). Unless a statute or regulation provides otherwise, an attestation does not have to take the form of an original signature; it need only be an original mark, such as a stamp or facsimile. See Commonwealth v. Martinez-Guzman, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 170, 920 N.E.2d 322, 324 (2010) (holding that documents bearing the original stamped signature of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles were properly authenticated).

Any error in admitting a copy of a public record may be cured by comparing it to a properly authenticated record. Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. at 49, 762 N.E.2d at 822. See also G. L. c. 233, § 68 (proof of the genuineness of a signature to an attested instrument may be by the same methods used for proof of any signature).

**Proof of Specific Types of Records.** Records and court proceedings of a court of the United States or another State are admissible when relevant if authenticated “by the attestation of the clerk or other officer who has charge of the records of such court under its seal.” G. L. c. 233, § 69. Printed copies of State statutes, acts, or resolves “which are published under its authority,” and copies of city ordinances, town bylaws, and the rules and regulations of a board of alderman, “if attested by the clerk of such city or town, shall be admitted as sufficient evidence thereof in all courts of law and on all occasions.” G. L. c. 233, § 75. Printed copies of rules and regulations of a State department, commission, board, or officer of the Commonwealth or any city or town authorized to adopt them, printed copies of city ordinances or town bylaws, or copies of the United States Code Annotated, the United States Code Service, and all federal regulations, “shall be admitted without certification or attestation, but, if their genuineness is questioned, the court shall require such certification or attestation as it deems necessary.” G. L. c. 233, § 75. Copies of books, papers, documents, and records in any department of State or local government, when attested by the officer in charge of the items, “shall be competent evidence in all cases equally with the originals . . . .” G. L. c. 233, § 76 (in most cases the genuineness of that officer’s signature shall be attested by the Secretary of the
Commonwealth or the clerk of a city or town, as the case may be). See also G. L. c. 233, § 76A (authentication of documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission); G. L. c. 233, § 76B (authentication of documents filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission). Copies of records of banks doing business in the Commonwealth are admissible in evidence on the same terms as originals if accompanied by an affidavit, taken before and under the seal of a clerk of a court of record or notary, "stating that the affiant is the officer having charge of the original records, books and accounts, and that the copy is correct and is full" insofar as it relates to the subject matter in question. G. L. c. 233, § 77. See also G. L. c. 233, § 77A (bank statement showing payment of a check or other item, if accompanied by a legible copy of the check or other item, "is competent evidence in all cases" and prima facie proof of payment of the amount of the check or other item).

Subsection (b)(8). This subsection is derived from Whitman v. Shaw, 166 Mass. 451, 456–461, 44 N.E. 333, 335–337 (1896). See also Green v. Chelsea, 41 Mass. 71, 76–77 (1836). Compare Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(8) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 901(b)(8), which shorten the period from thirty to twenty years.


Subsection (b)(10). This subsection simply establishes that this section is not exclusive. For example, the authenticity of a writing which a party intends to offer at trial may be established prior to trial by a demand for an admission as to genuineness under G. L. c. 231, § 69. See Waldor Realty Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Westborough, 354 Mass. 639, 640, 241 N.E.2d 843, 844 (1968). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2)(A) ("Agreements reduced to writing in the conference report shall be binding on the parties and shall control the subsequent course of the proceeding."); Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(c) (authentication of official records or the lack thereof from the Commonwealth or a foreign jurisdiction may be accomplished "by any other method authorized by law"). Also, certain statutes provide that records may be authenticated as part of a hearsay exception by means of an affidavit. See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, §§ 79, 79G, 79J.

Subsection (b)(11). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 450, 945 N.E.2d 372, 381 (2011), where the court held that the same basic principles of authentication apply to e-mails and other forms of electronic communication as apply to, for example, telephone calls and handwritten letters. Evidence that a person’s name is written as the author of an e-mail or that the electronic communication originates from an e-mail or social-networking Web site that bears the person’s name is not, standing alone, sufficient to authenticate the communication as having been authored, posted, or sent by the person. There must be some “confirming circumstances” sufficient for a reasonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the person authored, posted, or sent the communication. Id. at 450, 945 N.E.2d at 380–381. In Purdy, the confirming circumstances were that the e-mails were found on the hard drive of the computer that the defendant acknowledged owning and to which he supplied all necessary passwords, and at least two e-mails contained either an attached photograph of the defendant or a self-characterization. Id. at 451, 945 N.E.2d at 381. “The defendant’s uncorroborated testimony that others used his computer regularly . . . was relevant to the weight, not the admissibility, of the[] messages.” Id. at 451, 945 N.E.2d at 381–382. The court stated that neither expert testimony nor exclusive access is necessary to authenticate the authorship of an e-mail. Id. at 451 n.7, 945 N.E.2d at 381 n.7. See so Commonwealth v. Salyer, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 356, 996 N.E.2d 488, 496 (2013) (Commonwealth had burden to demonstrate that communications contained in Myspace pages were authentic, “which in these circumstances meant that they were created by or at the direction of the defendant”); Commonwealth v. Amaral, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 671, 674–675, 941 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (2011) (e-mails authenticated by actions of defendant who, for example, appeared at time and place indicated in an e-mail and answered telephone number provided in another e-mail).
Section 902. Self-Authentication

Extrinsic evidence of authenticity, as a condition precedent to admissibility, is not required with respect to the following:

(a) Court Records Under Seal. The records and judicial proceedings of a court of another State or of the United States, if authenticated by the attestation of the clerk or other officer who has charge of the records of such court under its seal.

(b) Domestic Official Records Not Under Seal. An official record kept within the Commonwealth, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by that officer’s deputy. If the record is kept in any other State, district, Commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States, or within the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands, any such copy shall be accompanied by a certificate that such custodial officer has custody of the record. This certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the office.

(c) Foreign Official Records. A foreign official record, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, attested by a person authorized to make the attestation and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (1) of the attesting person or (2) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good cause shown, (1) admit an attested copy without final certification or (2) permit the foreign official record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without a final certification.

(d) Certified Copies of Public Records. Copies of public records, of records described in Sections 5, 7, and 16 of G. L. c. 66, and of records of banks, trust companies, insurance companies, and hospitals, whether or not such records or copies are made by the photographic or microphotographic process if there is annexed to such copies an affidavit, taken before a clerk of a court of record or notary public, under the seal of such court or notary, stating that the affiant is the officer having charge of the original records, books, and accounts, and that the copy is correct and is full so far as it relates to the subject matter therein mentioned.

(e) Official Publications.
(1) Printed copies of all statutes, acts, and resolves of the Commonwealth, public or private, which are published under its authority, and copies of the ordinances of a city, the bylaws of a town, or the rules and regulations of a board of aldermen, if attested by the clerk of such city or town.

(2) Printed copies of rules and regulations purporting to be issued by authority of any department, commission, board, or officer of the Commonwealth or of any city or town having authority to adopt them, or printed copies of any city ordinances or town bylaws or printed copies of the United States Code Annotated or the United States Code Service and all Federal regulations, without certification or attestation; provided, however, that if their genuineness is questioned, the court shall require such certification or attestation thereof as it deems necessary.

(3) Copies of books, papers, documents, and records in any department of the Commonwealth or of any city or town, authenticated by the attestation of the officer who has charge of the same; provided that the genuineness of the signature of such officer shall be attested by the Secretary of the Commonwealth under its seal or by the clerk of such city or town except in the case of books, papers, documents, and records of the Department of Telecommunications and Energy in matters relating to common carriers, and of the Registry of Motor Vehicles.

(4) The Massachusetts Register.

(f) Certain Newspapers. Certified copies of any newspaper, or part thereof, made by the photographic or microphotographic process deposited in any public library or a library of any college or university located in the Commonwealth.

(g) Trade Inscriptions. A trademark or trade name affixed on a product indicating origin.

(h) Acknowledged Documents. All oaths and affidavits administered or taken by a notary public, duly commissioned and qualified by authority of any other State or government, within the jurisdiction for which the notary is commissioned, and certified under an official seal; such documents shall be as effectual in this Commonwealth as if administered or taken and certified by a justice of the peace therein.

(i) Commercial Paper and Related Documents. Commercial paper, signatures thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided by general commercial law.

(j) Presumptions Created by Law. Any signature, document, or other matter declared by any law of the United States or this Commonwealth to be presumptively or prima facie genuine or authentic.

(k) Certified Copies of Hospital and Other Records of Treatment and Medical History. Records or copies of records kept by any hospital, dispensary or clinic, or sanitarium, if certified by affidavit by the person in custody thereof to be true and complete.
(l) Copy of Hospital and Other Records of Itemized Bills and Reports. Itemized bills and reports, including hospital medical records and examination reports, relating to medical, dental, hospital services, prescriptions, or orthopedic appliances rendered to a person injured, if (1) it is subscribed and sworn to under the penalties of perjury by the physician, dentist, authorized agent of a hospital or health maintenance organization, pharmacist, or retailer of orthopedic appliances rendering such services; (2) the party offering the evidence gives the opposing party written notice of the intention to offer the evidence, along with a copy of the evidence, by mailing it by certified mail, return receipt requested, not less than ten days before the introduction of the evidence; and (3) the party offering the evidence files an affidavit of such notice and the return receipt is filed with the clerk of the court after said receipt has been returned.

(m) Copy of Bills for Genetic Marker Tests and for Prenatal and Postnatal Care. Copies of bills for genetic marker tests and for prenatal and postnatal health care of the mother and child, furnished to the adverse party at least ten days before trial, shall be admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges billed and that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.

(n) Results of Genetic Marker Tests. In an action to establish the paternity of a child born out of wedlock, the report of the results of genetic marker tests, including a statistical probability of the putative father’s paternity based upon such tests, unless a party objects in writing to the test results upon notice of the hearing date or within thirty days prior to the hearing, whichever is shorter.

NOTE

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 69. See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 39(a).

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(1) and Mass. R. Crim. P. 40(a)(1).

Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Mass. R. Civ. P. 44(a)(2) and Mass. R. Crim. P. 40(a)(2).

Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, §§ 77 and 79A.

Subsection (e)(1). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 75.

Subsection (e)(2). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 75.

Subsection (e)(3). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 76.

Subsection (e)(4). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 30A, § 6 (“The publication in the Massachusetts Register of a document creates a rebuttable presumption [1] that it was duly issued, prescribed, or promulgated; [2] that all the requirements of this chapter and regulations prescribed under it relative to the document have been complied with; and [3] that the text of the regulations as published in the Massachusetts Register is a true copy of the attested regulation as filed by the agency.

Subsection (f). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79D (“Copies of any newspaper, or part thereof made by photographic or microphotographic process deposited in any public library or a library of
any college or university located in the commonwealth, shall, when duly certified by the person in charge thereof, be admitted in evidence equally with the originals.”). See also Section 901(b)(1), Requirement of Authentication or Identification: Illustrations: Testimony of Witness with Knowledge.

Subsection (g). This subsection is derived from Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 621–623, 377 N.E.2d 954, 955–956 (1978), and Doyle v. Cont. Baking Co., 262 Mass. 516, 519, 160 N.E. 325, 326 (1928). In Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. at 623, 377 N.E.2d at 956, the presence of the defendant’s name on the decal on a snowmobile was sufficient to identify the defendant as the manufacturer of the snowmobile. In Doyle v. Cont. Baking Co., 262 Mass. at 519, 160 N.E. at 326, the label on which the defendant’s name appeared was sufficient to identify the defendant as the manufacturer of the defective bread. See also G. L. c. 156B, § 11(a) (a corporation is not permitted to use the corporate name or trademark of another corporation registered or doing business in this Commonwealth without their consent).

“Several rationales underlie the acceptance of this rule. First, since trademarks and trade names are protected under statutes, the probability that a particular name will be used by another corporation is very low. Second, since the probability is very high that the corporation whose name appears on a product is the corporation which manufactured the product, judicial efficiency will be served by allowing the identity of the name on a product and the defendant’s name to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of identifying the defendant as the manufacturer. Finally, the presence of trademarks or trade names on products is accepted and relied on in daily life as sufficient proof of the manufacturer of the product. This common acceptance, which has been reinforced by manufacturers’ advertising, indicates that the identity of a corporation’s name and the name on a product should be sufficient to identify that corporation as the manufacturer.” (Citations omitted.)


Subsection (h). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 73. See also Mass. R. Civ. P. 43(d).

Subsection (i). This subsection is derived from various statutes and commercial law. See, e.g., G. L. c. 106, § 1-202 (document authorized or required by a contract to be issued by a third party is prima facie evidence of its own authenticity); G. L. c. 233, § 76A (records of the Securities and Exchange Commission must be attested by an officer or person who has charge of the same and under a certificate of a member); G. L. c. 233, § 76B (printed copies of rate schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission are admissible without certification); G. L. c. 233, § 77 (copies from the records, books, and accounts of banks and trust companies doing business in the Commonwealth must have an affidavit taken before a notary stating that the officer has charge of the original records); G. L. c. 233, § 78 (business records shall be admissible if the court finds the record was made in good faith, in the regular course of business, before the beginning of legal proceedings, and the person who made the entry has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the record).

Subsection (j). This subsection is derived from statutes which deal with authentication not covered in other areas of Article IX, Authentication and Identification. See, e.g., G. L. c. 9, § 11 (Great Seal); G. L. c. 111, § 195 (certified copy of reports of State laboratory for lead and lead poisoning); G. L. c. 209C, § 17 (in an action to establish paternity of a child born out of wedlock, the report of the results of genetic marker tests shall be admissible without proof of authenticity); G. L. c. 233, § 79B (published statements of fact of general interest to persons engaged in an occupation shall be admissible in the court’s discretion in civil cases); G. L. c. 233, § 79C (published facts or opinions on a subject of science or art shall be admissible in actions of contract or malpractice, conditioned on the court finding that said statements are relevant and that the writer is recognized in his or her profession as an expert on the subject); G. L. c. 233, § 80 (stenographic transcripts).
**ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION**

§ 902

**Subsection (k).** This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79. “[Section 79] was enacted primarily to relieve the physicians and nurses of public hospitals from the hardship and inconvenience of attending court as witnesses to facts which ordinarily would be found recorded in the hospital books” (citation omitted). *Bouchie v. Murray*, 376 Mass. 524, 527, 381 N.E.2d 1295, 1298 (1978).

Cross-Reference: Section 803(6)(B), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records: Hospital Records.

**Subsection (l).** This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 233, § 79G. Under Section 79G, in addition to those already noted are “chiropodists, chiropractors, optometrists, osteopaths, physical therapists, podiatrists, psychologists and other medical personnel licensed to practice under the laws of the jurisdiction within which such services were rendered.” This subsection applies to both civil and criminal cases. See *Commonwealth v. Schutte*, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 797–800, 756 N.E.2d 48, 51–53 (2001).

Cross-Reference: Section 803(6)(C), Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial: Business and Hospital Records: Medical and Hospital Services.

**Subsection (m).** This subsection is taken verbatim from G. L. c. 209C, § 16(f).

**Subsection (n).** This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 209C, § 17. Such reports shall not be admissible absent sufficient evidence of intercourse between the mother and the putative father during the period of probable conception and shall not be considered as evidence of the occurrence of intercourse between the mother and the putative father. *Id.* There is nothing in the statute that requires the test to be court-ordered in order to be admissible. *Department of Revenue v. Sorrentino*, 408 Mass. 340, 344, 557 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (1990).
Section 903.  Subscribing Witness Testimony Not Necessary

The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a writing unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the validity of the writing.

NOTE

ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS AND RECORDS

Section 1001. Definitions

For purposes of this Article, the following definitions are applicable:

(a) Writings and Records. “Writings” and “records” are documents which consist of letters, words, numbers, or their equivalent. Writings and records do not include photographs, composite pictures, tape recordings, videotapes, or digital images.

(b) Original. An “original” of a writing or record is the writing or record itself and any copy intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it.

(c) Duplicate. A “duplicate” is a copy of a writing or record which is not intended to be an original, the copies being no more than secondary evidence of the original.

NOTE


This section is not as extensive as Fed. R. Evid. 1001(1) and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 1001(1), both of which cover recordings and photographs. “The best evidence rule is applicable to only those situations where the contents of a writing are sought to be proved” (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. at 725, 260 N.E.2d at 170. “[T]his rule is usually regarded . . . as not applicable to any objects but writings. . . . So far, then, as concerns objects not writings, a photographic representation could be used without accounting for the original.” Id. at 725, 260 N.E.2d at 171, quoting Wigmore, Evidence § 796 (3d ed. 1940). See also Commonwealth v. McKay, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 396, 402–403, 853 N.E.2d 1098, 1102–1103 (2006).


Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Augur Steel Axle & Gearing Co. v. Whittier, 117 Mass. 451, 455 (1875) (as to letter-press copy of an original letter in possession of adverse party, “[t]here was sufficient foundation for the admission of secondary evidence of the contents of the letter”). See also Meehan v. North Adams Sav. Bank, 302 Mass. 357, 363–364, 19 N.E.2d 299, 302–303 (1939) (admissibility of copy of a letter upheld, not to prove its contents, but to prove the opponent had received the original letter).
Section 1002. Requirement of Original (Best Evidence Rule)

To prove the content of a writing or recording, but not a photograph, the original writing or recording is required, except as otherwise provided in these sections, or by common law or statute.

NOTE

This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 6, 746 N.E.2d 469, 474 (2001), where the court explained as follows:

"The best evidence rule provides that, where the contents of a document are to be proved, the party must either produce the original or show a sufficient excuse for its nonproduction. The rule is a doctrine of evidentiary preference principally aimed, not at securing a writing at all hazards and in every instance, but at securing the best obtainable evidence of its contents. Thus, where the original has been lost, destroyed, or is otherwise unavailable, its production may be excused and other evidence of its contents will be admissible, provided that certain findings are made." [Quotation and citations omitted; emphasis omitted.]


The best evidence rule does not apply where the writing is so simple that the possibility of error is negligible. See Commonwealth v. Blood, 77 Mass. 74, 77 (1858).


The admission of photographs, composite drawings, tape recordings, or digital images is within the discretion of the trial judge, provided that the evidence is accurate, similar enough to circumstances at the time in dispute to be relevant and helpful to the jury in its deliberations, and its probative value outweighs any prejudice to the other party. See Renzi v. Paredes, 452 Mass. 38, 52, 890 N.E.2d 806, 817 (2008); Commonwealth v. Duhamel, 391 Mass. at 844–845, 464 N.E.2d at 1355; Commonwealth v. Balukonis, 357 Mass. at 725–726, 260 N.E.2d at 170–171; Commonwealth v. Leneski, 66 Mass. App. Ct. at 294, 846 N.E.2d at 1198–1199; Henderson v. D'Annolfo, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 413, 428–429, 446 N.E.2d 103, 113 (1983). A witness may testify that a photograph or digital image is substantially similar to the original as long as the witness is familiar with the details pictured even though the witness is not the photographer. Renzi v. Paredes, 452 Mass. at 52, 890 N.E.2d at 817. "Concerns regarding the completeness or production of the image go to its weight and not its admissibility." Id., 890 N.E.2d at 818.

"The best evidence rule does not forbid the use of 'copies' of electronic records (including e-mails and text messages and other computer data files), because there is no 'original' in the traditional sense." Commonwealth v. Salyer, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 356 n.10, 996 N.E.2d 498, 497 n.10 (2013) (citations omitted). Cf. G. L. c. 233, § 79K. "However, oral testimony designed to prove the contents of an
Section 1003. Admissibility of Duplicates

Where the original has been lost, destroyed, or otherwise made unavailable, its production may be excused and other evidence of its contents will be admissible, provided that certain findings are made as outlined in Section 1004.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 434 Mass. 1, 6, 746 N.E.2d 469, 474 (2001).

"As a threshold matter, the proponent must offer evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that the original once existed. If the evidence warrants such a finding, the judge must assume its existence, and then determine if the original had become unavailable, otherwise than through the serious fault of the proponent and that reasonable search had been made for it." (Citation, quotation, and ellipsis omitted.)

Id. at 6–7, 746 N.E.2d at 474.

A number of statutes equalize duplicates and originals. See, e.g., G. L. c. 233, § 76 (attested-to records of governmental departments); G. L. c. 233, § 76A (properly authenticated copies of documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission); G. L. c. 233, § 77 (copies of books, etc., of trust companies and banks); G. L. c. 233, § 79A (duly certified copies of public, bank, insurance, and hospital records); G. L. c. 233, § 79D (duly certified copies of newspapers made by photographic process and deposited in certain public and college libraries); G. L. c. 233, § 79E (reproductions made in the regular course of business); G. L. c. 233, § 79K (duplicate of a computer data file or program file unless issue as to authenticity or unfair to admit). See also G. L. c. 233, § 78 (court "may" order originals).
Section 1004. Admissibility of Other Evidence of Contents

The original is not required, and secondary evidence of the contents of the writing or record is admissible, if:

(a) Originals Lost or Destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith;

(b) Original Not Obtainable. No original can be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure;

(c) Original in Possession of Opponent. At a time when an original was under the control of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the hearing; or

(d) Collateral Matters. The writing or record is not closely related to a controlling issue.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from Fed. R. Evid. 1004 and Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 1004, both of which reflect Massachusetts practice.


“[I]n order to permit proof by secondary evidence of the contents of [a lost original], the trial judge must make preliminary findings that the original had become unavailable, otherwise than through the serious fault of the proponent . . . and that reasonable search had been made for it.” Fauci v. Mulready, 337 Mass. at 540, 150 N.E.2d at 291.

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Topping v. Bickford, 86 Mass. 120, 122 (1862), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 151 Mass. 491, 495, 24 N.E. 677, 677–678 (1890).

Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Fisher v. Swartz, 333 Mass. 265, 271, 130 N.E.2d 575, 579 (1955) (defendant had an original in court and refused to produce it on plaintiff’s request so secondary evidence was admitted), and Commonwealth v. Slocomb, 260 Mass. 288, 291, 157 N.E. 350, 351 (1927) (when pleadings disclose proof of a document that will be necessary at trial, no further notice is necessary, and if the party fails to produce the document, secondary evidence is admissible). Cf. Cregg v. Puritan Trust Co., 237 Mass. 146, 149–150, 129 N.E. 428, 429 (1921) (“The failure of the defendant to produce its books and accounts when summoned by a subpoena duces tecum conferred authority on the court to compel that production by proper process, and authorized the plaintiff to introduce parol evidence of the contents of such books and records. A like result follows upon the failure of a party at the trial to produce on reasonable demand writings which are material to the issue. The failure to produce documents on demand at a trial or on the subpoena duces tecum, is not in itself evidence of the alleged contents of such documents.” [Citations omitted.]).
Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from Smith v. Abington Sav. Bank, 171 Mass. 178, 184, 50 N.E. 545, 546 (1898). See also Commonwealth v. Borasky, 214 Mass. 313, 317, 101 N.E. 377, 379 (1913) (defendant’s objection to testimony of physician, who performed autopsy, on the ground that the record was the best evidence, was properly overruled as “[t]he testimony of the witness who was present and observed the condition revealed by the autopsy was admissible”); Beauregard v. Benjamin F. Smith Co., 213 Mass. 259, 264, 100 N.E. 627, 628 (1913) (sheriff was permitted to testify as to where he served the defendant without producing the official return of service); Eagle Bank at New Haven v. Chapin, 20 Mass. 180, 182–183 (1825) (parol evidence of a notice to an endorser admissible without calling on the party to produce the written notice received by him).
Section 1005. Official Records

(a) Authentication.

(1) Domestic. An official record kept within the Commonwealth, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by that officer’s deputy. If the record is kept in any other State, district, Commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States, or within the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the Ryukyu Islands, any such copy shall be accompanied by a certificate that such custodial officer has the custody. This certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the office.

(2) Foreign. A foreign official record, or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof, or a copy thereof, attested by a person authorized to make the attestation and accompanied by a final certification as to the genuineness of the signature and official position (A) of the attesting person or (B) of any foreign official whose certificate of genuineness of signature and official position relates to the attestation or is in a chain of certificates of genuineness of signature and official position relating to the attestation. A final certification may be made by a secretary of embassy orlegation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States. If reasonable opportunity has been given to all parties to investigate the authenticity and accuracy of the documents, the court may, for good cause shown, (A) admit an attested copy without final certification or (B) permit the foreign official record to be evidenced by an attested summary with or without a final certification.

(b) Lack of Record. A written statement that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records designated by the statement, authenticated as provided in Subsection (a)(1) of this section in the case of a domestic record or complying with the requirements of Subsection (a)(2) of this section for a summary in the case of a foreign record, is admissible as evidence that the records contain no such record or entry.

(c) Other Proof. This section does not prevent the proof, by any other method authorized by law, of the existence of, or the lack of, an official record, or of entry, or lack of entry therein.

NOTE

This section is taken nearly verbatim from Mass. R. Civ. P. 44 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 40.
Section 1006. Summaries

The contents of voluminous writings or records which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a summary, chart, or the like, which accurately reflects the contents of the underlying documents. The originals, or duplicates, may be made available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.

NOTE

This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Greenberg, 339 Mass. 557, 581–582, 160 N.E.2d 181, 197 (1959), and the cases cited in Section 611(a), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Control by Court.

"[I]n a trial embracing so many details and occupying so great a length of time . . . during which a great mass of books and documents were put in evidence, concise statements of their content verified by persons who had prepared them from the originals were the only means for presenting to the jury an intelligible view of the issues involved" (quotation and citations omitted).

Id. at 582, 160 N.E.2d at 197.

Section 1007. Testimony or Written Admission of Party

The general principle, as to the production of written evidence as the best evidence, does not apply to the admissions of parties.

NOTE

ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS AND RECORDS

Section 1008. Functions of Judge and Fact Finder

Before secondary evidence of the contents of a writing or record may be admitted, the proponent must offer evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that an original once existed. If the evidence warrants such a finding, the judge must assume its existence and then determine if the original is unavailable, not through the serious fault of the proponent, and if reasonable search has been made for it. If the judge makes these findings in favor of the proponent, the judge must allow secondary evidence to establish the contents of the original writing or record. Once the secondary evidence is admitted, it is for the trier of fact to determine the weight, if any, to give the secondary evidence.

NOTE


"[T]here are no degrees in secondary evidence, so that a party authorized to resort to it is compelled to produce one class of such evidence rather than another." Commonwealth v. Smith, 151 Mass. 491, 495, 24 N.E. 677, 678 (1890).
ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS SECTIONS

Section 1101. Applicability of Evidentiary Sections

(a) Proceedings to Which Applicable. Except as provided in Subsection (c), these sections apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of the Commonwealth.

(b) Law of Privilege. The sections with respect to privileges apply at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings.

(c) Sections Inapplicable. These sections (other than those with respect to privileges) do not apply in the following situations:

1. Preliminary Determinations of Fact. The determination of questions of fact preliminary to the admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court as addressed in Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court.


3. Miscellaneous Proceedings. Most administrative proceedings; bail proceedings; bar discipline proceedings; civil motor vehicle infraction hearings; issuance of process (warrant, complaint, capias, summons); precomplaint, show cause hearings; pretrial dangerousness hearings; prison disciplinary hearings; probation violation hearings; restitution hearings; sentencing; sexual offender registry board hearings; small claims sessions; and summary contempt proceedings.

(d) Motions to Suppress. The law of evidence does not apply with full force at motion to suppress hearings. As to the determination of probable cause or the justification of government action, out-of-court statements are admissible.

NOTE


Subsection (b). Privileges are covered in Article V, Privileges and Disqualifications.

Subsection (c)(1). See Note to Section 104(a), Preliminary Questions: Determinations Made by the Court.

ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS SECTIONS

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Crim. P. 4(c) ("evidence which is not legally competent at trial is sufficient upon which to base an indictment").


This subsection identifies the various miscellaneous proceedings to which the rules of evidence are not applicable, including the following:


**Sexual Offender Registry Board Hearings.** See G. L. c. 6, § 178L(2); 803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.19(1).

**Small Claims.** See generally G. L. c. 218, §§ 21, 22.

**Summary Contempt Proceedings.** See Mass. R. Crim. P. 43.

**Subsection (d).** This subsection is derived from United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172–175 (1974), and Commonwealth v. Young, 349 Mass. 175, 179, 206 N.E.2d 694, 696 (1965). While out-of-court statements are admissible as to the determination of probable cause or the justification of government action, other evidence that would be incompetent under the rules of evidence is not admissible at suppression hearings or other proceedings in which probable cause is challenged. If a defendant testifies at a motion to suppress hearing and subsequently testifies at trial, his or her testimony from the motion to suppress hearing may be used to impeach his or her credibility at the later trial. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 425 Mass. 633, 637–638, 682 N.E.2d 636, 640–641 (1997).

Cross-Reference: Section 1112, Eyewitness Identification.
Section 1102. Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence

A judge has the discretion to impose sanctions for the spoliation or destruction of evidence, whether negligent or intentional, in the underlying action in which the evidence would have been offered.

NOTE


“Sanctions may be appropriate for the spoliation of evidence that occurs even before an action has been commenced, if a litigant or its expert knows or reasonably should know that the evidence might be relevant to a possible action. The threat of a lawsuit must be sufficiently apparent, however, that a reasonable person in the spoliator’s position would realize, at the time of spoliation, the possible importance of the evidence to the resolution of the potential dispute.” (Citations omitted.)

Kippenhan v. Chaulk Servs., Inc., 428 Mass. at 127, 697 N.E.2d at 530. “While a duty to preserve evidence does not arise automatically from a nonparty’s mere knowledge, there are ways that that duty may be imposed on a nonparty.” Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. at 548, 773 N.E.2d at 425. For example, a witness served with a subpoena duces tecum must preserve evidence in his or her control when the subpoena is received, or a third-party witness may enter into an agreement to preserve evidence. Id. at 549, 773 N.E.2d at 425.

Civil Cases. “[S]anctions for spoliation are carefully tailored to remedy the precise unfairness occasioned by that spoliation. A party’s claim of prejudice stemming from spoliation is addressed within the context of the action that was allegedly affected by that spoliation.” Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. 544, 551, 773 N.E.2d 420, 426 (2002). “As a general rule, a judge should impose the least severe sanction necessary to remedy the prejudice to the nonspoliating party.” Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 439 Mass. 223, 235, 786 N.E.2d 824, 833–834 (2003).

“[I]n a civil case, where an expert has removed an item of physical evidence and the item has disappeared, or the expert has caused a change in the substance or appearance of such an item in such circumstances that the expert knows or reasonably should know that that item in its original form may be material to litigation, the judge, at the request of a potentially prejudiced litigant, should preclude the expert from testifying as to his or her observations of such items before he or she altered them and as to any opinion based thereon. The rule should be applied without regard for whether the expert’s conduct occurred before or after the expert was retained by a party to the litigation.”


“The spectrum of remedies [also] includes allowing the party who has been aggrieved by the spoliation to present evidence about the preaccident condition of the lost evidence and the circumstances surrounding the spoliation, as well as instructing the jury on the inferences that may be drawn from spoliation” (citations
ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS SECTIONS

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omitted). Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 488, 802 N.E.2d 521, 527 (2003). A judge may preclude testimony that is dispositive of the ultimate merits of the case. Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 437 Mass. at 550, 773 N.E.2d at 426. Once the moving party produces evidence sufficient to establish that another party lost or destroyed evidence that the litigant or its expert knew or reasonably should have known might be relevant to a pending or potential case, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to prove that it was not at fault. Scott v. Garfield, 454 Mass. 790, 799, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (2009). See also Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 405 Mass. at 195, 199, 539 N.E.2d at 1020, 1022 (defendant entitled to summary judgment if excluded testimony prevents plaintiff from making prima facie case). For the extreme sanction of dismissal or entering a default judgment, ordinarily a finding of wilfulness or bad faith is necessary. Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 439 Mass. at 235–236, 786 N.E.2d at 834.

Criminal Cases. In Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414, 419, 693 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (1998), the court addressed the appropriate remedial action in criminal cases:

"[W]hen potentially exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed, a balancing test is employed to determine the appropriateness and extent of remedial action. The courts must weigh the culpability of the Commonwealth, the materiality of the evidence and the potential prejudice to the defendant. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination, that access to the [material] would have produced evidence favorable to [the defendant’s] cause." (Quotations and citation omitted.)

Section 1103. Sexually Dangerous Person Proceedings

In proceedings for the commitment or discharge of a person alleged to be a sexually dangerous person (SDP), hearsay evidence is not admissible, except as provided in Subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

(a) Hearsay That Is Admissible. Hearsay consisting of reports or records relating to a person’s criminal conviction, adjudication of juvenile delinquency or as a youthful offender, the person’s psychiatric and psychological records, and a variety of records created or maintained by the courts and other government agencies, as more particularly defined by statute, is admissible in SDP proceedings.

(b) Hearsay That May Be Admissible. In addition to hearsay admissible under Subsection (a), other hearsay may be admissible if it concerns uncharged conduct of the person and is closely related in time and circumstance to a sexual offense for which the person was convicted or adjudicated a juvenile delinquent or youthful offender.

NOTE

Introduction. A person who has been convicted of a sex offense may be confined indefinitely for treatment after the termination of the person’s criminal sentence if the person is found to be a sexually dangerous person in accordance with statutory procedures. See Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 547, 903 N.E.2d 1074, 1076–1077 (2009) (discussing G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12–14). The current Massachusetts law, G. L. c. 123A, was adopted in 1999, St. 1999, c. 74, §§ 3–8, and is the successor to an earlier statutory scheme for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons (St. 1958, c. 646) that was repealed by St. 1990, c. 150, § 304. As a result, the population of the Massachusetts Treatment Center includes persons who are confined under commitment orders made prior to 1990 and subsequent to 1999. Each population has a right to file a petition in the Superior Court each year that requires a redetermination of whether they remain sexually dangerous. See G. L. c. 123A, § 9. The law provides for trial by jury and affords the individual the right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Unless the Commonwealth proves that the person remains sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt, the person must be released. See Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. 583, 587, 593–594, 846 N.E.2d 379, 383, 387–388 (2006) (explaining the statutory procedures governing commitment and discharge under G. L. c. 123A). The criteria for commitment are set forth in the definition of a “sexually dangerous person” found in G. L. c. 123A, § 1. See Commonwealth v. Boucher, 438 Mass. 274, 275–281, 780 N.E.2d 47, 49–53 (2002). Expert witness testimony is required in order for a judge or a jury to make the determination that a person is sexually dangerous. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 511, 735 N.E.2d 1222, 1238 (2000).

"It is settled that hearsay not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence is inadmissible at the trial of a sexually dangerous person petition unless specifically made admissible by statute" (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. 331, 335, 771 N.E.2d 778, 782 (2002). Thus, the catch-all provision found in G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c) (“Any other evidence” tending to show that the person is sexually dangerous), is not interpreted to make any and all hearsay evidence admissible in SDP proceedings. McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass. 143, 147 n.2, 833 N.E.2d 1146, 1151 n.2 (2005). See also id. at 151 n.6, 833 N.E.2d at 1153 n.6 (“For example, there is no hearsay exception that would allow a party to introduce his own prior statements in the various reports and records; if offered by the petitioner, his own statements would not be the admission of a party opponent.”). It is equally settled that documents made admissible by
statute in SDP proceedings such as police reports, psychological assessments, notes about treatment, and the like, are not subject to redaction simply because they contain hearsay statements. See id. at 147–148, 151 n.6, 833 N.E.2d at 1151–1152, 1153 n.6.

“When the Legislature identified the specific records and reports that were to be admissible in sexually dangerous person proceedings, it did so with full knowledge that they routinely contain information derived from hearsay sources. Having made such records and reports ‘admissible,’ the Legislature did not intend that the documents be reduced to isolated shreds of partial information that would result from the application of hearsay rules to each individual entry in the documents.” Id. at 150, 833 N.E.2d at 1153. See also Commonwealth v. Reese, 438 Mass. 519, 527, 781 N.E.2d 1225, 1232 (2003) (G. L. c. 123A, § 14[c], does not supersede the requirements of the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule).

Miscellaneous Evidentiary Rulings. The Supreme Judicial Court and Appeals Court have addressed several other evidentiary questions that relate to these specialized proceedings. See Johnstone, petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 550, 903 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (2009) (although the annual report of the Community Access Board as to a civilly committed person’s sexual dangerousness is admissible in discharge proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, the Commonwealth cannot proceed to trial unless at least one of the two qualified examiners opines that the petitioner is a sexually dangerous person); Commonwealth v. Connors, 447 Mass. 313, 317–319, 850 N.E.2d 1038, 1041–1043 (2006) (although the allegedly sexually dangerous person has a right to refuse to speak to the qualified examiners, he or she may not offer his or her own expert testimony, based on his or her statements made to his or her own experts, while refusing to answer the questions of the qualified examiners); Commonwealth v. Nieves, 446 Mass. at 593–594, 846 N.E.2d at 387–388 (civil commitment of an incompetent person under G. L. c. 123A is not unconstitutional even though no effective treatment is available); Commonwealth v. Callahan, 440 Mass. 436, 439–442, 799 N.E.2d 113, 115–117 (2004) (G. L. c. 123A, § 13[b], which requires that certain material about a person alleged to be a sexually dangerous person be given to the qualified examiners, does not supersede the patient-psychotherapist privilege); Wyatt, petitioner, 428 Mass. 347, 355–359, 701 N.E.2d 337, 343–345 (1998) (questions concerning the relevancy and probative value of evidence offered in proceedings under G. L. c. 123A are within the discretion of the trial judge in accordance with Sections 401–403 of this Guide); Kenney, petitioner, 66 Mass. App. Ct. 709, 714–715, 799 N.E.2d 590, 596 (2006) (admissibility of juvenile court records in SDP cases); Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 287, 816 N.E.2d 152, 157–158 (2004) (if reports of qualified examiners are admitted pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 14[c], the author of the report must be made available for cross-examination).

Hearsay Evidence Excluded. Police reports and out-of-court statements of witnesses from cases in which the charges have been dismissed or nolle prossed or in which the defendant was found not guilty are not statements of “prior sexual offenses,” as set forth in G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), and thus are inadmissible as hearsay. See Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437 Mass. at 335–336, 771 N.E.2d at 781–782. However, this does not mean that the testimony of witnesses with personal knowledge of the facts in cases that were dismissed or nolle prossed cases would be inadmissible in SDP cases. See id. at 337, 771 N.E.2d at 783.

Subsection (a). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 123A, §§ 6A, 9, and 14(c). In proceedings for the initial commitment of a person under Section 12 (including the preliminary, probable cause hearing) and the discharge of committed persons under Section 9, the Legislature has removed many of the barriers against the admissibility of hearsay evidence. See G. L. c. 123A, §§ 6A, 9, 14(c). The case law has harmonized these sections so that the general rule is that hearsay admissible in a proceeding under G. L. c. 123A, § 12, is also admissible in a proceeding under Section 9. These statutory provisions permit psychiatrists or psychologists who are qualified examiners, see G. L. c. 123A, § 1, to testify as experts without an independent determination by the court that they are qualified and that their testimony meets standards of reliability under Section 702, Testimony by Experts. See Commonwealth v. Bradway, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 280, 285–289, 816 N.E.2d 152, 156–159 (2004) (admission of testimony and reports of qualified examiners as to
a person’s sexual dangerousness does not require the court to assess reliability under the standards established in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579 [1993], and *Commonwealth v. Lanigan*, 419 Mass. 15, 641 N.E.2d 1342 [1994]). Cf. *Ready, petitioner*, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 171, 172–179, 824 N.E.2d 474, 476–480 (2005) (in a Section 9 proceeding, the trial judge was correct in excluding the results of the Abel Assessment for Sexual Interest test administered by an independent expert witness for the petitioner on grounds that it was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and thus not reliable under the *Daubert-Lanigan* standard).

**Hearsay Evidence Expressly Made Admissible by Statute.** Under G. L. c. 123A, § 6A, reports by the community access board of evaluations of residents of the Massachusetts Treatment Center are admissible in proceedings for discharge under G. L. c. 123A, § 9. Under G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9 and 14(c), reports prepared by qualified examiners are admissible. The phrase “psychiatric and psychological records” in G. L. c. 123A, § 9, includes the reports prepared by psychiatrists and psychologists who have been retained as expert witnesses by the petitioner in connection with a Section 9 petition for examination and discharge. *Santos, petitioner*, 461 Mass. 565, 573, 962 N.E.2d 726, 733 (2012). The cognate phrase in G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), will be interpreted in the same manner. *Id.* at 573 n.10, 962 N.E.2d at 733 n.10. There also is a broad exemption from the hearsay rule found in G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), which states that the following records are admissible in proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 12, for the initial commitment of an offender as a sexually dangerous person:

“Juvenile and adult court probation records, psychiatric and psychological records and reports of the person named in the petition, including the report of any qualified examiner, as defined in section 1, and filed under this chapter, police reports relating to such person's prior sexual offenses, incident reports arising out of such person's incarceration or custody, oral or written statements prepared for and to be offered at the trial by the victims of the person who is the subject of the petition and any other evidence tending to show that such person is or is not a sexually dangerous person shall be admissible at the trial if such written information has been provided to opposing counsel reasonably in advance of trial.”

See also *Commonwealth v. Morales*, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 728, 730, 805 N.E.2d 1007, 1009 (2004) ("DSS reports and grand jury minutes containing information about victims of sexual offenses committed against them by a defendant convicted of those offenses are directly admissible in evidence at trials on petitions brought under G. L. c. 123A, § 14[a]"). Under G. L. c. 123A, § 9, either side may introduce in evidence the report of a qualified examiner, the petitioner’s “juvenile and adult court and probation records,” the petitioner’s “psychiatric and psychological records,” and the Department of Correction’s updated annual progress report pertaining to the petitioner. Constitutional challenges to the Legislature’s relaxation of the rule against the admissibility of hearsay in SDP cases were considered and rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court in *Commonwealth v. Given*, 441 Mass. 741, 746–748, 808 N.E.2d 788, 793–795 (2004).

**When Hearsay Evidence Is the Basis of Expert Testimony.** In *Commonwealth v. Markvart*, 437 Mass. 331, 336–339, 771 N.E.2d 778, 782–784 (2002), the Supreme Judicial Court applied *Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile*, 398 Mass. 516, 531, 499 N.E.2d 812, 820–821 (1986), see Section 703(c), Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts, and harmonized the demands of the more general law of evidence and the special statutory exemptions from the hearsay rule found in G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9 and 14(c). The Supreme Judicial Court held that in an SDP proceeding, a qualified examiner could base an expert opinion on police reports and witness statements pertaining to the sex offender even though the information is not in evidence, as long as the information could be admitted if the witnesses were called to testify. *Commonwealth v. Markvart*, 437 Mass. at 337–338, 771 N.E.2d at 783–784. Because the statutes, G. L. c. 123A, §§ 9 and 14(c), make the reports of these qualified examiners admissible, any independently admissible hearsay contained in such reports that is not admitted during the trial must be redacted from the reports before it is presented to the jury. *Id.* at 339, 771 N.E.2d at 784. The reason why redaction is required in such cases is not because the qualified examiner’s report contains hearsay within hearsay, but rather because the report is the equivalent of an expert witness’s direct testimony which cannot be used as a

Subsection (b). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Given, 441 Mass. 741, 745, 808 N.E.2d 788, 792–793 (2004). The Supreme Judicial Court explained that in proceedings under G. L. c. 123A, § 9 or § 12, G. L. c. 123A, § 14(c), makes admissible evidence of uncharged conduct when it is closely related in time and circumstance to the underlying sexual offense. Id. Cf. id. at 746 n.6, 808 N.E.2d at 793 n.6 (“We do not consider or decide whether statements in a police report that include information concerning uncharged misconduct completely unrelated in time and circumstance to the underlying sexual offense must be redacted.”).
Section 1104. Witness Cooperation Agreements

In a criminal case in which there is a written agreement between the Commonwealth and a witness in which the Commonwealth makes a promise to the witness in relation to the charges or the sentence in exchange for the testimony of the witness at trial, the use and admission of the agreement by the Commonwealth at trial is within the discretion of the trial judge subject to the following guidelines:

(a) On direct examination, the prosecution may properly bring out the fact that the witness has entered into a plea agreement and that the witness generally understands his or her obligations under it.

(b) The agreement itself is admissible. The timing of the admission of the agreement is within the judge’s discretion. The judge may defer admission of the agreement until redirect examination, after the defendant has undertaken to impeach the witness’s credibility by showing that the witness had struck a deal with the prosecution in order to obtain favorable treatment.

(c) References to a witness’s obligation to tell the truth, any certification or acknowledgment by his or her attorney, and any provision that suggest that the Commonwealth has special knowledge as to the veracity of the witness’s testimony should be redacted from the agreement, on request.

(d) Questions by the prosecutor about the duty of the witness to tell the truth and the reading of the agreement are not permitted until redirect examination and after the witness has been cross-examined on the matter.

(e) Care must be taken by the Commonwealth not to suggest, by questions or argument, that it has knowledge of the credibility of the witness independent of the evidence.

(f) The trial judge must instruct the jury by focusing their attention on the particular care they should give in evaluating testimony given pursuant to a plea agreement that is contingent on the witness’s telling the truth.

NOTE


General Application. The above guidelines also apply to nonbinding pretrial “agreements.” See Commonwealth v. Davis, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 75, 78–79 & n.7, 751 N.E.2d 420, 423 & n.7 (2001) (holding that Ciampa’s prophylactic measures are applicable in circumstances in which Commonwealth witness testified that, after he was charged with distribution of marijuana, he agreed to help police arrest others involved in illegal sale of drugs in exchange for nonspecific “consideration” from prosecution). A defendant has the right to bring to the attention of the jury any “quid pro quo” agreement between the prosecution and a testifying witness, whether formal or informal, written or unwritten. See id. at 78 n.7, 751 N.E.2d at 423 n.7; Commonwealth v. O’Neil, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 170, 179, 744 N.E.2d 86, 92 (2001).

In Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 98, 725 N.E.2d 233, 244 (2000), the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that the “better practice” is for the trial judge to include in the cautionary instruction a warning that the jury should not consider an accomplice’s guilty plea as evidence against the defendant.

An agreement that obligates a witness to testify to some particular version of the facts in exchange for a charge or sentence concession would be grounds for a motion to preclude the testimony or to strike it. See Commonwealth v. Ciampa, 406 Mass. 257, 261 n.5, 547 N.E.2d 314, 318 n.5 (1989) (“Testimony pursuant to a plea agreement made contingent on obtaining . . . a conviction, as a result of the witness’s testimony, would presumably present too great an inducement to lie, [and] would not meet the test of fundamental fairness.”). See also Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 553, 562 N.E.2d 797, 811 (1990) (“[W]e do not condone the use of agreements which do not require a witness to tell the truth. Such agreements are antithetical to the fair administration of justice. . . . [F]uture plea agreements [should] be drafted so as to make the obligation to testify truthfully clear to the witness[].”).

Cross-Reference: Section 611(b)(2), Manner and Order of Interrogation and Presentation: Scope of Cross-Examination: Bias and Prejudice.
Section 1105. Third-Party Culprit Evidence

Evidence that a third party committed the crimes charged against the defendant, or had the motive, intent, and opportunity to commit the crimes, is admissible provided that the evidence has substantial probative value. In making this determination, the court must make a preliminary finding (a) that the evidence is relevant, (b) that the evidence will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and (c) that there are other substantial connecting links between the crime charged and a third party or between the crime charged and another crime that could not have been committed by the defendant.

NOTE


In Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. 18, 22, 661 N.E.2d 56, 60 (1996), the Supreme Judicial Court observed that

"[i]f the defense offers its own theory of the case (beyond merely putting the government to its proof), its evidence must have a rational tendency to prove the issue the defense raises, and the evidence cannot be too remote or speculative. Evidence that another person committed the crime charged also poses a real threat of prejudice, especially the risk of confusing jurors by diverting their attention to wholly collateral matters involving persons not on trial."

For example, in Commonwealth v. Rosa, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the trial judge’s exclusion of so-called third-party culprit evidence consisting of the fact that there was another person awaiting trial with a record for crimes of violence and who was held in the same jail as the defendant. Id. at 24–25, 661 N.E.2d at 61. Even though this other person had been mistaken for the defendant by his lawyer and had lived in the same neighborhood as the defendant at the time of the murder, the court upheld the trial judge’s decision to exclude the evidence. The court concluded that "[w]ithout more, these are fairly common similarities that do not require the admission of evidence of similar crimes." Id. at 23, 661 N.E.2d at 60. The court contrasted Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. 264, 267, 385 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (1979), where it held that the trial judge should have admitted evidence “because there were substantial connecting links between the robbery charged and another robbery in which the defendant could not have participated.” Commonwealth v. Rosa, 422 Mass. at 23, 661 N.E.2d at 60. The court noted that in Keizer,

"[n]ot only did the two crimes share an identical modus operandi with several distinctive features, but the two robberies also had one common perpetrator (each robbery was by a team of three perpetrators). We also found distinctive a specific link between the identification testimony against the defendant and the identity of the perpetrators of the similar crime (only one witness could identify defendant, and same witness also identified common perpetrator of two crimes)."

Id. at 23, 661 N.E.2d at 60, citing Commonwealth v. Keizer, 377 Mass. at 268 n.2, 385 N.E.2d at 1004 n.2.

Constitutional Considerations. “The defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence that another may have committed the crime.” Commonwealth v. Keohane, 444 Mass. 563, 570, 829 N.E.2d 1125, 1131 (2005). State evidence rules which effectively bar the introduction of third-party culprit evidence deprive a defendant of his or her right to present a meaningful defense and violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Hearsay evidence is admissible as third-party culprit evidence even though it does not fall within a hearsay exception, but “only if, in the judge’s discretion, the evidence is otherwise relevant, will not tend to prejudice or confuse the jury, and there are other substantial connecting links to the crime.” Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801, 906 N.E.2d 299, 314 (2009), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 72, 489 N.E.2d 1233, 1239 (1986) (noting that in “rare circumstances,” the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense may require the admission of third-party culprit evidence). However, “[a] defendant has no ‘constitutional right to the admission of unreliable hearsay.’” Commonwealth v. Burnham, 451 Mass. 517, 526, 887 N.E.2d 222, 229 (2008), citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 348 Mass. 142, 156, 778 N.E.2d 885, 898 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 966 (2003). Accord Commonwealth v. Morgan, 449 Mass. 343, 358, 868 N.E.2d 99, 112 (2007) (explaining that an absent witness’s statement that a third party told her that he had shot the victim was not admissible as a statement against penal interest or as third-party culprit evidence in circumstances in which the third party denied making the statement when interviewed by the police and where there was no corroboration). Hearsay evidence which does not qualify as third-party culprit evidence may nonetheless be admissible for a different but related purpose of establishing the inadequacy of the police investigation. See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802, 906 N.E.2d at 315 (explaining that based on the reasoning in Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486, 399 N.E.2d 482, 491 (1980), “information regarding a third-party culprit, whose existence was known to the police but whose potential involvement was never investigated, may be admissible under a Bowden defense even though it may not otherwise be admissible under a third-party culprit defense”). Before such evidence is admitted, the judge should conduct a voir dire to determine whether the third-party culprit evidence was provided to the police and whether its admission would be more prejudicial than probative. Id., at 802–803, 906 N.E.2d at 315–316.

Section 1106. Abuse Prevention Act Proceedings

In all civil proceedings under the Abuse Prevention Act, G. L. c. 209A, the rules of evidence should be applied flexibly by taking into consideration the personal and emotional nature of the issues involved, whether one or both of the parties is self-represented, and the need for fairness to all parties.

NOTE


"[First, t]he burden is on the complainant to establish facts justifying the issuance and continuance of an abuse prevention order. The court must on request grant a defendant an opportunity to be heard on the question of continuing the temporary order and of granting other relief. That opportunity, however, places no burden on a defendant to testify or to present evidence. The defendant need only appear at the hearing.” (Quotation omitted.)


Second, the plaintiff's burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 597, 651 N.E.2d at 1210.

Third, an adverse inference can be drawn by the court from the defendant’s failure to testify in a G. L. c. 209A proceeding. The fact that the defendant may refuse to testify on the ground of self-incrimination does not bar the taking of an adverse inference. However, the adverse inference alone is not sufficient to justify the issuance of an abuse prevention order. Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596, 651 N.E.2d at 1210. See also Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 523 n.1, 658 N.E.2d 677, 680 n.1 (1995) (a judge may not issue a restraining order "simply because it seems to be a good idea or because it will not cause the defendant any real inconvenience"). The plaintiff is still permitted to call the defendant as a witness even though the defendant is able to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. S.T. v. E.M., 80 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 429, 953 N.E.2d 269, 274–275 (2011).

Fourth, “[b]ecause a G. L. c. 209A proceeding is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding, the constitutional right to confront witnesses and to cross-examine them set forth in art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights has no application.” Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596 n.3, 651 N.E.2d at 1210 n.3.

Sixth, with respect to cross-examination, “[t]he judge’s discretion in restricting cross-examination may not be unlimited in particular situations.” Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 598 n.5, 651 N.E.2d at 1211 n.5. The Supreme Judicial Court cautioned against “the use of cross examination for harassment or discovery purposes. However, each side must be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the other’s evidence.” Id. See C.O. v. M.M., 442 Mass. at 656–658, 815 N.E.2d at 589–591 (defendant’s due process rights were violated when the court refused to permit him to cross-examine witnesses or to present evidence).

Section 1107. Inadequate Police Investigation Evidence

Evidence that certain tests were not conducted, that certain police procedures were not followed, or that certain information known to the police about another suspect was not investigated, in circumstances in which it was reasonable to expect that the police should have conducted such tests, followed such procedures, or investigated such information, is admissible.

NOTE

This section is derived from Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472, 486, 399 N.E.2d 482, 491 (1980), and cases cited. See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 801, 906 N.E.2d 299, 314 (2009) (“[T]he inference that may be drawn from an inadequate police investigation is that the evidence at trial may be inadequate or unreliable because the police failed to conduct the scientific tests or to pursue leads that a reasonable police investigation would have conducted or investigated, and these tests or investigation reasonably may have led to significant evidence of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”); Commonwealth v. Phinney, 446 Mass. 155, 165, 843 N.E.2d 1024, 1033 (2006) (“Defendants have the right to base their defense on the failure of police adequately to investigate a murder in order to raise the issue of reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt . . . .”). See also Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 857–860, 920 N.E.2d 845, 859–862 (2010) (in a prosecution for attempted rape in which the defendant, a convict on work release, sought to demonstrate misidentification based on an inadequate police investigation because the police did not investigate three other Housing Authority employees who were on duty at the time who had criminal histories, it was error to refuse to permit the defense to question the police about their knowledge of the criminal histories of these employees).

The admission of Bowden evidence does not require the trial judge to give a special instruction to the jury. Instead, the judge is simply required not to take the issue of the adequacy of the police investigation away from the jury. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 687, 790 N.E.2d 662, 669 (2003).

The Bowden defense “is a two-edged sword for the defendant, because it opens the door for the Commonwealth to offer evidence explaining why the police did not follow the line of investigation suggested by the defense” (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 803 n.25, 906 N.E.2d at 315 n.25. “[T]he more wide-ranging the defendant’s attack on the police investigation, the broader the Commonwealth’s response may be.” Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 754–755, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 (2009) (“Here, the Bowden claim was an expansive one, calling into question police competence and judgment about both the leads that were not pursued and those that were. In response, the Commonwealth was entitled to elicit testimony about why the investigators chose the particular investigative path they did . . . .”).

Under a Bowden defense, information regarding a third-party culprit whose existence was known to the police but whose potential involvement was never investigated may be admissible to prove that the police knew of the possible suspect and failed to take reasonable steps to investigate the suspect. This information is not hearsay because it is not offered to show the truth of the matter asserted, but simply to show that the information was provided to the police. Therefore, it need not meet the standard set to admit hearsay evidence regarding a third-party culprit, including the substantial connecting links. See Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 429 Mass. 388, 391–392, 708 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1999) (police detective could testify to what confidential informants had told him about suspect’s motive and opportunity to kill the victim, despite the confidential informants’ potential lack of firsthand knowledge). There is a lessened risk of prejudice to the Commonwealth from the admission of evidence of a Bowden defense because the police are able to explain what they did to determine that the suspect was not guilty of the crime. See id., at 391 n.1, 708 N.E.2d at 662 n.1. In contrast to the third-party culprit defense, where evidence may be admitted regardless of whether the police knew of the suspect, third-party culprit information is admissible under
a Bowden defense only if the police had learned of it during the investigation and failed to reasonably act on the information. Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 802–803, 906 N.E.2d at 315. The judge would first need to conduct a voir dire hearing to determine whether the third-party culprit information had been furnished to the police, and whether the probative weight of the Bowden evidence exceeded the risk of unfair prejudice to the Commonwealth from diverting the jury’s attention to collateral matters. Id. at 803, 906 N.E.2d at 315.

Cross-Reference: Section 1105, Third-Party Culprit Evidence.
Section 1108. Access to Third-Party Records Prior to Trial in Criminal Cases (Lampron-Dwyer Protocol)

(a) Filing and Service of the Motion.

(1) Whenever in a criminal case a party seeks to summons books, papers, documents, or other objects (records) from any nonparty individual or entity prior to trial, the party shall file a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), stating the name and address of the custodian of the records (record holder) and the name, if any, of the person who is the subject of the records (third-party subject), for example, a complainant, and describing, as precisely as possible, the records sought. The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit as required by Mass. R. Crim. P. 13(a)(2) and Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 806 N.E.2d 72 (2004) (Lampron).

(2) The moving party shall serve the motion and affidavit on all parties.

(3) The Commonwealth shall forward copies of the motion and affidavit to the record holder and (where applicable) to the third-party subject, and notify them of the date and place of the hearing on the motion. The Commonwealth shall also inform the record holder and third-party subject that (i) the Lampron hearing shall proceed even if either of them is absent; (ii) the hearing shall be the third-party subject’s only opportunity to address the court; (iii) any statutory privilege applicable to the records sought shall remain in effect unless and until the third-party subject affirmatively waives any such privilege, and that failure to attend the hearing shall not constitute a waiver of any such privilege; and (iv) if the third-party subject is the victim in the case, he or she has the opportunity to confer with the prosecutor prior to the hearing.

(b) The Lampron Hearing and Findings.

(1) A party moving to summons documents pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) prior to trial must establish good cause by showing (i) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (ii) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (iii) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial, and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and (iv) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general fishing expedition.

(2) At the Lampron hearing, the judge shall hear from all parties, the record holder, and the third-party subject, if present. The record holder and third-party subject shall be heard on whether the records sought are relevant or statutorily privileged.

(3) Following the Lampron hearing, and in the absence of having reviewed the records, the judge shall make oral or written findings with respect to the records sought from each record holder indicating (i) that the party seeking the records has or has not satisfied the requirements of Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2), and (ii) that the records sought are or are not presumptively
privileged. A judge’s determination that any records sought are presumptively privileged shall not be appealable as an interlocutory matter and shall carry no weight in any subsequent challenge that a record is in fact not privileged.

(c) Summons and Notice to Record Holder.

(1) If all Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) requirements have been met and there has been a finding that the records sought are not presumptively privileged or the third-party subject has waived all applicable statutory privileges, the judge shall order a summons to issue directing the record holder to produce all responsive records to the applicable clerk of the court on the return date stated in the summons. The clerk shall maintain the records in a location separate from the court file, and the records shall be made available for inspection by counsel, as provided in Subsection (d)(1) below. The records shall not be made available for public inspection unless and until any record is filed in connection with a proceeding in the case or introduced in evidence at the trial.

(2) Where a judge has determined that some or all of the requested records are presumptively privileged, the summons shall so inform the record holder and shall order the record holder to produce such records to the clerk of the court in a sealed envelope or box marked “PRIVILEGED,” with the name of the record holder, the case name and docket number, and the return date specified on the summons. The clerk shall maintain the records in a location separate from the court file, clearly designated “presumptively privileged records,” and the records shall not be available for inspection except by counsel as provided in Subsection (d)(2). The records shall not be made available for public inspection unless and until any record is introduced in evidence at trial.

(d) Inspection of Records.

(1) Nonpresumptively Privileged Records. The clerk of court shall permit counsel who obtained the summons to inspect and copy all records that are not presumptively privileged. When the defendant is the moving party, the Commonwealth’s ability to inspect or copy the records is within a judge’s discretion.

(2) Presumptively Privileged Records.

(A) The clerk of court shall permit only defense counsel who obtained the summons to inspect the records, and only on counsel’s signing and filing a protective order in a form approved by the court. The protective order shall provide that any violation of its terms and conditions shall be reported to the Board of Bar Overseers by anyone aware of such violation.

(B) [The Supreme Judicial Court has not reached the issue of whether the procedures governing defense counsel’s review of presumptively privileged records also apply to the Commonwealth.]

(e) Challenge to Privilege Designation.
(1) If, on inspection of the records, defense counsel believes that any record or portion thereof is in fact not privileged, then in lieu of or in addition to a motion to disclose or introduce at trial (see Subsections (f) and (g) below), counsel may file a motion to release specified records or portions thereof from the terms of the protective order.

(2) Defense counsel shall provide notice of the motion to all parties. Prior to the hearing, counsel for the Commonwealth shall be permitted to review such records in order to respond to the motion, subject to signing and filing a protective order as provided in Subsection (d)(2) above.

(3) If a judge determines that any record or portion thereof is not privileged, the record shall be released from the terms of the protective order and may be inspected and copied as provided in Subsection (d)(1) above.

(f) Disclosure of Presumptively Privileged Records.

(1) If defense counsel who obtained the summons believes that the copying or disclosure of some or all of any presumptively privileged record to other persons (for example, the defendant, an investigator, an expert) is necessary to prepare the case for trial, counsel shall file a motion to modify the protective order to permit copying or disclosure of particular records to specifically named individuals. The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit explaining with specificity the reason why copying or disclosure is necessary; the motion and the affidavit shall not disclose the content of any presumptively privileged record. Counsel shall provide notice of the motion to all parties.

(2) Following a hearing, and in camera inspection of the records by the judge where necessary, a judge may allow the motion only on making oral or written findings that the copying or disclosure is necessary for the defendant to prepare adequately for trial. The judge shall consider alternatives to full disclosure, including agreed to stipulations or disclosure of redacted portions of the records. Before disclosure is made to any person specifically authorized by the judge, that person shall sign a copy of the court order authorizing disclosure. This court order shall clearly state that a violation of its terms shall be punishable as criminal contempt.

(3) All copies of any documents covered by a protective order shall be returned to the court on resolution of the case, i.e., on a change of plea or at the conclusion of any direct appeal following a trial or dismissal of the case.

(g) Use of Presumptively Privileged Records at Trial.

(1) A defendant seeking to introduce at trial some or all of any presumptively privileged record shall file a motion in limine at or before any final pretrial conference.

(2) Counsel for the Commonwealth shall be permitted to review enough of the presumptively privileged records to be able to respond adequately to the motion in limine, subject to signing and filing a protective order as provided in Subsection (d)(2) above.
(3) The judge may allow the motion only on making oral or written findings that introduction at trial of a presumptively privileged record is necessary for the moving defendant to obtain a fair trial. Before permitting the introduction in evidence of such records, the judge shall consider alternatives to introduction, including an agreed to stipulation or introduction of redacted portions of the records.

(h) Preservation of Records for Appeal. Records produced in response to a Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) summons shall be retained by the clerk of court until the conclusion of any direct appeal following a trial or dismissal of a case.

NOTE

Introduction. In criminal cases, pretrial discovery is limited to information and objects in the possession or control of the parties and is governed principally by Mass. R. Crim. P. 14. When a party seeks access in advance of trial to books, papers, documents, or objects (records, privileged or nonprivileged) that are in the hands of a third party, such requests are governed by Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). Commonwealth v. Odgren, 455 Mass. 171, 186–187, 915 N.E.2d 215, 227 (2009) (both prosecutor and defense counsel must follow the procedures contained in Mass. R. Crim. P. 17 and obtain prior judicial approval to obtain access before trial to any records in the hands of a third party, whether privileged or not). See Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 268, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76 (2004). See also Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 243, 246, 914 N.E.2d 904, 914–915 (2009) (Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) is the exclusive method to obtain records from a third party prior to trial). When Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) has been satisfied and a nonparty has produced records to the court, the protocol set forth in Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 139–147, 859 N.E.2d 400, 414–420 (2006), governs review or disclosure of presumptively privileged records by defense counsel. To reference the forms promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court, see http://www.mass.gov/courts/formsandguidelines/dwyerforms.html.

At trial, a defendant seeking records must proceed under Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). The Commonwealth may proceed under either Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) or G. L. c. 277, § 68. See Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. at 243, 914 N.E.2d at 914–915 (a subpoena issued under G. L. c. 277, § 68, may only request a third party to produce records to a court on the day of the trial).


Subsection (b). This subsection is derived generally from Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 268, 806 N.E.2d 72, 76 (2004), and Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 148, 859 N.E.2d 400, 420 (2006). “The Commonwealth’s inability to locate either the record holder or the third-party subject shall not delay the Lampron hearing.” Id. at 148 n.2, 859 N.E.2d at 420 n.2.

In Commonwealth v. Lampron, 441 Mass. 265, 806 N.E.2d 72 (2004), the Supreme Judicial Court followed Federal law as enunciated in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 699–700 (1974), and held that a party moving to summons documents pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) prior to trial must establish good cause by showing the following:

“(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial; and
(4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general 'fishing expedition.'”


“Presumptively privileged records are those prepared in circumstances suggesting that some or all of the records sought are likely protected by a statutory privilege, for example, a record prepared by one who holds himself or herself out as a psychotherapist, see G. L. c. 233, § 20B; a social worker, see G. L. c. 112, § 135B; a sexual assault counsellor, see G. L. c. 233, § 20J; or a domestic violence victims’ counsellor, see G. L. c. 233, § 20K.”

Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 148, 859 N.E.2d at 420. Because the judge will not have viewed any of the records sought by the defendant, “the judge shall make such determination based on the identity of the record holder or record preparer (if known) and any additional information adduced at the Lampron hearing. The defendant shall have the burden of showing that records are not presumptively privileged.” Id. at 148 n.3, 859 N.E.2d at 421 n.3.


“Some records, although not presumptively privileged, may contain information of a personal or confidential nature, such as medical or school records. See, e.g., G. L. c. 71B, § 3 (special education records); G. L. c. 111, §§ 70, 70E (hospital records). The judge may, in his or her discretion, order such records produced subject to an appropriate protective order.” Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 149 n.5, 859 N.E.2d at 421 n.5.

Subsection (d). This subsection is derived generally from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 149, 859 N.E.2d 400, 421–422 (2006). A judge may order that even nonpresumptively privileged records be subject to an appropriate protective order. Id. at 149 n.5, 859 N.E.2d at 421 n.5 (Appendix).

“The Commonwealth may inspect or copy any records if prior consent is given by the record holder and third-party subject (where applicable).” Id. at 149 n.7, 859 N.E.2d at 421 n.7. With respect to nonpresumptively privileged records, Subsection (d)(1), a party may have production obligations pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 or other pretrial agreements. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 444 Mass. 786, 800, 831 N.E.2d 890, 900 (2005).

Subsection (e). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 149–150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 422 (2006).

Subsection (f). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 422 (2006).

Subsection (g). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 422–423 (2006).

Subsection (h). This subsection is taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 150, 859 N.E.2d 400, 423 (2006).
Section 1109. View

(a) Availability.

(1) Upon motion in civil and criminal cases, the court has discretion to allow the jury, accompanied by the judge, or, in a matter tried without a jury, the judge to take a view of the premises or place in question or any property matter or thing relative to the case.

(2) In a limited class of civil cases, a party has the right, upon request, to a view.

(b) Conduct. Counsel may point out the essential features of the place or thing that is the subject of the view, but no comment or discussion is permitted. No witnesses are heard. Jurors are not permitted to ask questions.

(c) Status. Observations made by the jury or by the judge on a view may be used by the finder of fact in making a decision.

(d) Costs. In a civil case, the expenses of taking a view shall be paid by the party who makes the motion or in accordance with an agreement between or among some or all of the parties, and may be taxed as costs if the party or parties who advanced them prevails. In a criminal case, the expenses of taking a view shall be paid by the Commonwealth.

NOTE

Subsection (a)(1). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Gedzium, 259 Mass. 453, 462, 156 N.E. 890, 893 (1927); Madden v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 284 Mass. 490, 493–494, 188 N.E. 234, 236 (1933); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 201–202, 944 N.E.2d 1007, 1013–1014 (2011); and G. L. c. 234, § 35. In the administrative context, the judge or fact finder also may have the right to conduct a view. See, e.g., G. L. c. 152, § 2 (Authority of the Division of Industrial Accidents to “make all necessary inspections and investigations relating to causes of injuries for which compensation may be claimed . . . .”). Ordinarily a view is taken after the jury is sworn but before the evidence is taken. However, the court has discretion to take a view after the evidence begins and at any time during the trial. See Yore v. City of Newton, 194 Mass. 250, 253, 80 N.E. 472, 472 (1907) (court permitted jury to take a view after deliberations had begun).

The court may exercise its discretion to deny a motion for a view when visiting a particular location would not fairly represent the way it appeared or the conditions that existed at the time of the events that are the subject of the trial. See Commonwealth v. Cataldo, 423 Mass. 318, 327 n.8, 668 N.E.2d 762, 767 n.8 (1996). However, even though the appearance of premises or a thing has changed, if the premises or thing in its altered condition would be helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence the court has discretion to permit a view. See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 401–402, 55 N.E.2d 902, 912 (1944) (there was no error in permitting the jury to take a view of a nightclub after a fire had severely damaged it and caused the death of numerous persons who were trapped inside). The court may deny a motion for a view because it will not contribute to the jury’s understanding of the evidence at trial. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680, 704–705, 393 N.E.2d 820, 835, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 847 (1979).

Subsection (a)(2). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 80, § 9 (betterment assessments); G. L. c. 79, § 22 (eminent domain); and G. L. c. 253, § 7 (mill flowage).

Neither the State nor the Federal Constitution gives the defendant in a criminal case a right to be present at a view. If a view is taken in a criminal case, it is within the judge’s discretion to allow the defendant to be present. Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 402–403, 917 N.E.2d 191, 204 (2009) (“We have held repeatedly that a defendant does not have a right to be present during a jury view under either the Sixth or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights” [citation and quotations omitted].) See also Commonwealth v. Mack, 423 Mass. 288, 291, 667 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1996) (“The judge gave the defendant the option of attending the jury’s view of the crime scene if the defendant was in a police car and some distance away from the jury. After consultation with trial counsel, the defendant decided not to participate in the view.”); Commonwealth v. Gagliardi, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 225, 237, 559 N.E.2d 1234, 1243 (1990) (“[A] defendant should not assume that the judge will permit his attendance and show up without prior permission. A defendant is not entitled of right to confer with his counsel during a view.”).

Subsection (c). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Curry, 368 Mass. 195, 330 N.E.2d 819 (1975), where the Supreme Judicial Court stated that

“[t]he chief purpose (of a view) is to enable the jury to understand better the testimony which has or may be introduced. The function of the jury . . . is simply to observe. Although what is seen on the view may be used by the jury in reaching their verdict, in a strict and narrow sense a view may be thought not to be evidence.” (Citations omitted.)

Id. at 197–198, 330 N.E.2d at 821. See also Berlandi v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 424, 451, 50 N.E.2d 210, 226 (1943) (“A view is not technically evidence and subject to all the principles applicable to evidence . . . [but] it inevitably has the effect of evidence” [citations and quotation omitted].); Commonwealth v. Perryman, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 187, 193–194 n.1, 770 N.E.2d 1, 6 n.1 (2002) (a view is analogous to a courtroom demonstration or the use of a chalk; observations made on a view can be used “to illustrate testimony and assist the jury in weighing the evidence they hear” so long as the conditions are similar to the circumstances of the matter to be proved).

Subsection (d). This subsection is derived from G. L. c. 234, § 35.
Section 1110. Consciousness of Guilt or Liability

(a) Criminal Cases. In a criminal case, the Commonwealth may offer evidence of a defendant’s conduct that occurred subsequent to the commission of the crime if

1. the evidence reflects a state of consciousness of guilt;
2. the evidence supports the inference that the defendant committed the act charged;
3. the evidence is, with other evidence, together with reasonable inferences, sufficient to prove guilt; and
4. the inflammatory nature of the conduct does not substantially outweigh its probative value.

Evidence of consciousness of guilt alone is not sufficient to support a verdict or finding of guilt. The judge should instruct the jury accordingly.

(b) Civil Cases. Subject to Sections 407–411, in a civil case, a party may offer evidence of another party’s conduct that occurred subsequent to the commission of the alleged act or acts that give rise to the cause of action if the evidence

1. reflects a state of consciousness of liability of that party;
2. supports the inference that the party against whom the evidence is offered is liable; and
3. is, with other evidence, together with reasonable inferences, sufficient to prove liability.

Evidence of consciousness of liability alone cannot sustain the burden to establish liability. The judge should instruct the jury accordingly.

(c) Rebuttal. The party against whom the evidence is offered has the right to offer evidence explaining the reason or reasons for the conduct to negate any adverse inference.

NOTE


Illustrations. The following conduct may be offered as evidence of consciousness of guilt:

1. flight itself, regardless of whether the police were actively searching for the defendant, Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 451 Mass. 566, 579, 887 N.E.2d 1040, 1050 (2008);
2. flight after discovery by the party that he or she was about to be arrested or charged with an offense, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 391 Mass. 749, 758, 464 N.E.2d 946, 952 (1984);
– flight from a defendant’s “usual environs,” Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 Mass. 535, 553, 953 N.E.2d 139, 157 (2011);
– an intentionally false statement made before or after arrest, Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 410 Mass. 641, 649–650, 574 N.E.2d 1000, 1006 (1991);
– intentional attempts to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or bribe a witness, Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. at 423, 910 N.E.2d at 347; Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584 n.4, 433 N.E.2d 425, 431 n.4 (1982);
– alteration of a defendant’s appearance after a crime to conceal physical tics, Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. at 277, 552 N.E.2d at 567; or

The following conduct should not be admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt:
– flight, where the issue is misidentification and there is no dispute that the person who fled the scene committed the offense, Commonwealth v. Pina, 430 Mass. 266, 272–273, 717 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 (1999);
– evidence that the defendant lied during trial testimony, Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 390 Mass. 103, 110, 453 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (1983) (disfavoring such evidence; “[c]omment to a jury on the consequences of a criminal defendant’s lying in the course of his testimony must be made with care, and customarily should be avoided because it places undue emphasis on only one aspect of the evidence”);


**Jury Instruction on Evidence of Consciousness of Guilt.** If evidence of consciousness of guilt is admitted, the court should instruct the jury (1) that they are not to convict the defendant on the basis of the offered evidence alone, and (2) that they may, but need not, consider such evidence as one of the factors tending to prove the guilt of the defendant. Upon request, the jury must be further instructed (1) that the conduct does not necessarily reflect feelings of guilt, since there are numerous reasons why an innocent person might engage in the conduct alleged, and (2) that even if the conduct demonstrates feelings of guilt, it does not necessarily mean that the defendant is guilty in fact, because guilty feelings are sometimes present in innocent people. See Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584–585, 433 N.E.2d 425,

Cross-Reference: Section 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements; Section 1102, Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence.


Illustrations. The following conduct may be offered as evidence of consciousness of liability:

- providing false or inconsistent statements, McNamara v. Honeymon, 406 Mass. 43, 54 n.10, 546 N.E.2d 139, 146 n.10 (1989);
- leaving the scene of an accident without identifying himself or herself, Olofson v. Kilgallon, 362 Mass. 803, 806, 291 N.E.2d 600, 602–603 (1973);
- providing a false name or statement to police, Parsons v. Ryan, 340 Mass. 245, 248, 163 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1960);
- providing intentionally false testimony, Sheehan v. Goriansky, 317 Mass. 10, 16–17, 56 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1944);
- transferring property immediately prior to the beginning of litigation, Credit Serv. Corp. v. Barker, 308 Mass. 476, 481, 33 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1941);
- suborning a witness to provide false testimony, bribing a juror, or suppressing evidence, Bennett v. Susser, 191 Mass. 329, 331, 77 N.E. 884, 885 (1906); or

Cross-Reference: Section 407, Subsequent Remedial Measures; Section 408, Compromise and Offers to Compromise in Civil Cases; Section 409, Expressions of Sympathy in Civil Cases; Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses; Section 410, Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements; Section 411, Insurance; Section 1102, Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence.

Jury Instruction on Evidence of Consciousness of Liability. Upon request, the judge should instruct the jury that they may, but are not required to, draw an inference; that any such inference must be reasonable in light of all the circumstances; that the weight of the evidence is for the jury to decide; that there may be innocent explanations for the conduct; and that the conduct does not necessarily reflect feelings of liability or responsibility. See Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584–585, 433 N.E.2d 425, 432 (1982) (it was for jury to decide which explanation for defendant’s departure from scene was most credible). See also Sheehan v. Goriansky, 317 Mass. 10, 16–17, 56 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1944) (whether evidence of defendant’s conduct indicated consciousness of liability was for jury to decide); Hall v. Shain, 291 Mass. 506, 512, 197 N.E. 437, 440 (1935) (jury to decide whether driver’s failure to contact police after accident was because of consciousness of liability).
Section 1111. Missing Witness

(a) Argument by Counsel. Counsel is not permitted to make a missing-witness argument without first obtaining judicial approval; if approval is granted, the court must give a missing witness instruction.

(b) Jury Instruction. The court may instruct the jury that an adverse inference may be drawn from a party’s failure to call a witness when

(1) the witness is shown to be available;

(2) the witness is friendly, or at least not hostile, to the party;

(3) the witness is expected to give noncumulative testimony of distinct importance to the case; and

(4) there is no logical or tactical explanation for the failure to call the witness.

NOTE


In Commonwealth v. Saletino, 449 Mass. 657, 871 N.E.2d 455 (2007), the Supreme Judicial Court explained the critical distinction between argument by counsel that the evidence is insufficient, and the missing witness argument:

“...A defendant has wide latitude in every case to argue that the Commonwealth has failed to present sufficient evidence and, in this sense, that there is an ‘absence’ of proof or that evidence is ‘missing.’ That is distinctly different from a missing witness argument, however. In the former, the defendant argues that the evidence that has been produced is inadequate; the defendant may even legitimately point out that a specific witness or specific evidence has not been produced; but the defendant does not argue or ask the jury to draw any conclusions as to the substance of the evidence that has not been produced. In the latter, the defendant points an accusatory finger at the Commonwealth for not producing the missing witness and urges the jury to conclude affirmatively that the missing evidence would have been unfavorable to the Commonwealth. That is the essence of the adverse inference.”

Id. at 672, 871 N.E.2d at 467–468. Accord Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 Mass. at 17, 913 N.E.2d at 828.

The instruction permits the jury, “if they think reasonable in the circumstances, [to] infer that the person, had he been called, would have given testimony unfavorable to the party.” Id.

Whether to allow argument and give a missing witness instruction is within the discretion of the trial judge, even when the foundation requirements are met. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 151, 706 N.E.2d 669, 673 (1999). It is a highly fact-specific decision, and it cannot be insisted on as a matter of right. Id. “Because the inference, when it is made, can have a seriously adverse effect on the noncalling party—suggesting, as it does, that the party has willfully attempted to withhold or conceal significant evidence—it should be invited only in clear cases, and with caution.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Mass. 894, 900–901, 882 N.E.2d 850, 856 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Schatvet, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 134, 499 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 (1986). If the instruction is given, the court must take care not to negate its effect by instructing the jury not to consider anything beyond the evidence actually introduced at trial. See Commonwealth v. Remedor, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 694, 701, 756 N.E.2d 606, 612 (2001).

**Foundation for the Instruction.** In Commonwealth v. Broomhead, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 855 N.E.2d 413 (2006), the court stated as follows:

> "In order to determine whether there has been a sufficient foundation for a missing witness instruction, we look at (1) whether the case against the defendant is [so strong that,] faced with the evidence, the defendant would be likely to call the missing witness if innocent; (2) whether the evidence to be given by the missing witness is important, central to the case, or just collateral or cumulative; (3) whether the party who fails to call the witness has superior knowledge of the whereabouts of the witness; and (4) whether the party has a ‘plausible reason’ for not producing the witness."

Id. at 552, 855 N.E.2d at 418, quoting Commonwealth v. Alves, 50 Mass. App. Ct. 796, 802, 741 N.E.2d 473, 480 (2001). Even where the foundational requirements are met, the judge has discretion to decline to give the instruction and refuse to permit the argument if the judge finds that an adverse inference is not warranted. Commonwealth v. Pena, 455 Mass. 1, 17 n.15, 913 N.E. 2d 815, 828 n.15 (2009).


A missing witness instruction is not warranted where a witness is equally available to both sides. Commonwealth v. Cobb, 397 Mass. 105, 108, 489 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (1986). For example, in Commonwealth v. Hoilett, 430 Mass. 369, 376, 719 N.E.2d 488, 494 (1999), the court ruled the instruction was not warranted because both sides had the same contact information for a witness who was not aligned with either side. The instruction may properly be given where the missing witness is more friendly to one side than the other, even if the witness was available to the party requesting the instruction. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 429 Mass. 146, 151–152, 706 N.E.2d 669, 674 (1999). See also Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 434 Mass. 624, 641, 751 N.E.2d 848, 862 (2001) (defendant corporation’s vice president not absent where plaintiff could have subpoenaed him to testify).

**Is the “Missing Witness” Friendly, or At Least Not Hostile, to the Party?** “The jury should ordinarily be instructed not to draw inferences from the neglect of a defendant to call witnesses, unless it appears to be within his power to call others than himself, and unless the evidence against him is so strong that, if innocent, he would be expected to call them.” Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass. 162, 167, 19 N.E. 215, 217–218 (1889). See Commonwealth v. Rollins, 441 Mass. 114, 118–119, 803 N.E.2d 1256, 1259–1260


Criminal Cases. The judge must inform the jury in a criminal case that they may not draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s failure to call a witness unless and until they find beyond a reasonable doubt that if the witness had been called he or she would have given testimony unfavorable to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 Mass. 513, 522, 404 N.E.2d 643, 648 (1980). The inference may also be applied to a situation where evidence is “missing.” See Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 558, 870 N.E.2d 57, 65–66 (2007).

Cross-Reference: Section 1102, Spoliation or Destruction of Evidence.
Section 1112. Eyewitness Identification

(a) Eyewitness Identification Generally. An identification by an eyewitness is generally admissible unless the identification is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.

(b) Photographic Array.

(1) Suppression of Identification. Identification based on a pretrial photographic procedure is not subject to suppression unless the procedures employed in showing the photographic array were unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification. In making this ruling, the trial judge should consider

(A) whether the police properly informed the party making the identification that (1) the wrongdoer may or may not be in the depicted photographs, (2) it is just as important to clear a person from suspicion as to identify a person as the wrongdoer, (3) the depicted individuals may not appear exactly as they did on the date of the incident because features such as weight and head and facial hair may change, and (4) the investigation will continue regardless of whether an identification is made;

(B) whether the party making the identification was asked to state how certain he or she is of any identification;

(C) whether the array was composed of persons who possess reasonably similar features and characteristics; and

(D) whether the array contained at least five fillers for every photograph of the suspect.

(2) Suggestive Identification. If the trial judge finds that the procedures employed in the showing of the photographic array were so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to mistaken identity as to deny the defendant due process of law, the Commonwealth may offer evidence of the identification only if it establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the proffered identification has a source independent of the suggestive photographic array.

(3) Admissibility of Photographs. Police photographs used in an out-of-court identification may be admitted if (A) the prosecution demonstrates some need for their introduction, (B) the photographs are offered in a form that does not imply a prior criminal record, and (C) the manner of their introduction does not call attention to their source.

(c) Showup Identification. Showup identifications are generally disfavored. However, for good cause shown, the trial judge may admit evidence of such an identification if the showup was not unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive. This determination involves an inquiry of whether the Commonwealth has shown that police had good cause to use a one-on-one identification procedure and whether police avoided any special elements of unfairness.

(d) Subsequent and In-Court Identification. If an out-of-court identification has been excluded as unnecessarily suggestive, a subsequent in-court identification may be admissible if the trial
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judge finds that the in-court identification is based on an independent source unrelated to the unnecessarily suggestive identification.

(e) Testimony of Third-Party Observer. If the eyewitness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, a third party who observed the eyewitness’s out-of-court identification may testify about that identification (1) where the eyewitness cannot identify a defendant at trial but acknowledges having made an out-of-court identification of the defendant, or (2) where the eyewitness denies or fails to remember having made an identification. The third party’s testimony about the out-of-court identification is admissible as substantive evidence.

(f) Expert Testimony. Expert testimony on the issue of eyewitness identification is admissible at the discretion of the trial judge.

NOTE

Introduction. The Supreme Judicial Court’s Study Group on Eyewitness Identification, appointed to offer guidance as to how the courts can most effectively deter unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures and minimize the risk of wrongful convictions, anticipates reporting to the Justices during 2013. The Study Group’s recommendations and any action taken by the Justices will be available on the court’s Web site at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc.


In considering whether identification testimony should be suppressed, the judge must examine the totality of the circumstances attending the confrontation to determine whether it was unnecessarily suggestive. Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 795, 906 N.E.2d at 310. Factors to be considered in determining whether an identification is made independent of suggestiveness include (1) the extent of a witness’s opportunity to observe the defendant at the time of the crime; (2) past errors of description in identifying another person, or failing to identify the defendant; (3) the receipt of other suggestions; and (4) the lapse of time between the crime and the identification. Commonwealth v. Williams, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 144 n.4, 788 N.E.2d 580, 585 n.4 (2003). It is important to allow inquiry on cross-examination to examine fully the totality of circumstances surrounding the identification. Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 372 Mass. 783, 789, 386 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (1977). A recording of the identification procedure is not required as a condition of admissibility. Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. at 799, 906 N.E.2d at 313.

Where an identification is challenged as unreliable due to distance, lighting, brevity of the observation, or emotional state of the eyewitness, the question is one of the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. Commonwealth v. Walker, 460 Mass. 590, 606–607, 953 N.E.2d 195, 210 (2011).


Subsection (b)(1)(A). This subsection is derived from *Commonwealth v. Walker*, 460 Mass. 590, 600, 953 N.E.2d 195, 205–206 (2011), making mandatory the protocol adopted in *Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago*, 453 Mass. 782, 797–798, 906 N.E.2d 299, 312 (2009). While the Supreme Judicial Court has not yet required a double-blind procedure where the identification procedure is conducted by a law enforcement officer who does not know the identity of the suspect, it has recognized that such a process is the better practice to eliminate the risk of conscious or unconscious suggestion. Id. at 797, 906 N.E.2d at 311–312.


Subsection (b)(1)(D). This subsection is derived from *Commonwealth v. Walker*, 460 Mass. 590, 602–603, 953 N.E.2d 195, 207 (2011). Unless there are exigent circumstances, the police should not show a photographic array that contains fewer than five fillers for every suspect photograph. Id. at 603–604, 953 N.E.2d at 207–208.

Subsection (b)(2). This subsection is derived from *Commonwealth v. Warren*, 403 Mass. 137, 139, 526 N.E.2d 250, 251 (1988).


crime and the showup is one factor in determining whether the identification is inherently or unnecessarily suggestive, but such a delay does not make it per se inadmissible. Commonwealth v. Levasseur, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 629, 636, 592 N.E.2d 1350, 1355 (1990). The defendant may argue to the jury that as an alternative to a one-on-one showup, it would have been fairer to ask the witness to pick the defendant out of a group of similar individuals. Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 906, 908, 545 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (1989).


Subsection (e). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Cong Duc Le, 444 Mass. 431, 441–442, 828 N.E.2d 501, 509–510 (2005). Identification testimony must be accompanied by an accusation relevant to the issue before the court or some form of exclusionary statement.

“[A]n eyewitness’s out-of-court statement identifying a defendant as the person shooting at the eyewitness’s friend is part of the context of the identification, but a statement regarding the number of shots fired, the color of the firearm, and the defendant’s behavior after the shooting goes beyond the context of the identification of the shooter” (citation omitted).


Subsection (f). This subsection is derived from Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 495, 862 N.E.2d 341, 360 (2007). The judge must conclude the subject of the expert opinion is one on which the jurors need assistance, and that they will not be confused or misled by the testimony. The tests and circumstances on which the opinion rests must provide a basis for determining it is reliable. The testimony must be sufficiently tied to the facts of the case so that it will aid the jury. Commonwealth v. Santoli, 424 Mass. 837, 844, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1120 (1997).
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